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I. INTRODUCTION
The years 1873-1883 form perhaps the most im-
portant decade in United States constitutional history.'
In the course of deciding a steady stream of cases in-
volving the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
amendments, 2 the Supreme Court laid the basis for the
next century of the constitutional law of civil rights and
civil liberties. Unfortunately, it was a "dreadful dec-
ade." In decision after decision, the Court struck down
federal laws designed to protect civil rights and civil lib-
erties, and devitalized the new amendments.
These early civil rights decisions of the United
States Supreme Court provoked a significant response
in the African American community. Discussion of the
decisions, especially the Civil Rights Cases (1883), was a
major theme in the African American press of the time.4
t Law Clerk, Honorable James T. Giles, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. B.S., Oklahoma
State University, 1978; Ph.D., State University of New York at
Stony Brook, 1984; J.D., Yale Law School, 1992. The author
would like to thank Bruce Ackerman for his early encouragement
of this project, and Deborah Freedman for her constant editorial
help. This article is dedicated with special thanks and apprecia-
tion to the members of P.A.C.T. (Project for a Calculated Transi-
tion) at Green Haven prison, Stormville, New York.
1. The period opens with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873) and ends with the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2. Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
Section One of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
All three Amendments have enforcement clauses, which provide
that "Congress shall have power" to enforce the amendment by
means of "appropriate legislation."
3. See Louis BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, VOI. II, 126-
127 (1932).
4. By "African American press" or "Black press," I mean the
press edited by Blacks and intended for a primarily Black audi-
ence. See ROLAND WOLSELEY, THE BLACK PRESS U.S.A. 3-23
(1990). The papers of this period were usually published weekly,
were around four pages in length with five or six columns per
page. They were usually highly partisan, and reflected the person-
ality of their owners and editors. Subscriptions were usually one
or two dollars per year. PHILIP M. MABE, RACIAL IDEOLOGY IN THE
NEW ORLEANS PRESS, 1862-1877, at 29-30 (University of South-
western Louisiana Ph.D. 1977); GEORGETTA M. CAMPBELL, EXTANT
COLLECTIONS OF EARLY BLACK NEWSPAPERS: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO
THE BLACK PRESS, 1880-1915, at xiv (1981).
I rely primarily upon several papers which were rich in use-
ful material (and available on microfilm in the Yale University
library): Washington (D.C.) Bee, A.M.E. Christian Recorder (Phil-
adelphia, Pa.), Cleveland (Ohio) Gazette, Huntsville (Alabama)
Gazette, New York Globe, Petersburg (Virginia) Lancet, Arkansas
Mansion (Little Rock), Peoples Advocate (established in Alexan-
dria Virginia, later moved to Washington, D.C.). Invaluable re-
sources for identifying and locating Black newspapers include
CAMPBELL, EXTANT COLLECTIONS OF EARLY BLACK NEWSPAPERS,
supra; ARMISTEAD S. PRIDE, A REGISTER AND HISTORY OF NEGRO
NEWSPAPERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1827-1950 (Northwestern
University Ph.D. 1950). Works studying the Black press in partic-
ular times and places include: ALBERT KREILING, THE MAKING OF
RACIAL IDENTITIES IN THE BLACK PRESS: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF
RACEJOURNALISM IN CHICAGO, 1878-1929 (University of Illinois at
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The Black press reported mass meetings and speeches
which were held in response to the decisions and filled
its columns with letters, editorials and "exchanges" 5
discussing the reasoning and implications of the
decisions.
Black Americans responded to these civil rights
decisions on many different levels. The few favorable
decisions naturally provoked praise for the Court and
hopes for the future, while the unfavorable decisions
generated condemnation and fear. But African Ameri-
cans and their press responded to these decisions on a
much more complex level than mere cheering or hiss-
ing: they engaged the legal reasoning of the Supreme
Court majority and made legal arguments. In effect, Af-
rican Americans wrote and spoke dissents to the unfavor-
able opinions of the Supreme Court.6 Taken together,
these African American dissents define an alternative
Constitution, a Constitution which differs drastically
from the official version proclaimed by the Supreme
Court.
Since the African American dissenters' alternative
Constitution was rooted in the experience of oppres-
sion, it was often freed of the abstraction and formalism
of mainstream legalism. 7 From their position at "the
bottom"8 of American society, the dissenters in the Afri-
can American press could see more clearly the reality of
law in people's day-to-day lives. The dissenters in the
African American press called upon this experience and
constructed a "Constitution of Aspiration"9 that would
redress the real concerns of Black America.
For the most part, the constitutional questions
confronted by writers in the African American press
mirrored those which were addressed by the Supreme
Court. What is the appropriate role for judicial review
in a democratic society? In particular, what is the role of
judicial review over legislation passed to enforce the Re-
construction amendments? What is the proper relation-
ship between federal and state power? What are the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship?
What is the meaning of equal protection of the laws?
Does the Fourteenth Amendment have a state action re-
quirement? What rights may be protected under the
Thirteenth Amendment? Some of these issues were
"officially" settled more or less definitively by the
Supreme Court.' 0 Others survive today as realms of
legal contention.' I All of them were contested by writ-
ers in the African American press. 12
A thorough discussion of all the constitutional is-
sues addressed by the African American press as it re-
sponded to early Supreme Court civil rights decisions is
beyond the scope of this paper. 13 Instead I will focus on
one particular topic which was of great interest to writ-
Urbana Champaign Ph.D. 1973); MABE, RACIAL IDEOLOGY IN THE
NEW ORLEANS PRESS, supra; GEORGE SLAVENS, A HISTORY OF THE
MISSOURI NEGRO PRESS (University of Missouri, Columbia Ph.D.
1969); THE BLACK PRESS IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1979 (Henry Lewis
Suggs ed. 1983); GILBERT WILLIAMS, THE A.M.E. CHRISTIAN RE-
CORDER: A FORUM FOR THE SOCIAL IDEAS OF BLACK AMERICANS,
1854-1902 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Ph.D.
1979). THE BLACK PRESS, U.S.A., supra, presents a survey of the
Black press from its origins to the present day. THE BLACK PRESS,
1827-1890: THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY (M.E. Dann, ed.
1971) is a rich collection of reprinted articles from the Black
press. See also NEGRO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1850-
1920: REPRESENTATIVE TEXTS (H. Brotz ed. 1966). Other useful
articles from the nineteenth century Black press can be found in
RESPECT BLACK: THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF HENRY MCNEAL
TURNER (E.S. Redkey, ed. 1971); THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Philip Foner ed. 1975).
5. The Black press of this time usually published excerpts
from other papers (usually Black) around the country as part of a
program of "exchanges." Columns written by subscribers in
other cities were also common. Thus, the reported response to
civil rights decisions has a much broader geographic range than is
indicated by simple reference to the cities of publication given in
note 4.
6. They also wrote what were effectively concurrences to deci-
sions which they regarded as favorable. See infra Section I/I.A.
7. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7
(1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Catherine
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, (Parts I & 2), 7 SIGNS: J: OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y
515 (1982) & 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635
(1983).
8. See Looking to the Bottom, supra note 7.
9. See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The
Rights That Belong to Us All, " in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
LIFE 353-374 (David Thelen ed. 1988).
10. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Fourteenth
Amendment reaches only state action); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1880) (discriminatory action by a state judge, even in the ab-
sence of a discriminatory statute, is state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes). The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873), effectively gutted the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges
or immunities clause.
11. For example, although the Civil Rights Cases' holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment only reaches state action remains in-
tact, there has been a great deal of litigation concerning the exist-
ence, magnitude, and significance of a discriminatory actor's
connection to the state. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (court enforcement of racial covenant); Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953) (democratic primary run by private white club);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restau-
rant in city-owned parking lot refuses to serve Blacks); Bell v.
Maryland 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (state court enforcement of trespass
laws against black sit-in participants); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private club with state liquor license refuses
to serve Blacks); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) (discontinuance of service by privately owned utility li-
censed and regulated by a state public utilities commission);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (threats of arrest made to
union picketers by shopping mall owner); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982) (discharge or transfer to lower level of care of
Medicaid patients by privately owned nursing homes receiving re-
imbursement from the state for caring for Medicaid patients);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (discharge of employees
by private school whose income comes primarily from public
sources and which is regulated by public authorities).
12. One issue of modern importance which is conspicuously ab-
sent from the Black press is discussion of the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This may be partly an
artifact of the particular issues presented in cases during this pe-
riod, and partly due to the fact that the Due Process Clause had
not yet achieved the prominence it later acquired as a means of
securing "fundamental" rights against state interference. SeeJOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW 14-30 (1980).
13. For a much more detailed discussion than I can possibly
give here, see David Wycoff, Death Dealing Decisions: The African
American Press Responds to Early Supreme Court Civil Rights
Opinions (manuscript on file with the author).
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ers in the African American press, yet which barely fig-
ured on the surface of the Supreme Court's opinions:
the relationship of federal civil rights laws to what was
known as "class legislation." Class legislation is not
even a category for legal analysis in modern constitu-
tional law. But it figured heavily in the legal reasoning
of the nineteenth century, and it was bitterly divisive
among writers in the Black press.14
A discussion of legal theory in the Black press
must be grounded in an understanding of the main con-
stitutional issues facing the nation after the Civil War.
In the next section I will discuss the cases, from Slaugh-
ter-House 15 to the Civil Rights Cases, 16 which defined the
Supreme Court's civil rights jurisprudence from 1873-
1883. In Section III, I will describe the enormous re-
sponse that these decisions generated in the African
American press. Since the main doctrinal issue before
the Court in these cases was the impact of the Recon-
struction amendments on the federal system, I will next
discuss the Court's theory of federalism and the alterna-
tive ideas expressed in the African American press.
While the Court was attached to the old federal system,
and attempted to preserve as much of it as possible, Af-
rican Americans saw state power as a source of oppres-
sion, and were willing to jettison the old dual-federalist
system in favor of a strong nation-state. African Ameri-
can detachment from dual-federalist assumptions
brought other legal issues to the fore. In particular, the
role to be played by "class legislation" was an important
concern of writers in the Black press. In section V, I
discuss the concept of class legislation, and the way it
was used by some Republicans to justify a retreat from
the activist state which had made Reconstruction. Fi-
nally, in Section VI, I discuss attitudes toward class leg-
islation in the African American press.
The national legal landscape is bleak for progres-
14. Perhaps the closest analog to the nineteenth century debate
over class legislation and civil rights laws is the current debate
over affirmative action. Both debates are framed around concep-
tions of equal protection, and both are divisive within the African
American community. I will not address the modern debate over
affirmative action in any detail in the text, but will occasionally
mention parallels and cite to modern cases in the footnotes. On
the modern affirmative action debate, see, e.g., STEPHEN CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); GERTRUDE
EZORSKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(1991).
15. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
16. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17. The Civil Rights Bill Declared Unconstitutional: Opinions of Some
of Our Colored Exchanges, Petersburg Lancet, Oct. 27, 1883 (ex-
change from Louisville Bulletin). Different extracts from this ex-
change are reproduced in the Christian Recorder, Oct. 25, 1883
and the Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 3, 1883.
18. See especially, lIhen the First Quail Calls, supra note 7; Loohing to
the Bottom, supra note 7.
19. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, upheld in Prigg v.
Pennsy tvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) and Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215
(1847).
20. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, upheld in Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), and Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S.
506 (1859). Since all nine Justices wrote opinions in Dred Scott,
there has always been controversy as to what parts of the decision
were holdings and what parts were dicta. For a good discussion of
sive lawyers in 1992. It is my hope that by examining
the words and ideas of the dissenters in the African
American press of 100 years ago we can both rediscover
a lost jurisprudence of equality and sustain our own
hopes and ideals during a time when "[olne by one the
safeguards that were placed around the liberties of the
people are being torn down."' 17 The dissenters in the
Black press have more to offer to us than just an inspir-
ing example of resistance. By looking to their Constitu-
tion, progressive lawyers can find a source of insight and
values which will help us make choices today. As we
construct our own "Constitution of Aspiration," we can
make the move from critical theory to critical practice.18
II. THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENTS BECOME BUT HIDEOUS
MOCKERIES
African Americans' antebellum experience gave
them little reason to expect favorable decisions from the
United States Supreme Court. In the years before the
Civil War, the Court had interpreted a Constitution
whose text was ambiguous about slavery in ways that
threw the power of the national government behind the
institution. The Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Fugitive Slave Acts of 179319 and 1850.20 It struck
down state personal liberty laws that were designed to
protect fugitive slaves and to prevent free Blacks from
being kidnapped into slavery.2 1 It held that even free
Blacks were not citizens of the United States. 22 It held
that Congress was without power to prohibit slavery in
the territories.2 3 The Court's reasoning in Dred Scott
even led to speculation, by both pro- and anti-slavery
forces, that the free states might not be able to maintain
their bans on slavery. 24 In addition, the Court held that
the Bill of Rights was a limit only upon the federal gov-
ernment, 2 5 thus depriving anti-slavery agitators of Con-
the Dred Scott case and the Court's opinions, see, HAROLD HYMAN &
WILLIAM WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 172-192 (1982). One modern com-
mentator on the case has concluded that "As a matter of historical
reality .... the Taney opinion is, for all practical purposes, the
Dred Scott decision." Id. at 180 (quoting DON FEHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 333-334, 337 (1978) (emphasis in original)). This cer-
tainly seems to be the consensus in the Black press of 1873-83.
21. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
22. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
23. Id.
24. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 27 (1986); ERIC
FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 100-102 (1970); EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 20, at 192-197. Another Taney
opinion, Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 83 (1851) raised similar fears
six years before Dred Scott. See EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra, at
111-114.
25. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (fifth amend-
ment); Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469 (1833) (seventh amend-
ment); Permoli v. Municipatity No. 1, 44 U.S. 589 (1845) (first
amendment free exercise); No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note
24, at 22-24. For an illuminating discussion of Barron and its op-
ponents, including anti-slavery lawyers, see Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1198-1217 (1992).
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stitutional protection from hostile slave-state
governments.2 6
Thus, by the eve of the Civil War, the Court had
created a radically pro-slavery Constitution. 2 7 This pro-
slavery legal theory, complemented by the pro-slavery
political ideas of state sovereignty associated with John
C. Calhoun, 2 8 envisioned a national government that
was not just a neutral bystander, but an active protector
and even promoter of slavery. 29
Before the war, African Americans "had no rights
the white man was bound to respect."3 0 But the war
and its constitutional aftermath had brought about "a
change - a great change," 3' which gave African Ameri-
cans new cause for hope. African Americans had "been
made citizens." 3 2 The United States thus emerged from
the Civil War with the potential to start anew as a "pur-
fled Republic," s3 3 free of the taint of slavery and caste.3 4
Appropriately, the new era began with a renewed Court,
dominated by appointees of the Republican party which
had led the fight for Union and against slavery.3 5
Ironically, the Supreme Court first confronted the
implications of the new-modeled Constitution in a case
that did not involve the rights of the African Americans
who had so recently been "clothed in full citizenship. ' 3 6
Instead, the Slaughter-House Cases37 addressed the claims
of white butchers in Louisiana who claimed that a state
law giving a single corporation a monopoly over the
slaughter of livestock condemned them to involuntary
servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and
denied to them the privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.38
In an opinion written by the extreme pro-slavery Justice
Daniels of Virginia, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the
first amendment's right of petition against the federal government,
at a time when the right to petition was one of the primary weap-
ons of the anti-slavery movement and one of the central issues
dividing pro and anti-slavery forces. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266
(1845). See Eric Schnapper, "Libelous" Petitions for Redress of Griev-
ances - Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303,
306 n.27 (1989).
26. Southern States reacted to a rising tide of abolitionist senti-
ment in the 1830s by passing laws restricting freedom of speech
and press, and requiring postmasters to search the mail for aboli-
tionist literature. The right of the Southern States to ban aboli-
tionist publications from the mail was upheld by AndrewJackson's
postmaster general. No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at
30-31.
27. Garrisonian abolitionists accepted a pro-slavery interpreta-
tion of the Constitution with a vengeance, denounced the Consti-
tution as a "covenant with death" and abjured all political activity.
However, many "political abolitionists" rejected the Garrisonian's
moral purity in favor of a more pragmatic approach to anti-slavery
work that included electoral politics. This political activity was
complemented by the development of abolitionist legal theories
that used the language (and silences) of the Constitutional text to
construct an anti-slavery Constitutionalism. See e.g., FREE SOIL,
FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note 24, at 73-102; WALDO E. MAR-
TIN,JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 37-38 (1984); ROBERT
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
154-58 (1975); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 43-56
(1965); No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 42-48.
28. See, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAw, supra note 20, at 15-17,
135-140, 211-213.
29. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 426 (1857) ("The
government of the United States had no right to interfere [with
the slave states] for any other purpose but that of protecting the
rights of the [slave] owner ...."); Id. at 452 ("The only power
conferred [Ion Congress in the territories] is the power coupled
with the duty of guarding and protecting the [slave] owner in his
rights."); EQUALJUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 20, at 183-189.
30. Freedom in the United States a Mockery, Cleveland Gazette, Dec.
15, 1883 at I (call for a state convention of Black men, to be held
in Columbus, Ohio, on December 26, 1883). The words, of
course, echo the infamous statement of Justice Taney in Dred Scott:
At the time of the founding, according to Taney, African Ameri-
cans "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."
60 U.S. at 407.
31. Freedom in the United States a lockey, Cleveland Gazette, Dec.
15, 1883at 1.
32. Id. Although the author believed this to be "a great
change," he or she recognized the limitations of formal recogni-
tion of citizenship:
We have been made citizens; we have been tendered better
recognition; yet when the proud Caucasian speaks of our free
country, we as colored men cannot join in the chorus.The young men of this country must arise as one man
and in thunder tones demand that the Constitution be car-
ried out to a letter, demand that our rights secured to us by
the Constitution be a reality, not the mere word.
See also, Essence and Practice of Law, New York Globe, July 7, 1883
(speech given by Mr. R.S. Smith, Washington correspondent of
the Globe at Howard Law School commencement):
By the last amendments to the Constitution, all men
were made full-pledged citizens in the eyes of the law. But
what are the practices with regard to these acts? May not a
citizen be refused the most vital provisions of these acts
within the very precincts of the capital without attracting
any noticeable comment? The truth is, our ability to create
law has grown with our growth, but our power or disposi-
tion to enforce it has not strengthened with our strength. It
were far better never to have added amendments to the
Constitution, only to be defied and ignored. Each article,
each section, each clause, each word of that magna charter
of human rights should be held sacred and inviolable; and
just so far forth as any part of it is openly disregarded, does
the whole lose its potency and effect.
33. DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE
RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862-1872, at 72-73 (1981) (quoting
Thaddeus Stevens).
34. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, New York
Globe, Nov. 24, 1883 at 2 ("[W]e had a great war and among the
things it forever doomed to the devil was colorphobia in the
Constitution.").
35. The infamous ChiefJustice Taney died in 1864. By 1872,
only one Justice, Clifford, had been appointed by a Democrat
(Buchanan). Five Justices (Chase, Swayne, Davis, Field, Miller)
had been appointed by Lincoln, and three (Bradley, Hunt, Strong)
by Grant. By 1883, no Democratic appointees remained on the
Court. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW B2-B3 (1 th ed.
1985).
36. The Rights And Wrongs of the Colored People, Christian Re-
corder, November 8, 1883 at 2 (article reprinted from the Cincin-
nati Enquirer). The Christian Recorder, published in Philadelphia
since 1843, was the official organ of the African Methodist Episco-
pal Church. Its editor in 1883 was the Reverend B.T. Tanner.
ROGER LANE, WILLIAM DORSEY'S PHILADELPHIA AND OURS: ON THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF THE BLACK CITY IN AMERICA 6, 264 (1991).
For a more in depth study of the Recorder, see G.A. WILLIAMS,
THE A.M.E. CHRISTIAN RECORDER: A FORUM FOR THE SOCIAL IDEAS
OF BLACK AMERICANS, 1854-1902 (University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign Ph.D. 1979).
37. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
38. In one sense, the fact that white butchers were the plaintiffs
in this case was not at all ironic. The butchers who challenged the
monopoly were small entrepreneurs, and "exemplars of the 'free
labor system' " which had animated Republican ideology before
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Justice Miller's opinion for the .Court drastically
narrowed the protection provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment by claiming that the amendment distin-
guished sharply between United States citizenship and
state citizenship.' 1 The Fourteenth Amendment's privi-
leges and immunities clause, Miller argued, brought
only those "privileges and immunities" of national citi-
zenship under the protection of the national govern-
ment. Privileges and immunities of state citizenship
would be left to the state to protect, as they had been
before the war.4 ° This interpretation was not necessar-
ily destructive of the nation's power to protect funda-
mental rights. If most rights were identified as
privileges or immunities of national citizenship, .with a
few residual rights entrusted to state protection, the
ability of the federal government to protect its citizens
would not have been seriously impaired. However, the
Slaughter-House Court took exactly the opposite ap-
proach. The Court identified the privileges and immu-
nities of state citizenship broadly, as "nearly every civil
right for the establishment and protection of which or-
ganized government is instituted."14 ' The privileges and
immunities of United States citizenship, on the other
hand, were held to be a narrow class of rights which
"owe their existence to the Federal government, its na-
tional character, its Constitution, or its laws." 4 2
With its narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Slaughter-
House Court took what was in retrospect the first step
toward gutting the national protection of civil rights and
civil liberties. However, the Court left some room for
optimism when it indicated that it might not take such a
narrow view when the rights of African Americans were
the subject of litigation, since the "one pervading pur-
pose" of the Reconstruction Amendments was "the
freedom of the slave race."143 Robert Brown Elliott, an
African American Congressman from South Carolina,44
expressed this optimistic reading in 1874 when he said
that the Slaughter-House Court "declared [the Recon-
struction Amendments] to have as their all-pervading
design and end the security of the recently enslaved
race, not only their nominal freedom, but their com-
plete protection from those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over them."'4 5 Elliott recalled the
"shame and humiliation" that the Court brought upon
itself and the country in the era of Dred Scott, but con-
cluded that "those days are past. The Supreme Court of
today is a tribunal as true to freedom as any department
of this government."
4 6
Over the course of the following decade, the
the Civil War. William Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor
and the Law in the GuildedAge, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 767, 776 (1985).
On free labor ideology generally, see FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR,
FREE MEN, supra note 24. For further discussion of the role played
by free labor ideology in the Supreme Court's early decisions, see
in/ra Section V.
39. 83 U.S at 73-74.
40. Id. at 74-75.
41. Id. at 76.
42. Id. at 79. Although the Court's opinion narrowed the Four-
teenth Amendment's privileges or immunities clause so drastically
that it has been of little use to litigators since, see, e.g., DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST, supra note 12, at 22-30, the opinion is full of ambi-
guities which could generate a much broader reading. As I have
mentioned in the text, the Court's distinction between national
and state citizenship would not greatly impair the national protec-
tion of rights if the rights associated with national citizenship are
read broadly. Similarly the Court's statement that the privileges
and immunities of United States citizenship are those which "owe
their existence to the Federal government, its national character,
its Constitution, or its laws," is also subject to a broad reading.
For example, if the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are identified
as rights which "owe their existence to the .... Constitution,"
Miller's statement would require that those rights be protected
against the states. However, it is clear from the rest of the opin-
ion, and from the Court's subsequent cases, that such a reading
was not what the Slaughter-House majority had in mind. The rights
which Miller did identify as privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship included: the right of all citizens to come to the
seat of government in Washington, D.C; access to seaports; the
right to federal protection "on the high seas or within the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign government"; the writ of habeas corpus; and, the.
"right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of griev-
ances." 83 U.S. at 79. In a later decision the Court declared that
the last of these rights was only protected when the assembly was
for the purpose of petitioning the federal government. 'nited
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
43. The "one pervading purpose" of the Reconstruction
Amendments was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly made freeman and citizen from the oppression of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." Slaughter-
House, 83 US. 36, 71 (1873).
44. Robert Brown Elliott, 1842-1884, claimed that he was born
free in Boston, educated in Jamaica and England, where he gradu-
ated from Eton with honors in 1859 and then studied law, and
returned to the United States in 1861 to join the Union Army.
This account of his life was accepted by contemporaries and most
historians. However, a recent biographer of Elliott argues that he
was actually born in England, trained as a typesetter, and served
in the Royal Navy. He might have jumped ship in Boston in 1866
or 1867- Whatever his origins, it is clear that "[diuring the almost
ten years of Radical rule in South Carolina, Elliott emerged as the
major black.spokesman in a state unsurpassed in the quantity and
quality of its major black leaders." Howard N. Rabinowitz, Three
Reconstruction Leaders: Blanche K. Bruce, Robert Brown Elliott, and Hol-
land Thompson, in BLACK LEADERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
191, 202 (Leon Litwack & August Meier, eds. 1988).
Elliott was admitted to the South Carolina bar, and was a
member to the South Carolina House of Representatives from
July 1868 to October 1870. He served as Assistant Adjutant gen-
eral for South Carolina from 1869-71. He was elected to the
United States House of Representatives from the Third District of
South Carolina. He was reelected once, but resigned on Novem-
ber 1, 1874 and returned to the South Carolina House, where he
became Speaker. For more about Elliott, see Rabinowitz, supra;
PEGGY LAMSON, THE GLORIOUS FAILURE: BLACK CONGRESSMAN
ROBERT BROWN ELLIOTr AND THE RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH CAR-
OLINA (1973).
45. CONG. REC., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 408 (1874), reprinted in
THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA: MAJOR SPEECHES BY NEGROES IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1797-1971, at 389 (Philip Foner ed. 1972).
This was part of a speech given by Congressman Elliott in the
United States House of Representatives on January 6, 1874. The
speech was given in favor of the bill that was to become the Civil
Rights Act of 1875. Elliott's words closely follow the language of
Justice Miller's Slaughter-House opinion, quoted supra in note 43.
46. CONG. REC., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1874), reprinted in
VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 45, at 389. It is possible that
Elliott's optimism about the Court was at least partially a debater's
move, since he was trying to convince the House that the Slaughter-
House opinion did not impugn the Constitutionality of the bill that
was to become Sumner's Civil Rights Act of 1875.
5
Wycoff: LEGISLATION ESPECIALLY FOR THE NEGRO? THE BLACK PRESS RESPONDS TO
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1992
Legislation Especially For The Negro?
Supreme Court shattered any early optimism that its
reading of the Reconstruction amendments would be
more generous when the rights of African Americans
were at stake.4 7 While the Court continued to make
ringing pronouncements about the nation's commit-
ment to African American equality, 48 its decisions bru-
tally contradicted its occasional bursts of inspiring.
rhetoric. The Court struck down portions of an 1870
Act designed to protect African American voting
rights. 4 9- lit held that the right to bear arms, freedom of
assembly, and the right to jury trial were not privileges
or immunities of United States citizenship. 50 The Court'
held that a Louisiana statute forbidding discrimination on
public carriers was an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce. 51 In a series of decisions, the Court af-
firmed the rights of African Americans to serve on state
juries without discrimination, 52 but restricted federal
supervision of state trials so severely that its promises
became illusory. 5 3
The nightmarish quality of the years 1873-83, as
Reconstruction was smashed and the Supreme Court
gutted the possibility of effective enforcement of civil
rights,..was captured by the Petersburg Lancet in 1883:
"One by one [the Reconstruction enactments] are ex-
punged [from the statute books ]. One by one the safe-
guards that were placed around the liberties of the
people are being torn down, and they are left to the
tender mercies of unrelenting prejudice."'54 In the
hands of the United States Supreme Court, "the 14th
and 15th amendments [had] become but hideous
mockeries." 5 5
The final blows were struck by the Supreme Court
10 years after the Slaughter-House majority declared that
the "one pervading purpose ' 56 of the Reconstruction
Amendments was African American liberation. In
United-States v. Harris,57 decided in January of 1883, the
Court declared the criminal conspiracy section of the
1871 Ku Klux Klan Act 58 to be unconstitutional, effec-
47. For a concise summary of some of the major cases from
1873-83, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION and Black America's Struggle for
Equality 56-66 (1976). For a more detailed discussion, see CHARLES
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, part 1, at
1301-88 (1971); Id., part 2, at 221-89, 436-97, 550-88 (1987).
48. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880)
(repeating the assertion of Slaughter-House, supra note 43, about
the "one pervading purpose" of the Reconstruction
amendments).
49. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
50. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (arms and as-
sembly); Valker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (jury trial). The
Court held that the rights spelled out in the Bill of Rights were not
among the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship.
They were simply limitations on Congressional power.
Cruikshank arose from the infamous Colfax massacre.
Ninety-eight whites were indicted in federal court after violently
breaking up a meeting of African Americans. Over sixty Blacks
were killed. Only 9 of the whites were actually brought to trial,
and three were convicted in Louisiana federal court under the En-
forcement Act of May 31, 1870. The Supreme Court reversed the
convictions, arguing that such acts by private individuals could be
a federal crime only if the disrupted meeting had an object con-
nected with national citizenship. .Since the meeting was convened
to discuss state elections, it was beyond the protection of the fed-
eral government. RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, part 2, supra
note 47, at 261-76; No STATE SHAkLL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at
170, 178; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1867, at 437 (1988).
Ironically, the Court's refusal to apply the Bill of Rights to
the states in lW'alker v. Sauvinet actually helped an African American
litigant. Walker. (white) had denied equal accommodations to
Sauvinet (Black), in violation of state law. Sauvinet sued in state
court. When the jury failed to agree on a verdict, the trial judge,
following state law, decided in favor of Sauvinet. Defendant
Walker appealed, claiming that his Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial had been violated. The United States Supreme Court
held that this right applied only to trials in federal courts. No
STATE SHALL. ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 179.
51. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878). Hall was the (white) op-
erator of a steamboat between New Orleans and Vicksburg. He
denied Mrs. DeCuir, a woman of color, the use of cabins which he
reserved for whites only. This was a violation of Louisiana's Re-
construction Constitution, which barred discrimination on public
conveyances. Mrs. DeCuir won in the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Hall appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which over-
turned the state decision, declaring the law an unconstitutional
invasion by the state of the 'federal government's power to regu-
late interstate commerce.
52. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (statute confin-
ing jury service to whites unconstitutional); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1880) (state judge who excluded African Americans
from jury lists may be prosecuted under Civil Rights Act of 1875).
53. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880) (narrow interpretation
of federal statute providing for removal of cases from state to fed-
eral court). The editors of the New York Globe predicted that Rives
would make the promises of Strauder and Ex parte Virginia illusory.
Civil Rights Laws, New York Globe, Feb. 3, 1883 at 2. Modern
scholars have confirmed the accuracy of the Globe's prediction. See,
e.g., C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF
CHARACTER 146-47 (1963) (After Rives, "the Negro's right to free-
dom in the selection of juries became meaningless. All that was
necessary to keep Negroes off juries was the avoidance of open,
public discrimination."). For an in depth discussion of the jury
cases and their implications, see Benno Schmidt,Juries, Jurisdiction,
and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia,
61 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1983).
54. The Civil Rights Bill Declared Unconstitutional.- Opinions of Some
of Our Colored Exchanges, Petersburg Lancet, Oct. 27, 1883 (ex-
change from Louisville Bulletin). Different extracts from this ex-
change are reproduced in the Christian Recorder, Oct. 25, 1883
and the Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 3, 1883.
55. The Nashville Convention, Colored Tribune, April 1, 1876 (an-
nouncing a national convention of Black men to be held in Nash-
ville, Tennessee). On the role played by conventions in
galvanizing African American political participation after the war,
see'RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 110-119; W.E.B. Du Bois,
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 230-235, 361-
367 (1962). For a collection of speeches and discussions from
these conventions, see PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK NATIONAL AND
STATE CONVENTIONS, 1865-1900 (Philip Foner & George Walker
eds. 1,986).
56. 83 U.S. at 71.
57." 106 U.S. 629 (1883). Justice Woods wrote the opinion for a
unanimous Court. Harris arose from a racist atrocity in Tennes-
see. Four African Americans were taken from a deputy sheriff by a
white lynch mob and beaten so brutally that one later died.
58. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. This Act was also
known as the Force Act of 1871. The 'civil counterpart of the
criminal conspiracy section struck down by the Court in Harris sur-
vives today as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). After a long period of dor-
mancy, § 1985(3) was given new life in 1971, when the Supreme
Court held that it reached private racist conspiracies. Giffin v.
Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). The Griffin Court recognized that
Harris seemed to imply the unconstitutionality of § 1985(3), since
the language of the provision struck down in Harris is basically the
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tively putting lynching outside the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. On October 15, 1883, in the Civil Rights
Cases,51 the Court struck down the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Sumner Act, 60 which had
prohibited private acts of racial discrimination in thea-
tres, inns, public conveyances and other places of public
amusement. 6 t In both cases the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected African Americans
only from discrimination by the state or its agents.6 2
While the Court recognized that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment authorizes legislation reaching private action, and
"clothes congress with the power to pass all laws neces-
sary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery," 63 the Amendment was held not to authorize
the legislation at issue. The vast majority of everyday
"private" acts of oppression could not be penalized by
federal criminal or civil law. African Americans would
have to look to the states for the protection of the vast
majority of their rights.
III. EARNESTLY DISCUSSING THE DECISIONS
The cases of 1883 came "like an avalanche, carry-
same as the language of § 1985(3) apart from the substitution of
criminal for civil penalties. The Griffin Court argued that "sever-
ability rules" of statutory construction had changed since Harris
was decided, and indicated that Harris might have been decided
differently under modern rules of statutory construction. Griffin,
403 U.S. at 104-105.
59. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
60. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
61. These public accommodations provisions of the 1875 Act
carried both civil and criminal penalties. Four of the five cases
involved were criminal indictments. One was a civil suit.
62. Although the state action requirement had been voiced in
several earlier opinions, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-
47 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1876), it received its fullest ex-
position in Harris and especially in the Civil Rights Cases.
Soon after Harris was handed down, the editors of the New
York Globe predicted that the Court would rule as it did in the Civil
Rights Cases. What May Grow Out of the Ku-Klux Decision, New York
Globe, Feb. 3, 1883 at 2 (exchange from New York Herald); States
Rights Heresy, New York Globe, March 10, 1883 ("Already I hear
discussed by those who received [Harris] gladly, the right to dis-
criminate against the Negroes in theatres and Railroad cars, etc.,
to a greater extent than now exists, under the plea that the State
has sole jurisdiction of such matters, and that the Civil Rights Bill
is unconstitutional.").
63. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
64. Opinions of the Press, Christian Recorder, Oct. 25, 1883 at 2
(exchange from Detroit Plaindealer).
65. The Civil Rights Decision, New York Globe, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2,
partially reprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at
167-68. See also, Frederick Douglass, Speech at the Civil Rights lass-
.Meeting Held at Lincoln Hall, October 22, 1883, in 4 LIFE AND WRIT-
INGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 392, 393 ("We have
been, as a class, grievously wounded, wounded in the house of our
friends, and this wound is too deep and too painful for ordinary
measured speech. . . . It makes us feel as if someone were stamp-
ing upon the graves of our mothers, or desecrating our sacred
temples of worship."). This meeting in Lincoln Hall was reported
in the Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 27, 1883.
66. The Civil Rights Cases received the most attention in the
sources I have examined. Harris received significantly less atten-
tion, and a third case decided the same year, Pace v. Alabama, 106
U.S. 583 (1883), even less. This may be at least partially an arti-
ing [African Americans'] fondest hopes down the 'hill of
despair,' and burying them.'6 4 Five days after Justice
Bradley read his Civil Rights Cases opinion from the
Bench, the New York Globe proclaimed
The colored people of the United States feel today
as if they had been baptized in ice-water. From
Maine to Florida they are earnestly discussing the
decision of the Supreme Court declaring the Civil
Rights Law to be unconstitutional. Public meet-
ings are being projected far and wide to give ex-
pression to the common feeling of disappointment
and apprehension for the future.6 5
The decisions, especially the Civil Rights Cases, pro-
voked an enormous response in the African American
community and its press. 66 Discussions, debates, and
meetings about the decisions took place all over the
country, and the Civil Rights Cases opinion was "the prin-
ciple topic of discussion in all circles, whether social,
religious or political."16 7 A mass meeting in Washington
D.C.'s Lincoln Hall to discuss the Civil Rights decision
was "the largest meeting ever gathered in a Washington
fact of which sources have survived, but my impression is that the
Civil Rights Cases aroused more concern than previous decisions.
Pace v. Alabama arose in 1881 when, an African American
man, Tony Pace, and a white woman, Mary Cox, were convicted of
"living together in a state of adultery or fornication" and sen-
tenced under an Alabama statute that criminalized interracial mar-
riage and provided much higher penalties for interracial adultery
and fornication than it did for intra-racial adultery and fornica-
tion. Pace brought the case to the United States Supreme Court
on a writ of error, pleading that the statute violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Supreme
Court rejected Pace's argument and upheld the statute, arguing
that blacks and whites were punished equally by the law.
Although Pace received less attention than the other two
cases, it provoked several articles in the New York Globe. Writers
in the Globe assailed Pace for concentrating on formal equal protec-
tion analysis, and ignoring the fact that marriage is a fundamental
right. See Civil Rights Laws, New York Globe, Feb. 3, 1883; The
Southern Problem, New York Globe, March 3, 1883. Pace was over-
ruled in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
67. Our IVashington Correspondent's Views On the Recent Decision, Pe-
tersburg Lancet, Nov. 10, 1883 at 2. See also, Petersburg Lancet,
Nov. 3, 1883 at 2 (short reports of mass meetings in Indianapolis,
San Francisco, and Washington); New York Globe, Nov. 3, 1883
(announcing that the Globe office had been flooded with mail
about the Civil Rights Cases, and apologizing for not being able to
print all of it); The Hartford Convention: Colored Citizens of Connecticut
Discussing the Civil Rights Question and Other Important Topics, New
York Globe, Jan. 5, 1884 at 1; The Recent Decision, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 (by "Will") ("The recent decision ... has
excited a great deal of comment. To most persons who have
given the bill any study, and compared its action with the provi-
sions of the Constitution, the decision of the Court was no matter
of surprise."); Meeting on the Civil Rights Decision, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2; (announcing an upcoming meeting to
be held at Bethel Church on November 8); Peoples Advocate,
Nov. 10, 1883 at 2 ("We cannot begin to publish one-half of the
opinions given by colored men all over the country on "The Civil
Rights" decision."); Civil Rights, Cleveland Gazette, Dec. 1, 1883
at 4 (by Mrs. F.W. Corbin) ("Very little, except the all absorbing
topic of the Civil Rights decisions can occupy the minds of the
colored people of the United States at present. . . . What we want
now is not merely expressing opinions and forming resolutions, we
must stand up like men for our rights.") (emphasis in original);
Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 3, 1883 at
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Hall.""" "There were over 2,000 persons inside the
doors and double that number turned reluctantly
away.-11 1 An indignation meeting held in a small town
in Texas so frightened the white authorities that the
state militia was called out.7 Editors of African Ameri-
can newspapers apologized to their readers that they
could not "begin to publish one-half of the opinions
given by colored men all over the country on 'The Civil
Rights' decision." '71 The decision was the dominant
news story in the African American press for at least a
month after it was handed down on October 15, 1883.72
Even six years later, the Civil Rights Cases still
haunted African Methodist Episcopal Bishop Henry Mc-
Neal Turner.73 When asked, in 1889, to write an essay
about the decision for the New York Voice, Bishop Tur-
ner responded:
It is to me a matter of. . . wonder . . . to find a
single, solitary individual who belongs in the
United States, or who has been here for any con-
siderable time, unacquainted with those famous
FIVE DEATH DEALING DECISIONS. Indeed
sir, those decisions have had, since ... the day of
their pronouncement, more of my study than any
other civil subject.74
I (exchange from Detroit Plaindealer) ("The decision ... causes
almost universal disapproval of the people, both white and
colored, in Detroit."); Bad Blunders, Christian Recorder, Nov. 15,
1883 at I (Rev. I.F. Aldridge criticizes the decision, then goes on
to discuss questions of church (A.M.E.) doctrine.).
The following headlines illustrate the extent to which dis-
cussion of the Civil Rights Cases infused everyday life:
MOBILE
The Civil Righecion. Business
Looking Up. Other Notes of Interest.
Huntsville Gazette, Nov. 3, 1883 (incorrectly dated Oct. 27, 1883
on inner pages) (a regular column that reported on the activities
of the African American community in Mobile, Alabama. The au-
thor ("ONUS") described his feelings about the decision, then
went on to describe the prosperous business atmosphere in
Mobile.);
GLEANINGS FROM COLUMBUS
1Political - Civil Rights - Society Gossip -
A Marriage
Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2.
68. Civil Rights Decision: An Immense Mass Meeting of the Colored Cit-
izens and Their Friends at Lincoln Hall, Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 27,
1883 at 1.
69. Id. Another mass meeting was reported in Civil Rights: The
Harmonious and Enthusiastic Mass Meeting at Halcyon Hall Last Monday
Evening, Cleveland Gazette, Nov. 3, 1883 at 2 ("Quite a crowd of
ladies and gentlemen assembled ... to take some action in regard
to, and hear discussed the recent infamous decisions of the
Supreme Court .... ).
70. This story was reported in a number of papers. See Arkan-
sas Mansion, Nov. 17, 1883 (exchange from the Topeka (Kansas)
Tribune); Huntsville Gazette, Nov. 3, 1883 (incorrectly dated as
October 27 on inner pages); The Colored People of Texas: White Folks
Fearfully Frightened by a Negro Meeting, Petersburg Lancet, Nov. 24,
1883 at 3 (from a report in the Conservator). The details of what
happened differ slightly from paper to paper, but the basic idea is
conveyed by the Lancet:
The ridiculous scare in Texas Monday shows what cowards
the Texan white people are. The colored people of a small
interior town held an indignation meeting. During their de-
liberations, some fresh white man interfered and got a bat
in the mouth for his pains. Another took sides with him and
received the same treatment. As the trouble grew in pro-
portions it frightened a poor fool who holds the position of
Justice of the Peace. He ... telegraphed the governor that
the colored people were in arms against the whites and
asked immediate help. The governor, another coward....
called out soldiers and volunteers ... , had the whole state
in a condition of fever excitement . . . and made prepara-
tions for warfare costing more than $8,000. The next day
help was sent to the town when no trace of trouble was to
be seen. . . . While the people of the town slumbered and
slept, the excited governor, the militia and the newspaper
correspondents were scared half to death and made fools of
themselves generally.
71. Peoples Advocate, Nov 10, 1883 at 2. See also, New York
Globe, Nov. 3, 1883, cited supra in note 67.
72. It is revealing to contrast this reaction in the African Ameri-
can community and press to the following report in a white paper:
"The calm with which the country receives the news shows how
completely the extravagant expectations ... of the war have died
out." New York Evening Post, Oct. 16, 1883 (quoted in C. VANN
WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877
AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 245 (1966)). For a more exten-
sive quote from this article, which also appeared in the New York
Nation, see RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, part 2, supra note 47,
at 571-72. For a sampling of white newspapers' reactions to the
Civil Rights Cases, see id. at 568-83. Fairman concluded from his
survey of the white press that "the consensus at the time was that
the decision was right." Id. at 588. This is certainly not true of the
Black press. Fairman's appraisal of the response in the African
American community is unfair: "Black leaders, bitterly disap-
pointed, spoke from a sense of justice, with scant regard to the
text of the Constitution." Id. In fact, writers in the Black press
were often highly concerned with "the text of the Constitution,"
and gave sophisticated legal arguments.
73. Turner, 1834-1915, is considered to be one of the pillars of
the African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church. He was born
free in South Carolina, but worked alongside slaves in the cotton
fields. After learning to read and write he joined the A.M.E.
church and was assigned to the A.M.E. mission in Baltimore,
where he studied Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and theology. He be-
came a deacon in the church in 1860, and an elder two years later.
During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln appointed Turner as the
first Black Army chaplain. After the war Turner moved to Georgia
to work for the Freedmen's Bureau, and then travelled through-
out the South organizing for the Church, which soon became a
center for Black political life. Turner was elected to the Georgia
state constitutional convention in 1867, and was one of thirty-two
African American elected to the state legislature in 1868. As Re-
construction was crushed by white Southern resistance, Turner
retired from active political life in the early 1870s and turned full-
time to his church duties, where he began to develop a black the-
ology of liberation. He was elected to the bishopric in 1880.
These few details do not begin to indicate the richness and impor-
tance of Turner's life. SeeJohn Dittmer, The Education of Henry Mc-
Neal Turner, in BLACK LEADERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, suipra
note 44, at 253-272; RESPECT BLACK, supra note 4.
74. Essay by Henry McNeal Turner, written in 1889 for publica-
tion in the New York Voice (upper case letters in original). Turner
reprinted the essay in his 1893 pamphlet, The Barbarous Decision of
the Supreme Court Declaring the Civil Rights Act 'uconstitutional, and
again in an 1896 pamphlet titled The Black Man's Doom. See RE-
SPECT BLACK, supra note 4, at 63-69. The editors of the New York
Voice had asked Turner to briefly refer to the Civil Rights Decision.
Turner responded: "You bid me in my reply to observe brevity.
Shortness and conciseness seem to be the ever present rule when
the Negro and his case is under treatment." RESPECT BLACK,
supra.
The reference to "five" decisions is due to the fact that the
Civil Rights Cases involved five cases, from Kansas, California, New
York, Missouri, and Tennessee.
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These "death dealing decisions" left African Americans
with the feeling that they had "been abandoned by the
government and left to the laws of nature." 75 The de-
spair and anger engendered by the decisions was cap-
tured by the New York Globe when it proclaimed: "There
is no law in the United States for the Negro. The whole
thing is a beggarly farce." 76 "We are aliens in our na-
tive.land." 77
The Supreme Court's destruction of civil rights
legislation created a painful dilemma for the African
American community. While the Court's decisions re-
linquished the law to oppression, African Americans'
earlier experience during Reconstruction showed them
that law, when held to its promises, could also be a
weapon of liberation. As Professor Mari Matsuda has
written, those who have been excluded by the dominant
culture have learned to approach this dilemma "with
characteristic duality." They are "aware of the historical
abuse of law to sustain existing conditions of domina-
tion," but at the same time they "have embraced legal-
ism as a tool of necessity, making legal consciousness
their own in order to attack injustice." 78
Professor Matsuda has eloquently expressed the
dualist response:
There are times to stand outside the courtroom
door and say "this procedure is a farce, the legal
system is corrupt, justice will never prevail in this
land as long as privilege rules in the Courtroom."
There are times to stand inside the courtroom and
say "this is a nation of laws, laws recognizing fun-
damental values of rights, equality and per-
sonhood." Sometimes... there is a need to make
both speeches' in one day.79
Both types of responses appear in the African American
press. Sometimes writers "stand outside the courtroom
door" and heap scorn upon the Court and the nation
which could tolerate so many years of oppression.
Sometimes they "stand inside the courtroom" and "and
in thunder tones demand that the Constitution be car-
ried out to a letter."8 0 Often, both approaches appear
in the same speech or article.
Perhaps the most powerful voice of the African
Americans standing "outside the courtroom door" was
that of Reverend Henry McNeal Turner. Turner be-
lieved that
the [Civil Rights] decision merits no moderate talk;
it should be branded, battle-axed, sawed, cut and
carved with the most bitter epithets and blistering
denunciations that words can express. We want
fire-eaters now a thousand times [more] than we
do conservatives. The nation deserves and will re-
ceive, if it lets that decision stand, the hiss of man,
the curse of God, and the ridicule of the ages. 8 1
For Turner, the Court's decisions "absolve[d] alle-
giance of the negro to the United States."8 2 Moreover:
"If the decision is correct, the United States constitution
is a dirty rag, a cheat, a libel, and ought to be spit upon
by every negro in the land."'8 3 Turner went so far as to
say "the negro hereafter who will enlist in the armies of
the government, or swear to defend the United States
Constitution ought to be hung by the neck.''84
Most writers in the African American press were
not quite as biting as Turner in their attacks on the
Court or. the Constitution.85 But it was a common feel-
ing that the Court "deserve[d] the contempt of our race
and all fair-minded persons of every race." 8 6 The deliv-
75. Hon. Frederick Douglass: His Earnest and Eloquent Address,
Cleveland Gazette, Nov. 24, 1883 at I (speech of Frederick
Douglass to the National Convention of Colored Men at, L6uis-
ville, Kentucky (part 2 of 2)).
76. The Ku-Klux Law, New York Globe, Jan. 27, 1883 at 2 (re-
sponse to United States v. Harris). See also, Is There Any Law for the
Negro?, New York Globe, Feb. 17, 1883 (by Globe editor T.
Thomas Fortune), partially reprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-
1890, supra note 4, at 163-64; Hon. Frederick Douglass: His Earnest
and Eloquent Address, Cleveland Gazette, Nov. 24, 1883 (speech of
Frederick Douglass to the National Convention of Colored Men at
Louisville, Kentucky (part 2 of'2)) ("So far as they [African Ameri-
cans in the South] are concerned, there is no Government or Con-
stitution of the United States.").
77. The Civil Rights Decision, New York Globe, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2,
partially reprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at
167-68. See also, Civil Rights Laws, New York Globe, Feb. 3, 1883 at
2 ("He is an alien in his native land.").
78. Il'hen the First Quail Calls, supra note 7, at 8.
79. Id. (describing trial of Angela Davis).
80. Freedom'in the United States a Mockery, Cleveland Gazette, Dec.
15, 1883 at 1 (call for a state convention of Black men, to be held
in Columbus, Ohio, on December 26, 1883).
81. Christian Recorder, Dec. 13, 1883 at I (open letter from
Henry McNeal Turner). This open letter is addressed to Profes-
sor B.K. Sampson (a Black man, born free in North Carolina, ac-
cording to Turner's letter). It was originally published in the
Memphis Appeal (a white paper). The letter is partially reproduced
in RESPECT BLACK, supra note 4, at 61-63. The editor of RESPECT
BLACK describes Sampson as one who "advised blacks to wait and
see what would happen as a result of the decision" and as taking
an "accomodationist attitude." Id. at 61.
82. Christian Recorder, Dec. 13, 1883 at 1 (open letter from
Henry McNeal Turner).
83. Id. Turner continued, "More, if that decision is correct and
is accepted by the country, then prepare to return to Africa, or get
ready for extermination."
84. Id. See also, Turner on the Civil Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Oct.
27, 1883 at 1 (reporting an interview with Turner by the St. Louis
Globe-Democrat. This article is reprinted in the Christian Recorder,
Nov. 8, 1883 and reprinted in part in RESPECT BLACK, supra note 4,
at 60.):
Bishop Turner said that [the decision] . . . absolves the ne-
gro's allegiance to the general government, makes the
American flag to him a rag of contempt instead of a symbol
of liberty. It reduces the majesty of the nation to an aggre-
gation of ruffianism, opens all the issues of the late war, sets
the country to wrangling again, puts the negro back into
politics, revives the ku klux klan and white leaguers, resur-
rects the bludgeons, sets men to cursing and blaspheming
God and man, and literally unties the devil.
85. The editors of the Huntsville Gazette, for example, re-
sponded to Turner's remarks with caution: "Bishop Turner has
been made a strong secessionist by the Civil Rights Decision. Any
loyal Negro should 'be hung dead by the neck,' says he. A sober
second thought will modify the Bishop's views." Huntsville Ga-
zette, Nov. 17, 1883 at 4.
86. Railroads in Texas Take Advantage of that Outrageous Decision,
Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 27, 1883 at 2 (emphasis in original). See
also, New York Globe, March 17, 1883 at 2 ("We have no respect
9
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erers of adverse opinions were described as "small
men, '' 7 "judicial nondescript[s]," '8 a "narrow minded
body of'judicial owls,"' ' "gout-breeders," 9 0 or a "con-
clave of human donkeys.''" Comparisons of Justices
Bradley:' 2 and Woods9'3 to "the infamous, the execrable
ChiefJustice Taney, ' 19 4 that "reactionary, unrepublican,
bigoted Maryland lawyer (who] had no right to stamp on
this land his low native prejudice," 95 were common, as
were comparisons of the 1883 decisions to Dred Scott and
other antebellum decisions.9 6 Writers in the Black
press complained that the Court was racist,117 that it was
improperly influenced by corporations,"t 8 and that the
adverse decisions were part of a political scheme to
curry favor with the white South.!!)
Henry McNeal Turner's "battle axe" approach to
the decisions was in tune with his political project for
African American liberation. Turner had concluded by
1883 that it was hopeless to try and defeat racism in the
United States, and urged African Americans to "prepare
to return to Africa, or get ready for extermination." °0
for the Judges who have trampled upon our rights, torn down the
barricades which should have shielded us from oppression, arro-
gance, impudence and lawless villainies of infamous individu-
als."); The Civil Rights Decision, New York Globe, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2
("Is such a Government worthy the respect and loyalty of honest
men? It certainly does not enjoy our respect and our loyalty to it
is the cheapest possession we have."); Another View of the Decision,
New York Globe, Nov. 3, 1883 (letter to editor from George B.
Vashon, St. Louis, Missouri) ("We slander justice by making such
men her name-sakes. They are nothing but bunches of technicali-
ties or worse, the voluntary exponents of a most degraded preju-
dice."); Prof. Greener's Views, New York Globe, Nov. 10, 1883 at I
(interview with Professor R.T. Greener, reprinted from Norfolk
(Va.) Landmark) ("I obey the-decision, but reserve the right to
despise the judges who have reached the ermine through the fidel-
ity of my race, who basely remanded me to the prejudices of the
basest.").
87. The Civil Rights Bill: Opinions of Some of Our Colored Exchanges,
Petersburg Lancet, Nov. 3, 1883 at 2 (exchange from the Bulletin)
("The United States Supreme Bench is a dangerous place for
small men.").
88. The Ku-Klux Law, New York Globe, Jan. 27, 1883, at 2 (re-
ferring to Justice Woods for his opinion in United States v. Harris).
89. President Arthur on Civil Rights, New York Globe, Dec. 8,
1883.
90. Another View of the Decision, New York Globe, Nov. 3, 1883
(letter to editor from George B. Vashon, St. Louis, Missouri).
91. Christian Recorder, April 1, 1886, partially reprinted in VOICE
OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 45, at 504-06 (speech of Henry Mc-
Neal Turner, referring to the Civil Rights Cases).
92. For his opinion in the Civil Rights Cases.
93. For his opinion in United States v. Harris.
94. New York Globe, March 17, 1883, at 2 (referring to Justice
Woods). See also, The Ku-Klux Law, New York Globe, Jan. 27, 1883
at 2 (same); New York Globe, March 17, 1883 at 2 ("[W]e brand
the Supreme Court, as now constituted, worthy disciples of the
great Southern Judge Taney, whose name is a byword and re-
proach among the nations."); The Civil Rights Decision, New York
Globe, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2 ("It has reaffirmed the infamous deci-
sion of the infamous ChiefJustice Taney that a 'black man has no
rights that a white man is bound to respect.' "); The Civil Rights Bill
Declared Unconstitutional. Opinions of Some of Our Colored Exchanges,
Petersburg Lancet, Oct. 27, 1883 (exchange from Louisville Bulle-
tin) ("When Justice Bradley lies rotting in the ground, his decision
will be associated with other [sic] infamous decision of Chief jus-
tice Taney."); Our Colored Exchanges, Washington Bee, Nov. 10,
1883 (exchange from Cairo Pilot) ("[O]ur best friends, our Bru-
tus, dons the judicial garb of a Taney, with the hand of an adverse
sentiment raises the dagger.").
95. The Rights and Wrongs of the Colored People, Christian Re-
corder, November 8, 1883 at 2 (exchange from Cincinnati
Enquirer).
96. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Bill, Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 20,
1883 at 2 (letter from an "indignant citizen," signed B.) ("It is
worse than the Dred Scott decision."); The Civil Rights Decision,
Peoples Advocate, Oct. 20, 1883 ("The Supreme Court has not
the power to stay the march of progress any more now than it did
when the Dred Scott decision was rendered. That was an anachro-
nism. So is this."); Opinions of the Press, Christian Recorder, Oct.
25, 1883 at 2 (exchange from the Boston Hub) ("The decision is
worthy of the Republic fifty years ago."); The Rights And Wrongs of
the Colored People, Christian Recorder, Nov. 8, 1883 at 2 (exchange
from Cincinnati Enquirer) ("The decision of the Supreme Court
negativing the Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby constituting
themselves the constitutional power in this country after the peo-
ple had made the amendment, is a disgrace to that tribunal, even
more than the Dred Scott decision was twenty five years ago."
The Dred Scott decision "was more natural, more honest, more
candid than the work of the present Supreme Court in the face of
the light of the nineteenth century; and of the bloody experience
of the past."); sources cited supra in note 94.
97. See, e.g., Turner on the Civil Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Oct. 27,
1883 at I (report on an interview of H.M. Turner by the St. Louis
Globe-Democrat) (same article in Christian Recorder, Nov. 8,
1883), reprinted in RESPECT BLACK, supra note 4, at 60 ("[H]ad the
negro not been involved, [the Sumner Act] would not have been
so unconstitutional.").
98. See, e.g., New York Globe, Nov. 3, 1883 (The Justices were
"known to sympathize with the railroad corporations."); Mr. Justice
Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, New York Globe, Nov. 24, 1883 at 2
(The Civil Rights majority "have placed themselves in a false posi-
tion, sucking technicality, subterfuge and allied corporate inter-
ests as if they were sugar teats instead of brickbats which always
blind the eye of reason and make mad men of narrow minds with
big prejudices - the prime elements of disorder, confusion and
revolution.").
99. President Arthur was believed to be anxious to secure
Southern Electoral votes in the 1884 election. His administration
was "known to be dickering for... Southern support." It seemed
that the Arthur administration would do almost anything to get
that support, since they had even "deposed numerous Republican
officials of both colors throughout the South." Civil Rights Deci-
sion: Declared Unconstitutional By the Supreme Court, Cleveland Ga-
zette, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2. The Republicans, through a Republican
Court, thus hoped "to get rid of the negro vote in the South and
annex the white vote[,]" The Rights and Wrongs of the Colored People,
Christian Recorder, Nov. 8, 1883 at 2 (reprinted from the Cincin-
nati Enquirer), by "toadying to the South in establishing the Cal-
houn theory of 'States Rights.' " Cleveland Gazette, supra.
100. Christian Recorder, Dec. 13, 1883 at 1 (open letter from
Henry M*cNeal Turner) ("You know that I am an African emigra-
tionist, and . . . I have had no faith in this country being the ulti-
mate home of the negro for fifteen years. I believed that the
prejudice of the white race would either drive us out of the coun-
try or reduce us to a state of vassal degradation that could be
more intolerable than slavery itself. I had no faith in the race love
of the South and less in the North, for so soon as we failed to be a
political power in the South, the Northern papers began to berate
us .... "). For a discussion of Turner's "back to Africa" position,
see The Education of Hemny McNeal Turner, supra note 73.
Other writers in the Black press urged movement to the
Western United States, rather than a return to Africa. See, e.g., 7"o
)'our Tents, 0 Israel!!, Peoples Advocate, Nov. 10, 1883 at 2 ("We
perform all the labor in the south. What would be the effect upon
our white brothers if a movement were made to quit the south?
When they see the laborer leave their farms, their workshops and
their plantations, would they not call them back and promise to
.deal honorably with them? ... The west beckons us on. ... Let
us be slaves no longer. . . . Let us emigrate! Westward ho!!");
WI'hat Shall le Do?, Peoples Advocate, Nov. 17, 1883 at 2 ("Rev.
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Most African Americans, however, probably agreed with
a writer in the Christian Recorder: "It is just as well that
the white people understand it, that the Western world
is not to be the home of the white man only .... The
black man is here also, and he proposes remaining."''
If African Americans were to remain in the United
States, the "land which they had watered with their
tears, enriched with their blood, tilled with their hard
hands,"' 1 2 and "made productive and beautiful, '03
they needed to use every means of protest which was
available to them. 10 4 Turner's battle axing of the
Supreme Court's decisions had to be just one part of a
multi-faceted resistance to racist America.' 0 5 Others
W.H Brooks ...said ...[t]he white people of that section [the
South] did not care how intelligent, how thrifty, how moral a
colored man was, they placed him below the position of the
poorest and meanest white. [The best solution] was a wholesale
emigration to the west. Leave the South deserted, compel the
whites to labor and it was possible that a beneficent result would
follow."). On Colonization and westward migration after the end
of Reconstruction, see AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN
AMERICA, 1880-1915: RACIAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE AGE OF BOOKER
T. WASHINGTON 59-68 (1988); RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at
598-600; NELL PAINTER, ExODUSTERs: BLACK MIGRATION TO KAN-
SAS AFTER RECONSTRUCTION (1977).
101. The Recent Decision, Christian Recorder, Oct. 25, 1883 at 2.
It is worth quoting this article at greater length:
The very idea is humiliating in the extreme. That we, with
four generations of American blood flowing in our veins,
shall hold our rights at the sufferance of men who have not
.one generation of such blood behind them, is simply mad-
dening. And yet this is precisely what the recent decision of
the Supreme Court makes possible. The rights of colored
men whose fathers fought through the battles of the
Revolution that made the Republic possible, placed at the
sufferance of white men whose fathers fought on the oppo-
site side! We say nothing of the war of 1812 and the greater
war of 1860. Was there ever a parallel for such base ingrati-
tude? .. . [B]e strong and defensively defiant. If the white
people of the country insist on widening the breach be-
tween the two races, let them widen it. We have as little to
lose as they, even less. A disturbed country affects only its
capital, which the whites have taken pains to keep from us;
save only, and thanks to them for it, the capital of strong
arms and broad feet - feet prepared to stand the flow of
even an Alpine brook. We are seven millions strong today.
How rapidly we are increasing let the last census tell. If
they were wise they certainly would not make it necessary
for us to store up feelings that only the conscious weakness
of to-day keeps from breaking out. But we are not always
going to be weak; not always going to hold our rights at the
sufferance of any. To-morrow we will have enough strength
to defend ourselves; and having it, the will which we already
possess will not be called into play to hold it in suspense.
It is just as well that the white people understand it,
that the Western world is not to be the home of the white
man only .... The black man is here also, and he proposes
remaining. He proposes to live in amity and equality with
his neighbors. If, however, there is to be a conflict, he will
not alone be the sufferer. The under rail cannot be de-
stroyed without bringing down the upper.
In the meantime we say to our brethren: Husband
your resources. See to it that you preserve your health. Get
information. Know once for all that you must depend upon
yourself.
See also, Be 11ien, Petersburg Lancet, Dec. 29, 1883 at 2:
It is true that the Negro does not enjoy all his political and
civil rights as does the whites. It is true that we are ostra-
cized and grossly abused and ill-treated; ... it is true that on
account of the color of our skin we are maliciously abused:
but then all these things being facts, shall we give up in de-
spair? Shall we desert the land of our nativity hallowed in
the blood of our ancestors? Shall Bourbon threits of intim-
idation and bloodshed make us cowards and drive us from
our homes .. .?
102. The Twentieth Anniversar of Lincolns Proclamation of Emancipa-
tion, Washington Bee, Jan. 6, 1883 at 1, 2 (speech of Frederick
Douglass).
103. Be Men, Petersburg Lancet, Dec. 29, 1883 at 2.
104. The means of resistance I discuss in the text are all verbal
or written. Violent resistance was also contemplated by some
writers. See, e.g., New York Globe, Jan. 5, 1884, reprinted in THE
BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 107-08 (reporting on a
lynching in Yazoo City, Mississippi) ("The Supreme Court of the
United States, a beggarly apology for wisdom and fairness, de-
clares that such lawlessness and murder are without the jurisdic-
tion of the National Government; that if the State affords the
victim no protection he need not look to the National Govern-
ment. Then where shall he look, pray? To the mercy of the mob,
the humanity of the murderer? No; let him use the same weapons
that other oppressed people use - let him use the dagger, the
torch and the shotgun. There is no other appeal; no other argu-
ment will avail. The State denies protection; the National Govern-
ment declares it has no jurisdiction."); Be Men, Petersburg Lancet,
Dec. 29, 1883 at 2 ("We cannot agree with some of the prominent
colored men of the State who are in favor of emigration. . . . We
believe it is our urgent and imperative duty to place ourselves
upon the Constitutions of our State and the United States, and
demand every right guaranteed to us in the constitutions, and de-
mean ourselves properly as good citizens of the commonwealth.
If then the Courts refuse to administer justice to us, if popular
sentiment, in the face of our good citizenship, wax sore against us,
if villains, cutthroats, midnight assassins and cold blooded mur-
derers persist in intimidating orderly and law abiding citizens ... ,
if the chastity and virtue of our women are assaulted .... if persua-
sion will not avail, the last remedy must be resorted to: An eye for
an eye and a tooth for a tooth. I repeat it sir, we must fight. We
must be in earnest. Instead of innocent Negroes running from the
Danville Massacre, and being shot as so many dogs, it is more
manly, it is in compliance with a sense ofjustice and right, to fight
for our rights until life leaves our physical frame. It is better to die
a freeman than to live a cursed slave. When a terrorizzer or a
desperado point a deadly weapon at you, there is no time for
words, you must overcome him by a more powerful weapon and
physical force. . . . Virginia ... is as much the home of the black
residents as it is the home of the white, nor do we intend to leave
the land that we have made productive and beautiful for others.
We must not leave, we cannot leave, but must remain at our post
and do our part of praying, fighting, and at the same time be sub-
missive to the civil authorities and rest our cause in the hands of a
Just God.").
105. Even Turner's "battle axe" was combined with legal argu-
ments. For example, Turner argued that the results of the 1872
presidential election had given the Sumner Act special constitu-
tional status beyond that possessed by most acts of Congress.
Turner pointed out that the platforms of both major parties in
1872 endorsed racial equality. Since the Sumner Act embodied
this commitment to racial equality, Turner argued that the elec-
tion of 1872 served as a sort of national plebescite in which
every man in the nation, both democrats and republicans,
voted for the civil rights bill - every man who voted for
Grant or Greeley, for both of their platforms accepted the
[Sumner] civil rights bill but seven men in Washington put
their little will in opposition to the will of 50,000,000 peo-
ple. Did you ever hear of such audacity? . . . [Tihere is
nothing like it since God made Adam.
Turner on the Civil Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Oct. 27, 1883 at I
(also published in Christian Recorder, Nov. 8, 1883), partially re-
printed in RESPECT BLACK, supra note 4, at 60. See also, Turner's
remarks in the Christian Recorder, Dec. 13, 1883 at I ("[Fihe civil
11
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had to "stand inside the courtroom" and lay claim to the
Constitution.
The African American people resisted slavery with
all the means that were available to them for over 200
years.' 1 ' Part of that resistance had been to claim the
promises of the Constitution as their own, even when
the Court and the nation said that African Americans
Were not among "the People" for whom the Constitu-
tion was created. Political abolitionists, and their anti-
slavery interpretations of the Constitution, had ensured
that even during the bleakest days of slavery the mean-
ing of the Constitution was contested terrain. 10 7 Afri-
can Americans were not about to give up that terrain
now, "when the power of the Constitution has been
made stronger, more unequivocal, more explicit upon
the question of individual rights than when the Supreme
Court upheld the right of the slave trader."'10 8
The Reverend Benjamin T. Tanner, 10 9 writing in
the wake of the Civil Rights Cases, spoke for many in the
African American community when he laid claim to the
Constitution, and denied that the Supreme Court had
the final say in its interpretation:
In the Constitutional administration of the
Government ... the six millions and a half colored
citizens have as much interest as any other equal
number, of whatever descent. ... They know too
well that as relates to citizenship they are Ameri-
cans or they are nothing. Nor has this "liberty"
been attained by them at any small price; for the
country itself will bear witness that we have paid as
great price as any, and greater than most. To say
nothing of our enforced immigration and our pas-
sive suffering, we absolutely won the boon by help-
ing fight the battles of '76, which made the
Republic possible, the battles of'12, which made it
respected, and the battles of '60, which made, as
the glorious Sumner said, "the Nation national."
We say therefore we have won the right of Ameri-
can citizenship, which no power on earth can make
us willingly surrender; and therefore do we realize
the duty involved of seeing the Government Con-
stitutionally administered.
The recent Supreme Court decision - is it
correct? If it be, we of the seven millions are just
as ready to receive it as they of the forty-three mil-
lions. But the question is, is it?' 10
status of the negro ...was virtually settled in 1872, when every
Democrat and Republican ... voted for his rights and drove the
negro question out of politics.").
The legislative history of the 1875 Civil Rights Act makes
Bishop Turner's argument that both parties' 1872 platforms en-
dorsed the content of that Act problematic. Senator Sumner first
introduced his bill in 1870. The original bill guaranteed equal ac-
cess to public schools, churches, cemeteries, juries, public trans-
portation and public accommodations. The bill failed. Sumner
reintroduced the bill at each session of Congress. The bill was
finally passed, shorn of the church, school and cemetery provi-
sions after Sumner's death in 1874. JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
ORDEAL By FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 576-77
(1982); BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 55, at 591-94. For a
more detailed account of the 1875 Act's legislative history, see RE-
CONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, part 2, supra note 47, at 156-84.
Thus, although both major candidates' platforms in 1872 con-
tained broad calls for legal equality, majority support for the Sum-
ner Act could not be mustered in Congress at that time. Some
modern commentators, and some writers in the Black press,
thought that the bill was passed more as a memorial to Charles
Sumner than out of a genuine commitment to civil rights. See, e.g.,
ORDEAL By FIRE, supra, at 576; Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883
at I ("The bill [was] chiefly valuable as a monument of the life
work and character of... Charles Sumner.").
Although Bishop Turner's argument is less than convincing
on its merits, it is intriguing. The idea that a statute of questiona-
ble constitutionality could be given constitutional stature in a sort
of referendum by national election is strikingly similar to the ideas
of some modern scholars. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Triggering
Ratification: The Electoral 11andate for the Fourteenth Amendment, Ch. 9
of DISCOVERING THE CONSTITUTION (manuscript on file with the
author 1986) (elections of 1866 as mandate on fourteenth amend-
ment); Rethinking the New Deal, Ch. 13 of DISCOVERING THE CONSTI-
TUTION (manuscript on file with the author 1988) (elections of
1936 as mandate for New Deal); Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Re-
visited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article ', 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1043 (1988) (amendment by national referendum); No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 131 (election of 1866 as referen-
dum on presidential versus radical reconstruction).
106. See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 585-660 (1975) (slave resistance
through armed rebellion, stealing, arson, murder, infanticide, sui-
cide, running away); BENJAMIN QUARLES, BLACK ABOLITIONISTS
(1969); THE BLACK MILITARY EXPERIENCE, Series II of FREEDOM: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION, 1861-1867 (Ira Berlin,
Joseph Reidy & Leslie Rowland eds. 1982). Elizabeth Fox-Geno-
vese has pointed out that most slave resistance, especially that of
women, was "woven into the fabric of slave[s'] ... lives and identi-
ties. . . . The very ubiquity of their resistance ensured that its
most common forms would be those that followed the patterns of
everyday life: shirking, running off, 'taking,' sassing, defying."
WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN
OF THE OLD SOUTH 329 (1988).
107. For discussions of the political abolitionists and their anti-
slavery interpretations of the Constitution, see sources cited supra
in note 27. Textual sources for an anti-slavery interpretation of
the Constitution included: the preamble; art. I, § 8 (necessary and
proper clause); art. I, § 9 (prohibiting bills of attainder and sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus); art. IV, § 2 (privileges and
immunities clause); art. IV, § 4 (guarantee of republican form of
government in the states); Fifth Amendment (due process clause).
It was also considered to be significant that the Constitution had
no explicit reference to slavery or race. Even the fugitive slave
clause, art. IV, § I, merely refers to a "Person held to Service or
Labor in one State, under the laws thereof." The Declaration of
Independence was an important non-Constitutional source of
anti-slavery interpretation. See, e.g., THE MIND OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, supra note 27, at 37-38; JUSTICE ACCUSED, supro note
27, at 154-58; EQUAL UNDER LAW, supra note 27, at 43-56; No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 42-48.
108. 1Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, New York Globe,
Nov. 24, 1883 at 2. For a fascinating discussion of the ways in
which the Labor Movement in the Gilded Age also claimed the
Constitution, rather than abandoning it to the corporate powers
in whose interest it was being interpreted, see .- nibigiities of Free
Labor, supra note 38.
109. Tanner was editor of the Christian Recorder from 1868-1884.
He urged his readers to support the Black press even when its
editorial quality was not equal to that of white papers, since it was
"the business of every colored man to help make them so; not by a
criticism of dubious worth, but by a cash subscription." NEGRO
THOUGHT IN AMERICA, supra note 100, at 45 (quoting A.M.E. Re-
view II, July, 1885).
110. The Recent Supreme Court Decision, Christian Recorder, Nov.
12
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Reverend Tanner's questioning of the correctness of
the Supreme Court's decisions makes it clear that resist-
ance to the decisions was not limited to complaints
about their evil effects, or attacks on the integrity and
character of the Justices. Resistance included argu-
ments about the meaning of the Constitution. African
Americans were simply not willing to agree that the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court were legally correct.
Writers in the Black press claimed that the Court's
legal reasoning was deficient.' I1 They protested that
the decisions were out of line with the Court's own
precedents,' 12 contradicted the intent of the framers of
the Reconstruction amendments," 13 and misunderstood
the backdrop of state law.' 14 They asserted that the
Court had revived the states rights theories which Afri-
can Americans hoped had died on the battlefields, and
had ignored the new national citizenship which had
arisen from the ashes of the war.'' 5 They accused the
Court of deliberately conflating civil and social equality
in order to deny African American citizens their civil
rights. 116
By writing dissents to the Supreme Court's opin-
ions, and putting forth their own interpretations of the
Constitution as the legally correct ones, African Ameri-
cans could do battle against a racist nation and still be
"armed with the Constitution of the United States."' 17
Central to the legal disagreement between the African
American dissenters and the Supreme Court was a dis-
pute over the effect that the Reconstruction amend-
ments should have had on the relationship between the
states and the nation. It is to this issue of federalism
which we now turn.
IV. FEDERALISM
The central doctrinal issue the Supreme Court
15, 1883 at 2 (by Rev. Benjamin T. Tanner, editor of the Christian
Recorder) (reprinted from New York Independent).
111. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, New York
Globe, Nov. 24, 1883 at 2 (The "abortion of a decision rendered
by Mr. Justice Bradley" was attributable to the fact that the
Supreme Court was "deficient in legal acumen, . . .swayed by
colorphobia, [and] biased by powerful corporate influences.").
112. See, e.g., Civil Rights, Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2
(by Hon. John P. Green, also published in Christian Recorder,
Nov. 1, 1883) ("One of the features of the Republican party which
most distinguished it from the Democratic party [had always been]
the fact that it construed our Constitution as being sufficiently
broad and elastic to save the Union and guarantee to every citizen
his rights of citizenship." Such "broad and elastic" readings of
the Constitution allowed the Republicans to "raise and equip ar-
mies and send them into the rebellious States," "to issue green-
back currency," and to reconstruct the nation in the aftermath of
the war. It was this creative use of Constitutional theory by the
Republican party which had "most distinguished it from the Dem-
ocratic party and opened the way to all its glory and fame." "But
now, at this late day, we find a Supreme Court composed of Re-
publican Judges, for the most part, who have all subscribed to this
self-same doctrine, casting it aside and bartering away the rights
and liberties of men who have risked their lives in putting them in
office."); Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, New York
Globe, Nov. 24, 1883 at 2 (Supreme Court had upheld fugitive
slave acts in spite of the fact that they "regulate[d] the conduct of
individuals.").
113. See, e.g., Civil Rights, Peoples Advocate, Oct. 27, 1883 at I
(by "Le Duke," a regular columnist) ("The rules of construction
were ample enough to have accepted the [Sumner] law constitu-
tional upon the ground of manifest intent.").
114. See, e.g., New York Globe, June 2, 1883, reprinted in THE
BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 164-65 ("The State
courts of the South are the safety, the cloak, of the lawless cut-
throats who live by intimidation and murder of black men."); In
Council - Proceedings of the Colored District Executive Committee, 8th
Congressional District. Decatur, Ala. Nov. 10, 1883, Huntsville Ga-
zette, Nov. 17, 1883 at 8 (by W.H. Blankenship) ("It is argued that
our laws are impartial - that they are made to affect neither race,
particularly. We admit that so they appear upon the statute books
of the country. They could not appear partial, for then they would
be unconstitutional - and void. Right here is where time estab-
lished prejudice steps in and boastingly performs what the statute
books dare not insinuate. . . . No impartial person, who has
watched closely the administration of the laws of the states of this
union, and more especially those known as the former slave states,
will attempt to deny the fact that every subterfuge which can be
devised is carried into operation, and evasions of law are resorted
to in order to throw stumbling stones in the way of the black man.
For slight offenses severe penalties are inflicted, and hundreds of
our race end their lives in that hell, the coal mine, while the fair
skin of our 'intellectual and moral superiors' exempts them from
punishment even though they commit murder, or steal a whole
state or county treasury. These are facts which the records of our
Courts of law (not Courts of Justice) will show.").
115. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Decision, New York Globe, Oct. 20,
1883 at 2, partially repprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra
note 4, at 167-68 ("The Government of the United States is the
puppet of the States - a thing without power to protect the citi-
zens of its own creation."); Colonel Pledger Calls The National Commit-
tee Together To Lay The Needs Of The Colored People Before Congress And
Is Interviewed, Washington Bee, Dec. 1, 1883 at 2 (The Civil Rights
Cases decision "revives the old states rights theories, the very thing
that the people of the south fought over."). For a short biography
of William A. "Colonel" Pledger, see THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-
1890, supra note 4, at 28.
116. For a discussion of nineteenth century conceptions of civil
and social equality, see Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Con-
stitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles
Hamilton Houston, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 224-
43 (David Thelen ed. 1988). The Court claimed in the Civil Rights
Cases that the rights of access to public spaces which were pro-
tected by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (Sumner Act) could not be
protected under Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment because they were not "fundamental rights which ap-
pertain to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or depri-
vation of which constitutes the essential distinction between
freedom and slavery." Instead they were mere "social rights."
109 U.S. at 22. Opponents of the Sumner Act commonly criti-
cized it as an attempt to legislate "social equality."
Writers in the Black press accused opponents of civil rights
of deliberately conflating "social equality, which is the result of
mutual agreement among individuals," and civil equality, which is
secured by "legal rights which are given by law and enforced by
the courts." Colonel Pledger Calls the National Committee Together to
Lay the Needs of the Colored People Before Congress and is Interviewed,
Washington Bee, Dec. 1, 1883 at 2. Frederick Douglass recog-
nized that sometimes the line between civil and social rights might
be hard to define, that "[i]t is hard to say what social equality is,"
but the Sumner Act presented easy cases, since "it is certain that
going into the same street car, hotel or steam heat cabin, does not
make any man society for another more than flying in the same air
makes all birds of one feather." Hoi. Frederick Douglass: His Earnest
and Eloquent Address, Cleveland Gazette, Nov. 24, 1883 at I (speech
of Frederick Douglass to the National Convention of Colored Men
at Louisville, Kentucky (part 2 of 2)).
117. Hop. Frederick Douglass: His Earnest and Eloquent Address,
Cleveland Gazette, Nov. 17, 1883 at I & 3 (speech by Frederick
Douglass to the National Convention of Colored Men at Louis-
ville, Kentucky (part I of 2)).
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faced in deciding early civil rights cases was the role to
be played by federalism in the post-War world.' 18 Ef-
fective protection of African American rights depended
upon the willingness and ability of the national govern-
ment to intervene in the South. But the national guar-
antees of citizenship, freedom, and equality encoded in
the Reconstruction amendments were in sharp conflict
with the basic tenets of antebellum constitutional the-
ory, which was committed to a federal system in which
the national government was of sharply limited power,
and the vast majority of powers were committed to the
states.
A. PRESERVING THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE GENERAL
SYSTEM
The Supreme Court Justices who decided early
civil rights cases had much invested in antebellum con-
stitutional theory.' 19 They came of age professionally
in a world where the legal regulation of everyday life lay
with the states, national power was strictly limited, and
the most prominent representative of national power
likely to be seen by most Americans was the local post-
master.' 2 0 In this world the United States was a plural,
rather than a singular, noun. 12 1
This strong dual-federalist system was more than
just an artifact of the lack of need for a powerful central
government, it was an essential part of the Federalist
Constitutional scheme. The Federalists and their heirs
hoped that the federal system would "break and control
the violence of faction," thereby avoiding the interne-
cine struggles which had racked the classical democra-
cies. 12 2 In addition, the federal system, with its weak
national government of enumerated powers, insured
that most decisions affecting the day-to-day life of citi-
zens were made in local and state bodies. Since these
bodies could be more easily held accountable to the citi-
zenry than those in far-away Washington, D.C., liberty
was ensured and democracy was protected from central-
ized despotism. ' 23
The Civil War can be seen as the ultimate of the
factional fights so dreaded by the founders. In its after-
math, the Justices of the Supreme Court could not help
but recognize that national power was not the only dan-
ger to union. According to the Slaughter-House Court,
the war demonstrated that "the true danger to the
perpetuity of the Union was in the capacity of the State
organizations to combine and concentrate all the pow-
ers of the State, and of contiguous States, for a deter-
mined resistance to the General Government." 1 24
Thus, the experience of the war gave "great force to the
argument ... of those who believe[d] in the necessity of
a strong National government."1
2 5
The Supreme Court recognized that the Recon-
struction Amendments granted "additional powers to
the Federal government," while placing "additional re-
straints upon those of the States." 126 However, the
Court resisted the full nationalizing implications of the
War and its constitutional aftermath. Justice Miller,
writing for the Court in Slaughter-House, responded to
those who believed that the War and Reconstruction
had revolutionary implications for the redistribution of
power from the states to the nation: "[H]owever pervad-
ing this sentiment, and however it may have contributed
to the adoption of the [Reconstruction] amendments
.. , we do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the
main features of the general system." 127 The federalist-sys-
tem-as-it-was was a fixed point in the Justices' legal uni-
verse. Although the Reconstruction Amendments
might alter the contours of that universe in significant
ways, the Court would struggle to preserve its "main
features." 128
B. THE CAUSE OF ALL OUR WOES
African Americans were well aware of the impor-
tance of federalist thought to the old Constitutional or-
der. But they had no reason to look back on antebellum
118. See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction
and the JI'aite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 39 (1978).
119. As Robert Cover wrote, "Judges, more than most men, are
conscious of the baggage of the past. Thus, the traditions they
inherit will be important." JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 27, at 7.
120. Preserving Federalism, supra note 118, at 39-45; EQUALJUSTICE
UNDER LAW, supra note 20, at 306-08.
121. ORDEAL By FIRE, supra note 105, at 488.
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 77 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For a
discussion of the "Founders' " fear of faction, see GORDON WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 53-65
(1969).
123. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV.
503, 514 (1985).
124. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 82.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 68. See also, Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)
(The amendments "were intended to be ... limitations on the
power of the States and enlargements of the power of
Congress.").
127. 83 U.S. at 82 (emphasis supplied).
128. Id. That the preservation of federalism is a central concern
of the Supreme Court's decisions is apparent from even a cursory
glance at them. Consider some of the concerns voiced by Justice
Bradley for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases. Bradley feared that
any construction of the Fourteenth Amendment which did not
have a state action requirement would allow Congress "to estab-
lish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights be-
tween man and man in society. It would be to make Congress take
the place of the State legislatures and supersede them." 109 U.S.
at 13. Such a construction would result in federal legislation
which "steps into the domain of local jurisprudence and lays down
rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other."
109 U.S. at 14. Brandishing the ultimate textual reminder of the
federal system, Bradley warned that a construction of the Four-
teenth Amendment with no state action requirement "is repug-
nant to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which declares
that powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people." 109 U.S. at 15.
Early lower federal court opinions, written by Supreme
Court Justices riding circuit, indicated that at least some members
of the Court were willing to go much further in restructuring the
federal system. Indeed, in 1873, four dissenters in Slaughter-House,
including Bradley, gave a nationalistic interpretation of the Re-
construction Amendments. However, by 1883 even Bradley, who
penned the Civil Rights Cases, had adopted a conservative attitude.
See John Anthony Scott,Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Four-
teenth Amendment froi the Slaughter-Hlouse Cases to the Civil Rights
Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552 (1971).
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federalism with veneration. The Constitution and the
federal system were born in compromises that insured
the survival of slavery.I -' ' The anti-slavery movement
had been a "faction" of the type that the federal system
was designed to keep in check.' And the system had
"worked" for a long time. Abolitionists had been con-
tained in the north and silenced in the south for nearly a
century until westward expansion and the acquisition of
territories forced slavery back to the center of national
debate and drove the country to civil war.13 ' In the few
cases when the federal system might have protected Af-
rican Americans from slavery, it had failed them misera-
bly.' 3 2  The African American experience with
federalism was expressed by D. Augustus Straker in
March of 1883, when he wrote to the New York Globe:
[W]e recognize the fundamental doctrines of the
National Constitution which declare that all power
not expressly given to the National Government by
the States is reserved to the State, also that the sev-
eral states are sovereign and independent in the
exercise of all powers, not enumerated as dele-
gated to the National Government. It is sad, but it
is true, that this mythical line, as indeterminable as
the equator of the earth, or at least as intangible,
has been the cause of all our woes.'13 3
For African Americans, the idea that the old fed-
eral system protected democracy against despotism, the
notion that states' rights served as a bulwark of liberty
against an oppressive national government, was simply
absurd. "While the tyranny which has always flowed
from centralized government [wa]s obviated, no check
[wa]s placed upon the tyranny of the individual state
.... [Wa]s this wise? D[id] this ensure the largest lib-
erty to the individual? We doubt it. Experience refutes
it." 1
3 4
African American experience turned federalist
political theory on its head. Tyranny in its most brutal
form was a product of state law, while liberation came
through the most awesome exertion of national power
ever seen.13 5 "States made men slaves; legislated them
into chattels. The nation struck the shackles from their
fettered limbs, and made them men." 13 6 "States did
not free the negro, the States . . . did not make him a
citizen, the States did not give him the elective
franchise, the States did not call on him to go 200,000
129. Abolitionists identified five specific clauses in the Constitu-
tion as compromises with slavery: art. I, § 2 (three/fifths compro-
mise); art. I, § 8 (Congressional power to suppress insurrection);
art. I, § 9 (entrenchment of slave trade until 1808); art. 4, § 2 (fu-
gitive slave clause); art. 4, § 4 (responsibility of federal govern-
ment to suppress "domestic violence" at request of state
government). Frederick Douglass, The Constitution and Slavery,
North Star, March 16, 1849, reprinted in I LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 361-67; Wendell Phillips,
THE CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY DOCUMENT 4-5 (1844) (re-
print, New York 1969) (cited and discussed in THE MIND OF FRED-
ERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 27, at 31-32). See also JUSTICE
ACCUSED, supra note 27, at 151-52.
130. See, e.g., Andrew Jackson, FarewellAddress (March 4, 1837), in
III MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 292-
308 (James D. Richardson ed. 1897). Jackson warned against
"systematic efforts publicly made to sow the seeds of discord be-
tween different parts of the United States and to place party divi-
sions directly upon geographical distinctions; to excite the South
against the Aorth and the North against the South, and to force into
the controversy the most delicate and exciting topics." Id. at 295.
Jackson went on to attack abolitionists as, at best, misguided phi-
lanthropists, "but everyone, upon sober reflection, will see that
nothing but mischief can come from these improper assaults upon
the feelings and rights of others." Id. at 298.
131. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF
THE CIVIL WAR 34-53 (1980); FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN,
supra note 24, at 301-317.
132. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
133. States Rights Heresy, New York Globe, March 10, 1883. The
author was identified in the Globe as "D.A.S." According to the
editor of THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 94, a
"D.A.S." who often wrote to the New National Era was probably D.
Augustus Straker. "He was a professor of common law at Allen
University in South Carolina, and later moved to Detroit where he
was a prominent lawyer and judge. He published The New South
Investigated (Detroit 1888) and was a frequent contributor to the
New National Era." Id. Straker was very critical of the Compro-
mise of 1877, which led him to temporarily abandon the Republi-
can party and become an advocate for political independence. By
1888 he made a qualified return to the Republican fold. Straker
believed that only a combination of self-help and strong legal pro-
tections would lead to African American advancement. He be-
lieved that Black children should be taught Black history as a way
of building self-respect and racial solidarity. NEGRO THOUGHT IN
AMERICA, supra note 100, at 33, 53, 56-57, 242-245.
See also, Is There Any Law for the Negro?, New York Globe, Feb.
17, 1883 (article by T. Thomas Fortune) ("[T]he National Gov-
ernment has shown in a thousand instances that it had no power
to coerce the states. . . . This non-interference was based upon
the powers vested in the federal government and those reserved
to the states - the which vested and reserved rights have always
made the central government the helpless foot ball of bellicose
states and placed the citizens of the United States more at the
mercy of the state than at the mercy of the sisterhood of states.");
T. THOMAS FORTUNE, BLACK AND WHITE: LAND, LABOR AND POLI-
TICS IN THE SOUTH 128-29 (1884) (reprint 1968) ("The citizen of a
State is far more sovereign than the citizen of the United States.
The State is a real, tangible reality; a thing of life and power; while
the United States is, purely, an abstraction - a thing that no man
has successfully defined, although many, wise in their way and in
their own conceit, have philosophized upon it to their own satis-
faction. The metaphysical polemics of men learned in the science
of republican government, covering volume upon volume of 'de-
bates,' the legislation of ignoramuses, styled statesmen, and the
'strict' and 'liberal' construction placed upon their work by the
judicial magi, together with a long and disastrous rebellion, to the
cruel arbitrament of which the question had been, as was finally
hoped, in the last resort, submitted, have failed, all and each, to
define that visionary thing the so-called Federal government, and
its just rights and powers. As Alexander Hamilton and Thomas
Jefferson left it, so it is to-day, a bone of contention, a red flag in
the hands of the political matadors of one party to infuriate those
of the other parties."). For a biography of T. Thomas Fortune,
editor of the New York Globe, see EMMA Lou THORNBROUGH, 1'.
THOMAS FORTUNE: MILITANT JOURNALIST (1972).
134. Is There Any Law for the NVegro?, New York Globe, Feb. 17,
1883.
135. Changes in the federal budget give some indication of the
startling increase in the activity of the national government during
the war and the early years of Reconstruction. During four years
of Civil War, the federal government spent nearly twice as much
as it did in the entire antebellum period. During the first four
years of post-war peace, federal expenditures nearly equalled the
antebellum total. BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 47.
136. Our Exchanges, Christian Recorder, Nov. 15, 1883 at 2 (ex-
change from Chicago Conservator).
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strong into the army during the late war, . . . but the
United States did it all .... ,,,37 The experience of the
freedmen in the South after the war confirmed that the
worst forms of oppression would come from the states
and from their white fellow citizens, while the only hope
for protection came from the nation.' 38
This view of federalism "from the bottom"' 139 led
many African Americans to radical nationalism as the
only hope for their liberation. 140 For African Ameri-
cans, the federalism inherited from the founders was a
system for the preservation of their own bondage, while
the Reconstruction Amendments were a (however in-
complete) expression of their highest aspirations. Afri-
can Americans' lived experience, their view "from the
bottom" of American society, thus led them to privilege
citizenship, freedom, and equality over federalism. As
the editors of the New York Globe proclaimed:
The right of the government, and its transcendent
duty to protect American citizens upon American
soil should be maintained at all times and at all
hazard. . . . Some American statesman . . . must
be found who will see to it that the laws are faith-
fully executed, and that a Republican form of gov-
ernment is guaranteed in each of the Southern
States. Let the cry of "Caesarism" and "Imperial-
ism" be raised. . . . Give us the "Caesarism"
of Liberty; give us the "Imperialism" of Equal
Rights! 141
African Americans believed that "National power
is the only remedy" to assure that "every citizen has
equal and exact justice under the constitution and
laws." Therefore, "it must be asserted. ' 142 Freed by
memory from the Supreme Court's attachment to pre-
war federalism, writers in the African American press
were able to fully appreciate the nationalizing possibili-
ties of the Reconstruction Amendments. Thus, they
were able to present a comprehensive legal program
which interpreted the Reconstruction Amendments in a
way that would have allowed the direct exertion of na-
tional power to protect civil rights.
Since there was broad agreement in the Black press
that the war and Reconstruction had smashed the old
federal system and replaced it with a new nation, there
was little disagreement about the proper resolution of
the main doctrinal issues associated with federalism,
such as the state action requirement. Most writers
agreed that the nation had the power, and the duty, to
directly protect the rights of its citizens against infringe-
ment from any quarter. This common agreement about
federalism allowed disagreements about other legal is-
sues to come to the fore in the Black press. Among the
most divisive of these other legal issues was the question
of the relationship between civil rights laws and what
was known as "class legislation." Since "class legisla-
tion" is not a prominent part of the modern legal vocab-
ulary, I will review the influence of nineteenth century
ideas about class legislation on the Supreme Court's
early civil rights decisions 143 before discussing the class
legislation debate in the Black press.
1 4 4
V. CLASS LEGISLATION
Near the end of Justice Bradley's Civil Rights Cases
opinion appears a statement filled with such cruelty that
it leaps off of the page:
137. Christian Recorder, December 13, 1883 (open letter from
Henry McNeal Turner). Reverend Turner continued, "and now
this decision sends us back to the States to get our Civil Rights, for
the white people of the respective States to decide whether we
shall be treated as people or dogs."
138. See, e.g., Michael Perman, Counter Reconstruction: The Role of
Violence in Southern Redemption, in THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN 121-140 (Eric Ander-
son & Alfred Moss, Jr. eds. 1991); RECONSTRUCTION, supra note
50, at 119-123, 176-227.
139. See Looking to the Bottom, supra note 7.
140. This study has concentrated on Newspaper articles which
discuss civil rights decisions. Therefore, the nationalist state-
ments reproduced here are focused on national enforcement of
civil rights. National aid for education was also a common plea in
the African American press. See e.g., Hon. Frederick Douglass: His
Earnest and Eloquent Address, Cleveland Gazette, Nov. 24, 1883 at 1
(speech of Frederick Douglass to the National Convention of
Colored Men at Louisville, Kentucky (part 2 of 2)) ("In the pres-
ence of this appalling picture [of illiteracy] presented by the last
census we hold it to be the imperative duty of Congress to take
hold of this important subject, and without waiting for the States
to adopt liberal school systems within their respective jurisdic-
tions, to enter vigorously upon the work of universal education."
Douglass continued by "urging Congress to lay the foundation for
a great National system of aid to education." In particular, Con-
gress should distribute money "among the colored colleges of the
country, giving the preference as to amounts to the schools that
are doing effective work in industrial branches."); Huntsville Ga-
zette. Nov. 17, 1883 at 4 (" 'National aid for free schools' should
be a plank in the next Republican platform.").
14 1. .nierica s Degradation: The Impotenc
'
of the Government to Protect
its Citizens at Home, New York Globe, Dec. 29, 1883 (suggesting
that a "Caesar of Liberty" is already available: General John A.
Logan). This article contrasted the concern shown by President
Arthur for an American citizen (O'Donnell) about to be hanged in
Ireland with his indifference to the fate of "vast numbers of
colored Republicans of the South who have been ruthlessly shot
down, and hanged by mobs without one word of remonstrance
from him as President." Arthur's reaction to racist violence in the
South was also compared unfavorably to the showdown policies of
Andrew Jackson in the crisis over nullification.
Similarly, the editors of the Louisville Bulletin held that "a
despotic, centralized government is to be despised," but a govern-
ment should be "strong enough to protect the citizens in all of
their rights." The Bulletin warned:
If the legislative branch of the Government is not compe-
tent to enact laws to secure to the citizens of the country the
rights inherent in the citizen; if the states have powers supe-
rior to the general government, and can dictate who may be
and who shall not be citizens; who may enjoy the privileges
and who shall not enjoy them; then is our Government a
farce, a delusion and a snare, and the sooner it is over-
thrown and an empire established upon its ruins, the better.
Exchange from Louisville Bulletin published in: Arkansas Man-
sion, Nov. 3, 1883 at I; Christian Recorder, Oct. 25, 1883 at 2;
Petersburg Lancet, Oct. 27, 1883. See also, Once More, Washington
Bee, Nov. 10, 1883 ("When a republic fails to protect its citizens,
it is well to abolish such government and establish another and
inaugurate measures by which all citizens can be protected.").
142. Our Exchanges, Christian Recorder, Nov. 15, 1883 at 2 (ex-
change from Chicago Conservator).
143. See infra Section V.
144. See infra Section VI.
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When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the
aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the in-
separable concomitants of that state, there must be
some stage in the progress of his elevation when
he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws, and when his
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights
are protected.1
4 5
The inhumanity and audacity of these words is so multi-
layered that an appropriate response is difficult. At its
center is the idea that the Sumner Act had made African
Americans "the special favorite of the laws," by guaran-
teeing them equal access to public spaces. How can the
Court refer to a people who were held as human prop-
erty only twenty years earlier, and who had been subject
to the most brutal treatment since, as "the special favor-
ite of the laws"?
At one level these words can be read as merely a
restatement of the Court's conclusion that African
Americans should appeal to state law and state courts
for the protection of their civil rights, as white citizens
would, rather than rely on the protection of federal law
or the federal courts. Read in this way, the words are no
more than a particularly callous statement of the Court's
commitment to federalism. However, the particular lan-
guage used - "special favorite of the laws" - resonates
in another arena of nineteenth century legal and polit-
ical struggle. This language evoked the spectre of class
legislation. 146
"Class" or "special" legislation was common par-
lance in the nineteenth century legal lexicon. Such leg-
islation employed state power in the interest of a single
class of citizens, at the expense of a different class.' 4 7
Opposition to such legislation had roots in the egalita-
145. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
146. But see Benedict, Preserving Federalism, supra note 118, at 76,
claiming that Bradley was referring to "stages of law .... Direct
national legislation protecting basic rights inherent in freedom
was legitimate; legislation protecting more elevated rights was
not." In other words, the passage was just about federalism and
the state action requirement. Whatever meaning Bradley in-
tended to attach to the phrase "special favorite of the laws," the
relationship of the decision to class legislation was of great inter-
est to writers in the African American press. See infra Section VI.
At any rate, the fact that the Sumner Act gave African Americans a
federal cause of action for wrongs that might otherwise be litigated
in state court was one of the factors which led opponents of the
act to label it as class legislation. Thus, the issues of class legisla-
tion and federalism were actually inseparable. See infra note 236.
147. See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Eval-
nation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L.
& HIST. REV. 293 (1985); RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 490;
WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 176-77 (1988); Mark Yudof,
Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small
Cheer for Mir. Herbert Spencers Social Statics (Book Review), 88 MICH.
L. REV. 1366, 1366-1387 (1990).
148. 1 do not mean to suggest that the Jacksonian Democrats
were the first to oppose class legislation. Michael Les Benedict
has shown that the "American heritage of hostility to 'special leg-
islation' can be traced at least as far back as the seventeenth cen-
tury, when the common law courts began to challenge royal grants
of special privileges to favorites.- Laissez-Faire and Liberty, supra
rian tradition of Jacksonian democracy. 14  The Jack-
somans resisted state created corporations, monopolies,
tariffs and paper money because they were designed to
benefit the "moneyed power" at the expense of the "la-
boring classes," the vast majority of the population.' 49
Jacksonian opposition to class legislation extended
only to unfair distribution of social and economic bene-
fits and burdens among white citizens. '5 0 While Jack-
sonians railed against the moneyed power, and
condemned privilege as inimical to democracy and re-
publicanism, the slave-holding aristocracy of the South
was the beneficiary of class legislation in its most loath-
some form - the slave code. Part of the genius of the
Republican party was its ability to recognize the contra-
diction inherent in Jacksonian democracy's attitude to-
ward race, and to mobilize the north in opposition to
the slave-holding south. By shifting the Jacksonian
democratic impulse from opposition to the "moneyed
power" to opposition to the "slave power," the Republi-
cans were able to give anti-slavery a social base far
broader than that provided by the abolitionists' reliance
on moral opposition to slavery. 151
Given these ideological roots of the Republican
party, it is not surprising that Jacksonian opposition to
class legislation, as extended to cover racial inequities,
was reflected in Reconstruction. The Thirteenth
Amendment, by abolishing slavery, also did away with
all the special legislation which had accompanied and
supported the institution. The Fourteenth Amendment
also embodied opposition to class legislation. Senator
Jacob Howard, the manager of the amendment for the
Joint Committee said of the equal protection clause:
"This abolishes all class legislation in the States and
does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of
note 147, at 314. However, as Benedict points out, the "modern
democratic party was founded upon Andrew Jackson's opposition
to legislation for the benefit of the privileged few, as he perceived
it in the charter of the second national bank." Id. at 318.
149. See Andrew Jackson, Farewell Address, supra note 130, at 299-
306; Laissez-Faire and Liberty, supra note 147, at 318-26. "Laboring
classes" had a more expansive meaning for Jackson than it does
today, including "all those whose work was directly involved in the
production of goods - farmers, planters, laborers, mechanics,
and small businessmen. Only those who profited from the work of
others, or whose occupations were largely financial or promo-
tional, such as speculators, bankers, and lawyers, were excluded
from this definition." FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR FREE MEN, supra
note 24, at 15.
150. See Yudof, supra note 147, at 1379-1380.
151. FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note 24, at 40-72,
73-102. The use of egalitarian arguments which pitted "free la-
bor" against the "slave power" was especially popular among bor-
der state Republicans because it provided an ideological basis for
poor whites to join a Republican alliance against the slaveholding
aristocracy. As Missouri Republican Frank Blair explained in a
letter to his son:
I wish to make a new issue out of the slave question - giv-
ing the chief importance to the mischief inflicted on the
poor whites rather than the blacks. In making this issue ...
the contest ought not to be considered a sectional one but
rather the war of a class - the slaveholders - against the
laboring people of all classes.
Id. at 64.
17
Wycoff: LEGISLATION ESPECIALLY FOR THE NEGRO? THE BLACK PRESS RESPONDS TO
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1992
Legislation Especially For The Negro?
persons to a code not applicable to another." 152 Oppo-
sition to class legislation was thus an enduring legacy of
the Jacksonian roots of Republicanism. 153
Any follower of the current debate over affirmative
action will recognize that opposition to class legislation
in its equal protection guise can be a two edged sword,
to be used against measures that would effectively re-
dress the effects of past discrimination. Just as modern
opponents of affirmative action describe it as a violation
of equal protection, 154 opponents of early federal civil
rights bills voiced their opposition in the language of
class legislation. ' 55 Thus, Congressman Nelson Taylor
of New York objected to the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau
Act on the grounds that it was "class legislation - legis-
lation for a particular class of the blacks to the exclusion
of all whites."' 15 6 President Johnson later vetoed the
act, using his veto message to warn Congress that it
should not provide special treatment for any "favored
class of citizens," and to "urge upon Congress the dan-
ger of class legislation." 157 Opposition to class legisla-
tion, which had fueled the Republican drive for equal
protection of the laws, was now being used to block ef-
forts to make that equal protection more than mere ver-
biage. This opposition was not limited to Democrats.
As Reconstruction progressed, increasing numbers of
Republicans came to use the language of class legisla-
tion to oppose Republican legislation. 15 8
During the early years of Reconstruction the Radi-
cal Republicans in Congress were able to form a major-
ity coalition which coupled an inclusive vision of
democracy with an activist state to secure rights to those
who had for so long been excluded. Many early Recon-
struction measures, such as the Freedmen's Bureau,
used racially conscious remedies. 1 5 9 However, even
during the early days after emancipation, opposition to
special legislation on behalf of the freedmen was not
152. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2766 (Sen. Howard)
(1866).
153. In the Civil Rights Cases, both the majority and Harlan's dis-
sent refer to the Fourteenth Amendment as banning class legisla-
tion. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23-24 ("Many wrongs may
be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
which are not, in any just sense, incidents or elements of slavery.
Such, for example, would be the taking of private property with-
out due process of law; or allowing persons who have committed
certain crimes ... to be seized and hung by the posse comitatus with-
out regular trial; or denying to any person, or class of persons, the
right to pursue any peaceful avocations allowed to others. What is
called class legislation would belong to this category, and would
be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but would not necessarily be so to the Thirteenth, when not in-
volving the idea of any subjection of one man to another."); 109
U.S. at 48 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
154. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989); University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
155. See Eric Schnapper, ,4ffirmative Action and the Legislative Histoy
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (arguing that
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the
constitutionality of affirmative action).
156. Schnapper, supra note 155, at 763 (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 544 (1866) (Rep. Taylor)).
157. VI MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at
425 (James D. Richardson ed. 1897).
158. See, e.g.. Schnapper, supra note 155, at 763-64, 774-75, 778.
limited to Democrats or people who had opposed the
abolition of slavery. Once emancipation was achieved,
even some abolitionists were wary of any further legisla-
tive action on behalf of African Americans.' 60 So long
as this position was isolated among a few disaffected
Republicans, the radical coalition remained intact.
However, as early as 1870 the party began to see large
scale defections into the ranks of a new "reform" move-
ment - "liberal Republicanism." 161
Eric Foner has described the liberal Republican re-
form movement as "at one and the same time a moral
creed, part of an emerging science of society, and the
outcry of a middle-class intelligentsia alarmed by class
conflict, the ascendancy of machine politics, and its own
exclusion from power."' 162 At the center of liberal ide-
ology was the belief that the political and economic
worlds were governed by scientific laws. ' 6 3 The laissez-
faire principles of classical liberalism furnished the axi-
oms for the liberals' "science of society."1 64 Since soci-
ety ran by a set of natural laws, the discovery and
implementation of these laws was a task for experts.
Politics, rather than being a means for implementing the
will of the majority, became "the art by which the teach-
ings of social science are put into practice."i 6 5 Democ-
racy was to be judged not by how effectively it
represented the will of the majority, but by whether it
elevated "the best men" to leadership. 66
The ideological roots of the liberal defection from
radical republicanism lay in the existence of two differ-
ent visions of the free labor ideology' 6 7 which animated
the Republican party before the war. One vision of free
labor came out of the republican tradition, the other was
a construct of the classical liberalism associated with
Adam Smith.' 6 8 This ambiguity in free labor ideology
allowed the liberal reform movement to abandon the
159. For numerous examples, see Schnapper, supra note 155.
160. JOHN G. SPROAT, "THE BEST MEN": LIBERAL REFORMERS IN
THE GUILDED AGE 14-15 (1982).
161. The standard account of the liberal reform movement is
THE BEST MEN, supra note 160. Of particular interest for their dis-
cussions of liberal attitudes toward class legislation and civil rights
are: Michael Les Benedict, Reform Republicans and the Retreat from
Reconstruction, in THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 138,
at 53-77; RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 488-499; BEYOND
EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 379-386; Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra
note 38.
162. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 492.
163. Id. at 488-89; Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 55-64.
164. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 488-89; Reform Republi-
cans, supra note 161, at 56-57.
165. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 60 (quoting New York
Nation, Feb. 10, 1870 at 91).
166. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 60-61. The expres-
sion, "the best men" was commonly used by liberals to refer to
those men whose "loft[y] development of moral and intellectual
education" fitted them for the task of managing society. Id. at 60
(quoting Charles Francis Adams). Unsurprisingly, the liberals
found a high percentage of such men in their own ranks.
167. See generally, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note
24.
168. See Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38; James Gray Pope,
Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 1071, 1100-1104 (1987).
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radical wing of the Republican party, while still laying
claim to the party's ideological heritage.
Republican ideology from the time of Paine and
Jefferson had held that true freedom entailed ownership
of productive property. Only the citizen who enjoyed
the economic independence which came with property
ownership could possess the political independence and
"civic virtue" which would keep the republic healthy. 16 9
At the same time, too much wealth concentrated in a
few hands would lead to self-indulgence, arrogance and
the domination of the political process by the few. 170
Therefore, the ideal republican free laborer was a small
scale entrepreneur, a farm owner, or an artisan, an
owner of productive property which he worked him-
self.,71 The free laborer of classical liberalism, on the
other hand, owned no productive property. He worked,
for wages, for another. He was a free laborer "only in
the sense that no legal bonds tied [him] to particular
tasks or masters."' 172 His "freedom rested simply in his
ownership of his capacity to labor."' 73 To those
steeped in the republican tradition, the Smithian free la-
borer was dangerously dependent upon the one who
paid his wages. To many northerners, a worker who
spent his entire life dependent on the wages of another
seemed almost as unfree as a slave. 174
Before the war, these two visions of the free la-
borer were able to peacefully coexist within the Republi-
can party. Because of economic mobility for white
workers in the antebellum years, the Smithian wage la-
borer was perceived as being merely in a state of transi-
tion, accumulating property and experience on his way
to becoming a republican free laborer.175 Meanwhile,
slavery, which degraded the value of free labor, and the
slave power, which used its concentrated wealth for its
own ends, were the common enemies of either vision of
free labor. After the war, however, changing economic
conditions brought out the contradictions between the
two visions of free labor. This conflict precipitated a cri-
sis in free labor ideology, and led to a split in Republi-
can ranks.
While economic mobility in the pre-war years had
blurred the distinctions between labor and capital by
making today's wage laborer tomorrow's owner, the
rapid expansion of industrial capitalism in the years
after the war led to increasing class divisions and an-
tagonisms. Meanwhile, the common struggle of all pro-
ponents of free labor against slavery was completed.
Eric Foner has described the result:
During Reconstruction the coalition which had
fought the Civil War dissolved into its component
elements, and strands of the free labor ideology
were adopted by contending social classes, each
for its own purposes. For the middle class, free la-
bor became a stolid liberal orthodoxy, in which in-
dividualism, laissez-faire, the defense of private
property, and the rule of the "Best Men" defined
good government. At the same time, the labor
movement, especially after 1873, adopted the free
labor outlook as an affirmation of the primacy of
the producing classes and a critique of the emerg-
ing capitalist order, rather than as a testament to
the harmony of interests in society. 176
Republicans had envisioned that a "purified re-
public"' 177 would emerge from the ashes of the war.
The republic would be made up of free and equal citi-
zens and would use the new activist state to pursue the
common good. 178 As post-war class divisions grew,
Republicans began to question the existence of a unitary
common good. Many working class and African Ameri-
can Republicans hoped that both state and federal gov-
169. See J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS
ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80-103 (1973); POCOCK, THE
POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 150-51 (1977); Ambigui-
ties of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 774-75; Labor and the Constitution,
supra note 168, at 1101-02; Akhil Reed Amar, ForY Acres and a
Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990). For a discussion of the influence of republi-
can ideology on the "founders," see GORDON WOOD, supra note
122, at 46-124.
170. See James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct
Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
287, 296-97 (1990). On the dangers of luxury as perceived by
American revolutionaries, see GORDON WOOD, supra note 122, at
108-16. On the Republican Party's suspicion of concentrated
wealth, see FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note 24, at
21-23.
171. See FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note 24, at 15-
23; Labor and the Constitution, supra note 168, at 1102; Andrew Jack-
son, Farewell Address, supra note 130, at 305 ("The planter, the
farmer, the mechanic, and the laborer... are the bone and sinew
of the country - men who love liberty and desire nothing but
equal rights and equal laws, and who, moreover, hold the great
mass of our national wealth, although it is distributed in moderate
amounts among the millions of freemen who possess it."). I use
the masculine pronoun deliberately. For most Republicans, the
free laborer was imagined to be a man. For an account of the
nineteenth century women's rights movement that considers the
intersections of that movement with radical republicanism, see El-
len Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights,
Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 176-223 (David Thelen ed.
1988).
172. Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 779.
173. Id. at 769.
174. FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note 24, at 16-17;
Labor and the Constitution, supra note 168, at 1101; BEYOND EQUAL-
ITY, supra note 33, at 30-31; Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38,
at 776.
175. The accuracy of the perception that most northern wage la-
borers were only in a transitional stage to economic independence
was questionable even before the war. The 1850's had seen wage
workers emerge as a permanent class. But, as late as 1860, large
factories were still a rarity. Most wage earners worked with only a
few others, in an enterprise owned by an individual or small part-
nership. Thus, the free labor image which northern Republicans
had of their society was still tenable when the war began. FREE
SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note 24, at 29-39; Labor and the
Constitution, supra note 168, at 1102-03. For a detailed description
of the development of wage labor during and after the war, see
BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 3-44.
176. POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR, supra
note 131, at 126. See also Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38;
Labor and the Constitution, supra note 168, at 1100-04.
177. BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 73 (quoting Thaddeus
Stevens) ("[N]o distinction would be tolerated in this purified Re-
public but what arose from merit and conduct.").
178. BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 79-80, 335.
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ernments would take an active role in ensuring the fair
and equal distribution of wealth and power which was
necessary to make the republican vision of free labor a
reality.1'7 " Elite and middle class Republicans, on the
other hand, "looked upon the hybrid of their own crea-
tion - the mixture of the democratic state and the ac-
tive state - as Frankenstein's monster."180 Among the
most frightening and dangerous products of this hybrid
was the masses of working people pursuing their own
interests by seeking "class legislation" in the form of
regulatory laws like the eight-hour day, or redistributive
plans, like progressive taxes. 18 1
The liberal reform movement formed the van-
guard of the elite and middle class Republicans who
feared the emerging "politics of class feeling."' 8 2 The
influence of the liberal movement on the Republican
party was strengthened beyond its absolute size by the
fact that liberal ranks included academicians, editors,
and intellectually inclined businessmen and lawyers. 183
Many of the liberal reformers had been supporters of
the anti-slavery movement, but by 1870 they had begun
a defection from the radical coalition, and had formed
alliances with conservative Republicans and Democrats
in a retreat from Reconstruction. ' 8 4 It is no coincidence
that this fracturing of the radical movement, the retreat
from Reconstruction, and the abandonment of the
freedmen was led by elite middle class reformers. As
William Forbath has explained, the liberals' "dis-
enchantment with federal intervention and 'Black Re-
publicanism' in the South ... was closely bound up with
a desire to curb the 'extreme phase of republicanism'
and the clamour for 'class legislation' which seemed rife
at home."' 18 5
In the aftermath of the war,, some Radical policies
toward the defeated South struck elite Republicans as
dangerous examples of the class legislation that would
inevitably result from runaway democracy in an activist
state.' 8 6 Radicals' early experiments with confiscation
and redistribution of former slave-holders' land' 8 7 were
particularly frightening, since confiscation was the
"quintessential case" of class legislation.' 8 8 Some
Republicans, including the editors of the New York
Times, feared that the precedent set by confiscation
"would not be confined to the South," but would soon
spread to the North where "a war on property" would
"succeed the war on Slavery."' 189
Reconstruction measures much less radical than
land redistribution were still threatening to elite Repub-
licans who feared the power of the emerging working
class. African Americans were majorities or near major-
ities in most of the Southern states.' 9 0 Federal laws
which protected the political rights of the freedmen
179. 1 do not mean to imply that white working class and African
American interests were identical, only that both groups had a di-
rect interest in activist government and in what liberals would
condemn as class legislation.
180. BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 340.
181. See THE BEST MEN, supra note 160, at 182-84, 211-12; Lais-
sez-Faire and Liberty, supra note 147, at 302, 306-09; Reform Republi-
cans, supra note 161, at 57-58; RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at
478-82, 498; BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 335-340.
182. BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 335 (quoting Nation edi-
tor E.L. Godkin). Godkin "was the pre-eminent spokesman for
liberal reform." THE BEST MEN, supra note 160, at 273-74.
183. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 53-54; RECONSTRUC-
TION, supra note 50, at 488.
184. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 53-54, 64-77; RECON-
STRUCTION, supra note 50, at 492. I do not mean to imply that the
liberal defection was the only cause of radical Reconstruction's
death. However, as Michael Les Benedict has pointed out, the lib-
eral defection did "sap the party of much of its intellectual vigor
and its crusading spirit." Reform Republicans, supra, at 55. In addi-
tion, the liberals allied themselves with conservative Republicans
and even Democrats in their attempt to dislodge the radicals from
power. Id. at 64-77. The abandonment of Reconstruction by any
Republicans was particularly painful to African Americans, since
the party had led the nation, however reluctantly, from contain-
ment of slavery to abolition, to African American citizenship and
even enfranchisement.
The pain of being abandoned by the Republican party was
expressed by several writers. See, e.g, Our Colored Exchanges, Wash-
ington Bee, Nov. 10, 1883 (exchange from the Cairo Pilot) ("It
would scarcely have occasioned a ripple of excitement if a Demo-
cratic supreme bench had bridged our civil rights with a shadow
- phantom - a technicality - but when our best friends, our
Brutus, dons the judicial garb of a Taney, with the hand of an
adverse sentiment raises the dagger - we say with Caesar of old
and "thou too Brutus."); Civil Rights, Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 20,
1883 at 2 (written by John P. Green) (also published in Christian
Recorder, Nov. 1, 1883) ("[Alt this late day, we find a Supreme
Court composed of Republican Judges, for the most part .... bar-
tering away the rights and liberties of men who have risked their
lives in putting them in office."); The Civil Rights Decision, New York
Globe, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2, reprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-
1890, supra note 4, at 167-68 ("The Democratic Party is a fraud -
a narrowminded, corrupt bloody fraud; the Republican party has
grown to be little better."); New York Globe, Nov. 3, 1883 ("The
Republican party, like the United States, is a hollow sham."). It
was, at least partially, this sense of betrayal that resulted in the
massive outpouring of distress in the press and led the New Orle-
ans Standard to complain, "Morally, this decision [the Civil Rights
Cases] is the heaviest blow that has been struck at us." Peoples
Advocate, Oct. 27, 1883 at 2 (exchange from New Orleans
Standard).
185. Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 789 (citing 4 Na-
tion 520 (1867)). See also RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 497-
99; POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR, supra
note 131, at 97-127.
186. See C. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN'S
BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP (1978); RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 50, at 498-99.
187. See RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 68-71, 158-59
(Freedmen's Bureau authorized to divide abandoned and confis-
cated land for rental and eventual sale to freedmen and loyal refu-
gees; Sherman's Field Order No. 15). Tragically, by 1866 almost
all African Americans who had received land had been evicted
from their new property, after Presidential pardons of plantation
owners and orders to restore prior ownership. Id. at 159-64.
188. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 68-69. See also THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 147, at 176-77.
189. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 309 (quoting New York
Times, June 14, July 9, 1867).
190. For population figures see BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra
note 55, at 383 (South Carolina), 431 (Mississippi), 451 (Louisi-
ana), 487 (Alabama), 495 (Georgia), 511 (Florida), 526 (North
Carolina), 536-37 (Virginia), 546 (Arkansas), 552 (Texas), 563-64
(Maryland), 566 (Kentucky), 571 (Tennessee), 576 (Missouri).
Three states of the old confederacy, South Carolina, Mississippi
and Louisiana, had Black majorities. Three others, Alabama,
Florida and Georgia, were just under half Black. Two states, Vir-
ginia and North Carolina, were about forty per cent Black. The
remaining three states, Texas, Tennessee and Arkansas, were
about one quarter African American. RECONSTRUCTION, supra
note 50, at 294.
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threatened to produce the same kind of class legislation
on behalf of the "African proletariat" in the South that
elites feared from the "Celtic proletariat" and other
working people in Northern cities. 19 1 The African
American/Radical dominated state governments of the
reconstructed South affirmed the liberals' fears by using
progressive taxes to finance public services, internal im-
provements, and public school systems.' 9
2
The activist governments of the southern states
during Reconstruction would have been frightening to
elite Republicans under any circumstances. The fact
that African Americans played a major role in the new
political order made the southern Radical wing of the
party particularly unattractive to liberals. Although the
liberals were racial egalitarians by the standards of their
day, and many of them had been active in the movement
to end slavery, 193 they still believed that Black people
were inferior to whites. Thus, their middle class inclina-
tion to favor the men of "intelligence and culture"'
' 9 4
from the former southern slave-holding class was rein-
forced by their racist disdain for the freedmen's experi-
ment in self government. 19
5
The liberal reformers' retreat from Reconstruction
also served a pragmatic political purpose. Liberals be-
lieved that the only way to dislodge radical Republicans
from power was to divert the country's attention away
from the great moral issues of slavery and race which
had been at the center of the party's agenda during the
war and the early years of Reconstruction. l6 It was the
radicals' anti-slavery fervor and discipline which had al-
lowed them to consolidate their power in the party and
steer party policy. If the liberal reformers could deflect
the nation's attention from racial justice, they would rob
the radicals of the issue which had given them their
moral cachet and kept them in power. The liberal re-
formers therefore wanted to put away the "bloody
shirt," forget slavery and the war, and get on with the
"important" issues of the day, such as tariff reduction,
"good government," and civil service reform. ' 9 7 These
were the issues which liberals believed to be the nation's
truly pressing concerns. They were also the issues
which could propel the reformers to political power.19 8
The liberal reformers thus hoped to dislodge radi-
cals from power and to "place administration and legis-
lation in the hands of the best men."' 99 In the north
"the best men" were identified as the liberals them-
selves. In the south they were the men of "intelligence
and culture" 20 0 from the former slave-holding class -
the south's "natural leaders."'20 1 Both would be pro-
pelled to power together by smashing the "politics of
class feeling." 20 2
The liberals' solution for the evils of the "politics
of class feeling" and its resulting class legislation was a
retreat from the activist state back to the safe haven of
limited government. 20 3 Since the majority of the popu-
lation could not be trusted to refrain from using the
political branches for their own interest, the judiciary
had to be enlisted in the liberal cause to foil the redis-
tributive aims of the masses. 20 4 Many judges were in
fact attracted to liberal ideology by its anti-majoritarian
aspects and the prominence of elite attorneys in the
movement. 20 5 Courts had several mechanisms through
191. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 69 (quoting liberal Re-
publican Charles Francis Adams, Jr.). Adams also feared a grow-
ing "Chinese proletariat on the Pacific." Id. See also BEYOND
EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 335-36.
192. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 75-76; RECONSTRUC-
TION, supra note 50, at 364-379; Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitu-
tion in Black Life During the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 203, 218-220 (David Thelen
ed. 1988).
193. THE BEST MEN, supra note 160, at 14-15; RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 50, at 492.
194. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 499 (quoting Nation,
Dec. 2, 1869).
195. See RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 497-99; Reform
Republicans, supra note 161, at 69; THE BEST MEN, supra note 160,
at 29-36.
196. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 73-74.
197. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 497.
198. Writers in the Black press were aware that the attention of
the country was slipping away from racial justice. One writer re-
called that over the course of the previous decade, the country
had seen "the ebb of public sentiment on the rights of the new
citizen and the shifting of the main political issues which divide
National parties from those questions growing out of the recon-
struction period to those mainly economical in their nature." The
Civil Rights Decision, Peoples Advocate, Oct. 20, 1883.
199. Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 60 (quoting liberal
Henry Adams).
200. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 499 (quoting Nation,
Dec. 2, 1869).
201. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 499 (quoting Nation,
June 16, 1870).
202. BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 335 (quoting Nation ed-
itor E.L. Godkin).
203. See BEYOND EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 379-81.
204. An alternative to using the judiciary as a check on popular
government would be place more direct limits on democracy by
restricting the franchise to citizens with certain "qualifications."
This approach was favored by some reformers, who "advocat[ed]
educational and property qualifications for voting, especially in
the nation's largest cities, and an increase in the number of ofli-
cials appointed rather than elected." However, "[a]s -one re-
former recognized, proposals for sweeping restrictions on the
ballot stood little chance of approval, since 'men will not vote to
disfranchise (sic) themselves.' " RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50,
at 492-493 (quoting Dorman B. Eaton, Municipal Government, 5
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 7 (1873)).
For the African American masses in the Southern states,
there was little distinction between direct suffrage restrictions and
a judiciary devoted to limited government. Because of white ter-
ror against African Americans who dared to vote, the practical
existence of African American suffrage in the South depended
upon a federal judiciary that was willing to allow free reign to an
activist federal government in protecting African American rights.
On the role played by white terror in the destruction of Recon-
struction, see A. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX CON-
SPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971); Counter
Reconstruction, supra note 138; JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUC-
TION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 152-173 (1961). When the federal
government was willing to intervene forcefully, it proved that it
could be effective in stopping Klan violence against African Amer-
ican and white Republican voters. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note
50, at 454-59 (federal campaign against the Klan in 1871-72).
205. Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 792. In fact, as
William Forbath and David Montgomery point out, "the first sys-
tematic exposition of the new liberalism was an essay on the Con-
stitution," by Thomas McIntyre Cooley. Id. (quoting BEYOND
EQUALITY, supra note 33 at 380). Cooley's Treatise on the Constitu-
tional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union, first published in 1868 while he was chiefjustice of
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which they could curb the tendency of runaway democ-
racy to pass class legislation. The federal legislature
could be limited by using the tradition of federalism,
with its doctrine of enumerated powers. Judges could
restrict both federal and state legislation by a construc-
tion of Reconstruction which emphasized the laissez-
faire principles which were part of the liberal version of
free labor ideology, and thus give laissez-faire a consti-
tutional basis in the new Amendments.
For modern constitutional lawyers, the idea that
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies laissez-faire prin-
ciples is encapsulated in a single reviled code word -
Lochner.20 6 The conventional wisdom of constitutional
history adopts the view of Justice Holmes, expressed in
his famous Lochner dissent, that reactionary judges had
simply read their own personal laissez-faire economic
theories into the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
of liberty and property. Holmes's view that the Four-
teenth Amendment was "not intended to embody a par-
ticular economic theory,"'20 7 but was designed with
much more limited purposes in mind, was shared by the
majority of the Court in Slaughter-House. The Slaughter-
House majority held that "the one pervading purpose"
of the Reconstruction amendments was "the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him."-2 0 8 However, the four dissenters in Slaughter-House
took a different view. The dissenters believed that Re-
construction went far beyond the dissolution of slavery
and the establishment of African American freedom.
They believed that Reconstruction implemented free la-
bor ideology into constitutional law.
2 0 9
The claim of the Slaughter-House dissenters that Re-
construction had encoded free labor principles into the
Constitution was not at all unreasonable. The millions
of white northerners who fought and mobilized for total
war were not driven to death and sacrifice 2 10 by pure
moral opposition to slavery. Instead, many who joined
the Republican cause "opposed slavery and the 'Slave
Power' chiefly because they appeared to threaten the
flourishing of 'Free Labor' and the North's 'free labor
system.' "211 For many Republicans, then, the fruits of
victory should have included the reconstruction of the
South, and the nation, into a national free labor system.
But which vision of free labor, the republican or the
liberal, should it be? This question was faced by the
Slaughter-House dissenters. 212
William Forbath has pointed out that the plaintiff
butchers in Slaughter-House were "exemplars" of the re-
publican free laborer. "They were artisan shopkeepers,
and pursued their calling by selling their products, not
their labor.''213 Each butcher "owned productive prop-
erty .... worked in his own buildings, and employed one
or two hirelings, who, in turn, would learn their trade
and become independent workingmen themselves. ' 2 14
When Louisiana granted an exclusive slaughterhouse
monopoly to a single corporation, the state threatened
to reduce these independent, productive property own-
ing free laborers to a dangerous state of dependence on
the corporation which owned the monopoly rights.
If the republican free labor system was constitu-
tionalized by Reconstruction, it had to protect these ar-
chetypal free laborers from a monopoly which stripped
them of their ability to pursue their trade and even
threatened to force them into the dependence of "wage
slavery." The Slaughter-House dissenters warned that
"our government will be a republic only in name... [if]
the right of free labor . . . is violated," '2 15 and would
have struck down Louisiana's monopoly grant as
unconstitutional.
Since the butchers were archetypes of the republi-
can free laborer, the Slaughter-House dissenters' defense
of them against Louisiana's grant of monopoly could
have been a major blow for the republican free labor
vision. However, Field's dissent also contains a gratui-
tous statement of the liberal vision of free labor. In a
footnote immediately after his affirmation of the "sa-
cred" "right of free labor,"' 2 16 Field quotes a passage
from Adam Smith's ealth of Nations which celebrates
the "liberty... of the workman and of those who might
be disposed to employ him" to freely contract in the
marketplace. 2 17 Thus, while the facts of Slaughter-House
the Michigan Supreme Court, became laissez-faire's bible. Cooley
argued that there was a higher moral law, in the light of which the
Constitution must be interpreted. This higher law implemented
the vision of laissez-faire by forbidding legislation that would
transfer property from one person to another, or interfere with
property relations in any other way except to fulfill the needs of
government. BEYOND EQUALITY, supra, at 381. For a brief discus-
sion of Cooley's influence, see Laissez-Faire and Liberty, supra note
147, at 330-31.
206. Lochiner v..\v York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
207. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
208. 83 U.S. at 71.
209. See 83 U.S. at 83 (Field,J., dissenting); 83 U.S. at I I I (Brad-
lev, J., dissenting); 83 U.S at 124 (Swayne, J., dissenting). The
Chief Justice dissented without opinion. All of the dissenters
joined Field's opinion. William Nelson has described Field's dis-
sent as "the only opinion in the case that stands on its own and
can be comprehended fully as an effort to transform into doctrine
the antebellum rhetoric underlying section one [of the fourteenth
amendment). The other dissents are supplements to Field's opin-
ion. Even Miller's opinion for the Court is best understood as a
response to Field and the other dissenters." THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 147, at 156.
210. See GERALD LINDERMAN, EMBATTLED COURAGE: THE EXPERI-
ENCE OF COMBAT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1987).
211. Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 773-774. See also
FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, supra note 24, at 73-102, 261-
300.
212. The traditional wisdom of constitutional history holds that
once the view of Holmes's classic dissents was adopted, and Re-
construction was reduced to its "proper" scope as being primarily
about racial equality, the "incorrect" view was replaced by the
"correct" one, and Constitutional law resumed its temporarily in-
terrupted march of progress. This view ignores a whole universe
of possible meanings of Reconstruction which might flow from the
republican version of free labor ideology. See generally Ambiguities of
Free Labor, supra note 38; Labor and the Constitution, supra note 168.
213. Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 776.
214. Id. at 777 (internal quotes omitted).
215. 83 U.S. at 110 (Field, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. The passage from Adam Smith is:
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implicate republican free labor principles, the "author-
ity" cited by Field relies on liberal free labor, and envi-
sions a laissez-faire world in which freedom of contract
is raised to constitutional status.
It is easy to understand why the Slaughter-House ma-
jority resisted either of the free labor interpretations of
Reconstruction offered up in the dissents. A truly re-
publican free labor Constitution would have required an
extremely active and powerful federal government, the
Frankenstein state that elite republicans feared. An ac-
tivist democratic nation-state would not only be danger-
ous to elite economic and political interests, it would
also obliterate the familiar and beloved federal system.
Even the laissez-faire, limited government reading of
free labor favored by liberals, when constitutionalized,
would have required an overhaul of the federal system
by making the Supreme Court the "perpetual censor
upon"'2 18 state legislation affecting vast areas of com-
mercial and industrial life. In 1873, the Court was (nar-
rowly) unwilling to accept the implications of either
vision of constitutionalized free labor.21 9
The reception of the laissez-faire version of free la-
bor in other courts was more enthusiastic. 220 As Wil-
liam Forbath has reported, "nothing in Field's Slaughter-
House dissent . . . quite presaged the fanatic liberalism
which judges would soon infuse into the fourteenth
amendment and state constitution due process clauses
as these became weapons against the working class's
political initiatives."' 22 1 Meanwhile, the republican vi-
sion of free labor disappeared from official ideology,
and survived only in the hopes and dreams of the labor
movement. 22 2 By the 1890s, laissez-faire liberalism had
worked its way back into the U.S. Reports, this time via
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 223
Field's Slaughter-House dissent thus proved to be the be-
The property which every man has is in his own labor, as it
is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the
most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man
lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands; and to
hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in
what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neigh-
bor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the
workman and of those who might be disposed to employ
him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks
proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they
think proper.
83 U.S. at 110 n.* (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting ADAM SMITH,
WEALTH OF NATIONS). Field found the quote in the butchers'
brief, which was largely an argument for "the general proposition
... that the Reconstruction amendments rendered the Constitu-
tion a charter for a free marketplace." Ambiguities of Free Labor,
supra note 38, at 780.
Field again made free labor arguments and quoted the same
passage from Adam Smith in his concurrence to Butchers Union Co.
v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884). In fact, by 1884
Smithian free labor had been promoted into the text of Field's ar-
gument, rather than being confined to a footnote as it was in
Slaughter-House. In Butchers Union, the Court revisited the monop-
oly issues which had led to the Slaughter-House litigation. The Lou-
isiana legislature had repealed the monopoly grant before the end
of the 25 year length for which it was initially established. After
the monopoly was repealed, Crescent City Company, which had
held the monopoly before it was repealed, sought an injunction
forbidding a rival company from slaughtering livestock. Crescent
ginning of a path by which the "sacred" "right of free
labor"2 2 4 dissolved into freedom of contract, and by
which republicans who had created the activist statejus-
tified calls for limited government and laissez-faire.
While the Supreme Court's commitment to feder-
alism delayed the victory of laissez-faire in economic re-
lations for a quarter of a century after Slaughter-House,
limited government won earlier victories when the
Court struck down federal civil rights laws. In Slaughter-
House the pull of laissez-faire worked at cross-purposes
with the restraint of federalism, and laissez-faire nar-
rowly lost. In the Civil Rights Cases, and in other cases
striking down federal civil rights laws, laissez-faire/lim-
ited government and federalism pulled together, both in
opposition to federal protection of civil rights.
By demanding that African American citizens no
longer be the "special favorite of the laws," 2 25 Justice
Bradley struck a blow against what liberals perceived to
be class legislation. The opinion was a thus a victory for
limited government and the ascendant laissez-faire phi-
losophy. At the same time, by striking down a law that
interfered with traditional state prerogatives, and in-
truded into the "domain of local jurisprudence, ' 22 6 the
decisions were also a victory for federalism. The painful
irony of this early success for the emerging laissez-faire
order was that it came at the expense of African Ameri-
can rights, rights which were declared by the Court to
be the central concern of Reconstruction.
Speaking in 1883 to a National Convention of
Colored Men, Frederick Douglass complained that as a
result of the nation's retreat from Reconstruction the
African American citizens of the south had "been aban-
doned by the Government and left to the laws of na-
ture." 2 27 For Douglass and other African Americans,
this abandonment was a bitter betrayal of Reconstruc-
Company maintained that the repeal of the monopoly before the
end of the statutory 25 year term was a violation of a contract
which it had with the state, and that the state was therefore forbid-
den from making the repeal. All the Justices agreed that the state
had the power to repeal the monopoly. Field, Ill U.S. at 754,
and Bradley, 111 U.S. at 760, wrote concurring opinions which
reaffirmed the arguments of their Slaughter-House dissents that the
initial grant of monopoly was unconstitutional. Bradley's opinion
was joined by Harlan and Woods, so fourJustices at least implied
that the Fourteenth Amendment enacted laissez-faire free labor
principles into the Constitution. See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
at 23-24 (quoted more fully in note 153), where the Court identi-
fies "the right to pursue any peaceful avocations allowed to
others," as one of the rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
218. Slaughter-House 83 U.S. at 78.
219. See supra Section IV.A (discussing Supreme Court's attach-
ment to federalism).
220. For a description of some of the cases where courts used
laissez-faire ideas to strike down labor laws and laws that inter-
fered with "freedom of contract," see Ambiguities of Free Labor,
supra note 38, at 795-800; Roscoe Pound, Freedom of Contract, 18
YALE LJ. 454, 470-82 (1909).
221. Ambiguities of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 786.
222. See id. at 800-814.
223. See, e.g., Allgever v. Illinois, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
224. 83 U.S. at I10 (Field, J., dissenting).
225. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Hon. Frederick Douglass: His Earnest and Eloquent Address,
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tion by Congress and the United States Supreme Court.
Ironically, the idea that African Americans, and all other
citizens, should be "left to the laws of nature" also cap-
tures the essence of the "science of society" espoused
by liberal proponents of laissez-faire. When Justice
Bradley declared that the African American citizen
would no longer be "the special favorite of the laws,"
ideological principle, an attachment to federalism, class
bias, racism and political expediency coalesced in the
"death dealing decisions" 2 28 of the Supreme Court.
VI. CLASS LEGISLATION IN THE BLACK PRESS
The possibility that federal civil rights laws were
examples of class legislation, and violated Jacksonian
concepts of equal protection by making African Ameri-
cans the special favorites of the law, is only hinted at in
the Supreme Court's opinions. The most obvious ex-
amples of class legislation, such as land confiscation, did
not survive long enough to merit the Court's review.
The offense done to the Court's conception of federal-
ism by the civil rights laws which did reach the Court
provided more than enough reason for the Court to
strike them down. There was no need for the Court to
even consider the class legislation issue.
For writers in the Black press, however, the rela-
tionship between civil rights laws and class legislation
assumed a prominent role in the discussion of the
Court's decisions. While African Americans who were
unhappy with the Supreme Court's decisions expressed
their displeasure through a blizzard of criticisms, per-
sonal, political, and legal, 2 29 the few writers who ap-
proved of the decisions almost invariably spoke of
federal civil rights laws as class legislation, which the
Court had properly struck down. Opposition to class
legislation was thus one of the few rationales mustered
by supporters of the Court in its defense. 2 30
The role of class legislation, and its relationship to
civil rights laws, was deeply divisive in the African Amer-
ican community. Opposition to class legislation was
part of the egalitarian heritage ofJacksonian democracy,
and had fueled the battle against slavery. However, af-
ter the slave power was defeated in battle the rhetoric of
class legislation was deployed against civil rights laws
which had been designed to fulfill freedom's promise.
These contradictions in the possible meaning of class
legislation were bound to produce divisions in the Afri-
can American community, just as they had within white
Republican ranks. In addition class divisions within the
African American community provided the same oppor-
tunities for conflicting attitudes toward class legislation
as existed among white Republicans.2 3' Meanwhile, all
African Americans had to struggle with the tension be-
tween their need for protection and their desire for
autonomy.2 3
2
In the wake of the Civil Rights Cases, the relation-
ship of class legislation to civil rights laws became a par-
ticularly prominent topic in the Black press. Responses
took three basic forms. A minority of writers labeled the
Sumner Act class legislation, and deployed anti-class
legislation arguments to affirm the Supreme Court's de-
cision that the Act was unconstitutional. 23 3 Some writ-
ers who opposed the Court's decisions defused the class
legislation issue by denying that civil rights laws could
be so categorized.2 3 4 Other writers faced the issue di-
rectly and argued that African Americans' unique his-
tory justified the use of special remedial measures that
might otherwise be condemned as class legislation. 23 5
A. THE BANE OF THE NEGRO Is LEGISLATION
ESPECIALLY FOR THE NEGRO
A few writers in the African American press disap-
proved of the Sumner Act as class legislation, and ap-
plauded the Supreme Court's decision to strike down
the Act in the Civil Rights Cases. These writers argued
that the Sumner Act had given special protection to Af-
rican American citizens which was not available to other
citizens, that it was "legislation especially for the ne-
gro. "236 They argued that no citizen deserved such
"special protection." These opponents of the Sumner
Act believed that special protection was not only unde-
served, it was undesirable. They hoped that the death
of the Act would provide a spur for African American
self-advancement and would even hasten the end of
racism.
Cleveland Gazette, Nov. 24, 1883 at 1 (speech of Frederick
Douglass to the National Convention of Colored Men at Louis-
ville, Kentucky (part 2 of 2)).
228. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Sections III-IV.
230. See infia Section VI.A.
231. See. e.g., RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 100-101, 289,
396-399, 545-547; Roberta Sue Alexander, Presidential Reconstruc-
lion: Ideology and Change, in THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra
note 138, at 29, 48-49.
232. See Constitution of Aspiration, supra note 9, at 358-360; Presiden-
ial Reconstruction, supra note 231, at 45-48.
233. See infia Section VI.A.
234. See infra Section VI.B. I.
235. See infra Section VI.B.2.
236. The Recent Decision, Christian Recorder, Nov. 1, 1883 (by
"Will"). Perhaps the classification of the Sumner Act as class leg-
islation by some of its opponents can best be understood through
a simple hypothetical example. Suppose two male citizens, one
white and one Black, were refused admission to a hotel. When
asked why, the manager replied, "I didn't like the looks of the
white man. I don't allow Blacks into my hotel." The African
American citizen could bring a suit in federal court under the
Sumner Act, while the white man would be limited to a common
law action in state court. Thus, only the African American would
be entitled to federal jurisdiction over his claim.
During Senate debate over the Sumner Act, Senator Hamil-
ton of Maryland identified two other aspects of the Sumner Act,
besides its grant of federal jurisdiction over racial exclusion suits,
which condemned it as special legislation in the eyes of its detrac-
tors: (1) The Sumner Act provided criminal penalties for racial
exclusion, whereas other forms of exclusion were only actionable
under common law civil suits; (2) The Sumner Act fixed civil pen-
alties at $500, whereas "All private wrongs under the common law
are to be compensated according to the injury done." CONG.
REC., 43rd Cong., 2d Sess. app. 114-115 (1875) (Sen. Hamilton).
Thus, opponents of the Act who wanted to label it class legislation
could look to its grant of federal jurisdiction, and to the provision
of different remedies than those available in non-racial cases.
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The idea that civil rights laws should be con-
demned as class legislation because they provided spe-
cial protection to African Americans which was not
generally available to all citizens was expressed force-
fully by African American attorney John D. Lewis of
Philadelphia.2 3 7 Writing in the Christian Recorder under
the headline "Conservative Views of a Colored Law-
yer,"'2'3 Lewis first recognized the unusual history of Af-
rican Americans in North America by reminding his
readers that the Constitution "was only practically made
to apply to colored people by the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments. ' 23 9 Lewis thoroughly approved
of the changes in "the organic law" which had elevated
himself and his fellow African Americans "to the dignity
of American citizenship. ' 240 However, he criticized Af-
rican Americans who "show[ed] a weakness to clamor
for class legislation or a civil law as extra protection to
them."'24 1 Lewis admonished advocates of civil rights
laws: "The colored people should not ask or expect
more statutory law than is available for the protection of
every other class of citizens." 242
Some writers emphasized that special legislation in
the form of civil rights laws was not just more than Afri-
can American citizens deserved. It was a positive evil.
As one writer in the Christian Recorder explained: "The
bane of the negro is legislation 'especially for the ne-
gro.' As soon as this country finds out that the only leg-
islation necessary for the negro is only that which is
necessary for white people, so soon will the absurdity of
237. Lewis was born in Toronto, Canada. He graduated from
Yale Law School and practiced for three years in Boston before
moving to Philadelphia. In 1876 he became one of the first two
African Americans admitted to the Philadelphia Bar. The other
admittee, J. Howard Scott, quit the law soon after, leaving Lewis
as the only practicing African American attorney in Philadelphia
until his death in 1891. Lewis was elected as one of Penn-
sylvania's delegates to the Nashville Convention of Colored Men
in 1879, and was a leader in the fight against segregation in Phila-
delphia. From the time of his arrival in the city, he lobbied for the
repeal of a statute which required separate schools. After school
segregation was officially banned in 188 1, he called upon commu-
nity groups to monitor compliance throughout the city.
Lewis was an "independent," in effect a Democrat, a polit-
ical alignment which was very unusual among African Americans.
His withdrawal from the Republican party was apparently moti-
vated by his perception that the party had chosen political expedi-
ency over African American rights in the Compromise of 1877. In
addition, he believed that by the late 1870s the Republican party
was dominated by manufacturing interests and capital. The best
one could hope for from the Republican party, Lewis believed,
were policies favorable to industrial factory workers. Since the
vast majority of African Americans were small farmers or farm la-
borers, Lewis thought they had little to gain by supporting the
Republican party. WILLIAM DORSEY'S PHILADELPHIA, supra note
36, at 167-72, 203, 217-18.
238. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2. Lewis's remarks were published along
with an article by John P. Green, who approved of the Sumner
Act, under the headline, Civil Rights: The Opinions of Two Leading
Colored Lawyers on the Recent Decision. Green's remarks were also
reported in the Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 20, 1883. Lewis's column
was cited with approval in the Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883.
239. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2.
240. Id.
241. Id. Lewis wrote: "So soon .. .as the organic law raises any
such nonsense as Civil Rights bills be apparent.112 43
Class legislation in the form of civil rights laws was not
just undeserved. It was undesirable.
Writers who labeled civil rights laws as class legis-
lation, and so condemned them as undeserved and un-
desirable special protection, gave several types of
reasons for their stance. Some writers made standard
laissez-faire liberal arguments against class legislation.
Others complained that African American citizens were
stigmatized when they were made the subject of "legis-
lation especially for the negro." Writers who opposed
class legislation in the form of civil rights laws often
framed their arguments in the language of racial pride
and expressed an attachment to the beliefs of anti-slav-
ery legal theory.
Henry Simkens, editor of the Arkansas Mansion
and one of the few editors of African American newspa-
pers who opposed the Sumner Act and welcomed the
Civil Rights Cases,24 4 spoke in the idiom of laissez-faire:
Now the farcical civil rights bill has been annulled
by the Supreme Court of the United States, equal
rights falls back upon its merit where it rightfully
should. These things should be let severely alone
to regulate themselves, then like the more favored
races, every man will be respected for what he
knows and has, which will be an incentive to the
race to acquire knowledge and wealth. 2
45
race or people to the dignity of American citizenship they show a
weakness to clamor for class legislation or a civil law as extra pro-
tection to them ...." This passage seems to indicate that Lewis
viewed African American "clamor[ing]" for class legislation as just
the latest in a history of such demands by numerous "race[s] or
people" who had become American citizens. In fact, American
history had seen waves of immigration and new citizens. See
ORDEAL By FIRE, supra note 105, at 82-83; FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR,
FREE MEN, supra note 24, at 226-260 (Republicans and nativism).
It seems likely that Lewis is referring to the European immigrants
in the white working class and their demands for special protec-
tion in the form of labor laws.
242. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2.
243. The Recent Decision, Christian Recorder, Nov. 1, 1883 (by
"Will").
244. Calvin Smith, Arkansas, in THE BLACK PRESS IN THE SOUTH,
1865-1979, supra note 4, 66-70. The Arkansas Mansion began
publication in 1869. Id.
245. Equal Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Oct. 27, 1883 at 1, partially
reprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 277.
Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (When laws "mak[e] race a relevant criterion, . . . the
Government implicitly teaches the public that the apportionment
of rewards and penalties can legitimately be made according to
race - rather than according to merit or ability."). Two weeks
after the article quoted in the text appeared in the .lansion,
Simkens published an interesting qualification to its use of the
word "farcical" in reference to the Sumner Act:
In denouncing the civil rights bill to be farcical it was
not our intention to reflect discreditably upon neither the
originators of the bill nor the republican party, as we still
believe and always will believe that the republican party
conscientiously freed the colored people and did all in their
power to secure their equal rights before the law. They
were so egotistical in the matter that they even passed un-
constitutional laws in order to accomplish that end, and at
25
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While most writers in the Black press were ap-
palled by the decisions, Simkens believed that they were
"really a blessing in disguise," 2 4  because they would
lead to a laissez-faire political and social order which
would provide the proper incentives for the develop-
ment of middle class virtues. The African American citi-
zen could "pluck from this seeming nettle of disaster the
perfumed rose of success," by following a plan of indi-
vidual self-advancement:
He must strike out boldly for himself, and must
rely largely upon his own efforts to win the confi-
dence and respect of his white fellow-citizens. ....
Let him be prudent, self-reliant, industrious, tem-
perate and provident of his means; let him educate
himself morally and mentally; let him be scrupu-
lously regardful of the rights of others - insisting
with firmness on all occasions upon like treatment
for himself- and the time must soon come when
the evils of which he now justly complains, shall be
healed by the balm of mutual forbearance and re-
ciprocal kindness. 24
7
Rather than rely on special legislation, the African
American citizen would be forced to rely on "our own
development, the acquisition of knowledge and prop-
erty, and ... the liberal spirit of the progress of the
age." 24 8 He could rest assured that "the forces of an
advanced civilization will work out his case if he acts well
his part." 24
9
While Henry Simkens expressed the liberal ideal
of a laissez-faire world leading to individual achieve-
ment, advancing civilization, and even the end of ra-
cism, John D. Lewis, the "conservative . . .colored
the expiration of twenty one-years or thereabouts, when the
colored people met in national convention and declared
that they were of age and desired to be their own moral free
agents to think and act for themselves. In response to this
the national government only disrobed us of the shield
which was in good faith thrown around us for a safeguard.
Hence we called it farcical because public opinion prohib-
ited its enforcement, as under our laws all men are entitled
to a trial by jury. Public sentiment rules supreme, civil
rights laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883 at 1. In contrast to Simkens'
remarks of October 27, supra, which emphasized individual effort
and class distinctions, and regarded the Act as an evil, this article
emphasizes the ineffectiveness of the Act. For a description of Af-
rican American attempts to enforce the rights promised by the
Sumner Act, and the ineffectiveness of the federal government in
providing protection, see JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACE AND His-
TORY: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1938-1988, at 116-31 (1989) (originally
published in PROLOGUE, volume VI (1974)).
Notice the Mansion's emphasis on the role of jury trials in
ensuring that the Sumner Act's public accommodations sections
were not effective. Section 2 of the Act provided for $500 dam-
ages in civil suits and for criminal penalties. Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 9 (quoting the Act). Thus a defendant in any suit brought
under the Act, civil or criminal, would be entitled to a jury trial by
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. Since local whites could easily dominate juries, it would be
hard for African Americans to win even when a case was brought
to trial. When Congress passed the public accommodations pro-
visions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it avoided this problem by
relying on equitable remedies, which obviated the defendant's
right to a jury trial. See Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
§§ 204, 206, 78 Stat. 241, 244-245 (1964).
246. The Correct View of the Situation, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 24,
1883 at 1. This article reprints remarks made by ex-Congressman
Robert B. Elliott. I have attributed them to Simkens in the text
because they express his editorial line. In fact Simkens opens this
article by writing:
Referring to the civil rights decision we said,
although we differed in opinion from the majority of the
leading colored men, that we would wait at the helm until
all swung around and agreed with us on the subject. We
find in every week's exchanges great men changing their
views on that question and concurring nearly, if not fully
with us. Hon. Fred Douglass has greatly toned down and so
has Bishop Turner, and compare the following letter with
the first views from Hon. R.B. Elliott. He here openly con-
fesses the error in judgement when he too compared the
decision with the Dred Scott decision. Here is what he says
about it now:
247. Id. See also Arkansas Mansion, Dec 1, 1883 at I (exchange
from Missionary Baptist) ("Civil rights for any race ... will not
come about by assembling ourselves together and passing pream-
bles and resolutions, but by obtaining money, education, prop-
erty, and aspiring for that high moral standing that must be seen
by those with whom we are surrounded.").
Simkens's optimism about the prospects for self-help with-
out the shield of federal protection may be attributable to his own
life experience. He reported in the Mansion:
In the year 1860, when we concluded to be free, we care-
fully packed our trunk and left South Carolina, our native
land. We even then rode in first class cars, stopped in first
class hotels, and travelled as a first class passenger on the
Ohio river, eat at the first table, sat next to the Captain, who
sat at the head of the table, on the steamer Silver Moon. At
this dark and dismal hour, no discrimination was made on
account of color, why, because we had plenty of money and
put on the air of an intelligent gentlemen. We were recog-
nized as such so long as the two lasted together, and just as
soon as they were severed we were lowered in the balance
of equality.
Equal Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Oct. 27, 1883. One historian has
pointed out that Simkens seemed to have forgotten that Jim Crow
segregation was a post-Civil war phenomenon. Calvin Smith, Ar-
kansas, in THE BLACK PRESS IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1979, supra note
4, at 66-70. But, with this personal history, it is easy to see why
Simkens would place great faith in advancement through shear
self-determination.
248. Our Exchanges, Christian Recorder, Nov. 15, 1883 at 2 (ex-
change from Florida News). This and the following quote are not
from Simkens, but seem to fairly express his views. As was the
case with the Mansion's editorials, there are certain ambiguities in
this piece which make it unclear whether the author opposed class
legislation in principle, or simply found it to be ineffective in prac-
tice. The author complained, "Class legislation has never done
any good for any of our people." But, as a preface to this state-
ment he wrote, "The decision ... should not surprise anybody."
The Sumner Act "has been a dead letter ever since it was enacted,
and this decision will not affect the present social status of the
colored people in the least." Thus, it is possible that the author
believed class legislation might do some good under the proper
circumstances.
249. Id. While there is a lot of discussion of "self-improvement"
in the Black press, some of which sounds very similar to the rheto-
ric of Simkens and other opponents of civil rights legislation, most
authors did not see self-help as being in opposition to federal pro-
tection of civil rights. Instead, the two should work together. In
the aftermath of the decisions, however, there was "no remedy in
the Constitution, therefore no power in Congress, to remedy the
injustice to which we are subjected." President .rthur on Civil
Rights, New York Globe, Dec. 8, 1883. African Americans were
advised, "We should not look for assistance from whence none
can come," id., and were thus thrown back on unreliable state law
and self-help as their only remaining options.
26
Yale Journal of Law and Liberation, Vol. 3 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjll/vol3/iss1/4
Law and Liberation
lawyer" of Philadelphia, voiced a common liberal anxi-
ety: fear of demagogues. Liberals worried that dema-
gogues would use the possibility of class legislation and
the spoils of electoral victory to bring the masses under
their sway, by promising special benefits to their sup-
porters.2 5 0 Liberals saw both the machine politics of
Northern cities, such as New York's Tammany Hall, and
the Radical/African American dominated state govern-
ments of the reconstructed south as dangerous exam-
ples of this demagogic tendency -to stir up class
antagonisms. Making a similar argument in the after-
math of the Civil Rights Cases, Lewis asserted that when
there is "too much law" 25 1 in the form of "class legisla-
tion ,"252 "the colored people are made the easy prey of
prejudice, artifice and imposition in the hands of design-
ing men, for sinister purposes." 25 3
Both Simkens and Lewis believed that African
American advancement would be speeded by the suspen-
sion of special legislation. Simkens appealed baldly to
the hopes of an emerging Black middle class when he
wrote:
The caste prejudice will in time die of itself sooner
than it could be killed by any special legislation.
Had it not been for the special legislation, the
whites of the South would have respected colored
men of distinction, also colored ladies and gentle-
men on travel, and treat ill-bred blacks as they did
and do ill-bred whites, but the Civil Rights Bill
took away all the superior virtues of colored peo-
ple and formed them into one class, and that the
lower class.
2 5 4
Simkens believed that "wealth and intelligence is
the key to the situation," and that whites would not dis-
criminate against those African Americans who "had
250. See Reform Republicans, supra note 161, at 59-60, 69-70; RE-
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 490-91. Liberal Republican fear
of demagogues reflects a recurring theme in republican theory.
The republican tradition had always held that ownership of pro-
ductive property was a prerequisite for the independence needed
by a virtuous citizen. The reason demagogues were such a danger
was that most citizens were not propertied and thus were not in-
dependent. When faced by a large population ofpropertyless citi-
zens, the believer in republicanism has two options: use an activist
state to redistribute property to the masses; or restrict full citizen-
ship to the few who have property. See Forty Acres and a Mule, supra
note 169. The radical impulse was to the former, liberals wanted
to do the latter.
251. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Equal Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Oct. 27, 1883 at 1.
255. Id. See also Arkansas Mansion, Dec. 8, 1883 at I (the Man-
sion quotes from a piece in Blackburn's Free South, edited by Col.
W.J. Blackburn (white), which effusively praises Frederick
Douglass. The editors then comment that this attitude "coming
from a white gentleman, to the manor born ... and reared in the
days of slavery . . . is conclusive evidence that wealth and intelli-
gence is the key to the situation; in this instance it is not money
alone, but intellect has called the special sentiment."); Opinions of
the Press and Leading Men of the Counhy, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 17,
1883 at I (exchange from Chattanooga Colored American) ("If
we would take up more time in the training and the educating of
plenty of money and put on the air of an intelligent gen-
tlemen." 2 55 Since the "annulling [of] the farcical civil
rights bill by the Supreme Court" would only put poor
blacks in the same situation as poor whites, and would
actually improve white attitudes toward wealthy blacks,
the decision would "not militate against the interest of
the colored people." 2 5
6
Simkens' attitude toward class legislation and so-
cial class meshed neatly with the elitism of liberal re-
formers. Simkens believed that the "looseness with
which the negro race practice class restrictions is one
great barrier to the association of the aristocratic classes
of the two races."12 57 Therefore, "if we ever hope to re-
ceive the just recognition from the white race, a higher
grade of moral and refined society must be formed
among us, and a line drawn barring out all that are not
possessed of the required qualifications.1 2 58 Just as lib-
erals believed in the rule of the "best men," Simkens
advised his fellow African Americans "to consider the
propriety of dividing [along class lines] in order that
[they] might eventually conquer!" 259
Although it is easy to look back on this expression
of elitism with disdain, perhaps the most astonishing,
and tragic, aspect of Simkens' approach is the extent to
which it underestimated the power of racism. The
liberal reformers and their conservative allies were will-
ing, even anxious, to reach out and embrace the men of
"quality" in the former slave-holding class. But
Simkens' hope that a member of the former slave race
would "find favor in the sight of his white fellow-citi-
zens" 260 by becoming a refined member of the middle
class was hopelessly optimistic. Racism would prevent
all but a few African Americans from approaching mid-
dle class economic status, and ensure that even those
who did acquire "wealth and intelligence" would still
not "find favor" in the eyes of white America. 26 1
our youth, the next decade will show a great change in our social
and civil circles; if we would devote more of our attention to the
acquisition of money and property by the next ten years it will not
be so much the railroads, hotels, etc., but it will be whoever has
the money and credit may take seats anywhere he pleases.").
256. Equal Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Oct. 27, 1883 at 1.
257. Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 3,
1883 at I (exchange from Peoples' Advisor). While this was an
exchange, and thus not written by Simkens himself, an editorial
comment published along with the piece says that the .lansion's
editor "fully concur[ed]" with the sentiments expressed in the Peo-
ples' Advisor.
258. Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 3,
1883 at 1 (exchange from Peoples' Advisor). The exchange con-
tinued in a vein which can be easily discerned despite its appar-
ently being typographically garbled: "The negro has no standard
society. The mingling and intermingling of all classes and individ-
uals, regardless of character, wealth or education, is taking largely
of the nature of civilized races, and destroy all elements of a ra-
tional and progressive people."
259. The Correct View of the Situation, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 24,
1883 at 1. Simkens seems incredibly optimistic about the pros-
pects for the future: "I have no fear for the future of the negro.
He will sweep forward with the advancing tide of humanity, and
shall yet find favor in the sight of his white fellow-citizens."
260. id.
261. See, e.g, What Shall We Do?, Peoples Advocate, Nov. 17, 1883
at 2 ("The white people of that Ithe South] did not care how intel-
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John D. Lewis agreed with Simkens that African
Americans would be better off without the Sumner Act
because "this class of legislation only held a whip over
respectable citizens, which made them more combative
against a remedy thus sought."'26 2 But the opposition
of "conservative" African Americans like Lewis and
Simkens to federal civil rights laws did not necessarily
mean that they had abandoned a commitment to equal-
ity under law. African American opponents of the Sum-
ner Act stressed that the Supreme Court's decisions did
not upset the fundamental fact of African American citi-
zenship, and the right to equal laws which went along
with that citizenship.2 63 It just meant that African
Americans would have to rely on state courts for protec-
tion of their rights.
John D. Lewis, for example, had a strategy that
would rely on more than just the hope that white racism
would be tempered by the economic advancement of a
Black middle class. Lewis would answer any "abridge-
ment of a colored citizen's civil rights" by bringing an
"action in our common law courts." 2 64 Lewis shared
the belief, routine among writers in the Black press, that
the rights of access to "hotels, cars, theatres, etc.," 2 65
which the Sumner Act had protected, were common law
rights and therefore should be guaranteed to all citizens
in state court. 266 Lewis explained:
Common carriers, inn-keepers, etc., are licensed
insurers of the citizens' rights, and cannot legally
discriminate on the basis of color. I would advise
in every such case a civil suit in the common law
court for damages .... and even though I were not
successful . . . by the time I carried the aggressor
through the Supreme Court, he, no doubt, would
conclude that it would have been cheaper for him
to receive decent colored persons on the same ba-
sis of all other citizens. 26 7
In order to insure that African Americans could afford
such litigation, Lewis urged the creation of a legal de-
fense fund for that purpose. 268
Criticisms of class legislation in the African Ameri-
can press were not based solely in liberal ideology, nor
did they all extol the virtues of social Darwinism. Writ-
ers in the Black press also grounded their critique in ra-
cial pride, anti-slavery legal theory, and memory of the
repressive and stigmatizing role played by special legis-
lation before the war.
In the awful days of slavery, the infamous Justice
Taney had used the fact that even free African Ameri-
cans "were governed by special legislation directed ex-
pressly to them," as evidence that they were "marked
and stigmatized," and therefore could not have been
considered to be citizens of the United States. 269 Simi-
ligent, how thrifty, how moral a colored man was, they placed him
below the position of the poorest and meanest white.).
262. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2.
263. See, e.g., Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press and Leading Men of the
Countr,, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883 at I ("Ex-Gov. P.B.S.
Pinchback ... holds that with or without the civil rights bill ... the
civil rights of all citizens are defined by the common law. If he was
denied any privilege belonging to him as a citizen of Louisiana on
account of his color he has a right to seek redress in the courts of
the state."); Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883 at I (letter to editor
from I.B. Atkinson) ("We need no special legislation to enforce
our civil rights; we must enforce them just as every other citizen of
the United States does .... ); A Civil Rights Inquiry, Arkansas Man-
sion, Nov. 17, 1883 at 1 (by "A Plebian") ("Are the rights of the
colored citizens of Arkansas not already secured by law? Let us
see." The author then describes Articles of the State Constitution
which guarantee equality before the law, and suggests that
colored people can enjoy all their rights if the "club their means
and employ good counsel.").
264. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2. Lewis's call for common law litigation
was more than a mere polemical device. He brought such cases.
As Lewis explained in the Christian Recorder, even
[iun the absence of the [Civil Rights Cases] decision, had I
cause of action for any abridgement of a colored citizen's
civil rights, I would have brought that action in our com-
mon law courts, as I did in the case of Brown vs. the Union
Railroad Company, and as was done in the case of Chew vs.
the Arch Street Theatre, and not under the Civil Rights Bill.
Conservative t'iews, supra.
Some of Lewis's optimism about the prospect of continuing
victories in common law courts may be due to indications in Phila-
delphia that the white community would be reasonable about Afri-
can American claims to equal treatment. Soon after the Civil
Rights Cases, Philadelphia's largest white newspaper opined that
"progressive public opinion" would no longer support exclusion
of African Americans from public spaces. In 1887, Pennsylvania
passed a state law which guaranteed the rights which had been
secured by the Sumner Act. However, Pennsylvania's civil rights
law placed a $100 cap on damages that could be recovered, mak-
ing it harder and riskier to pursue litigation. Lawyers who fol-
lowed Lewis in the 1890s had a very difficult time winning civil
rights cases, and such cases were soon an insignificant part of their
work. WILLIAM DORSEY'S PHILADELPHIA, supra note 36, at 171.
265. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2.
266. See infra notes 280-283 and accompanying text.
267. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2. Lewis's position makes it clear that Af-
rican American opponents of the Sumner Act did not necessarily
disapprove of the rights that it protected. They just thought those
rights should be protected by ordinary common law rules in state
courts rather than by "special legislation" from the federal
government.
268. Id. When Lewis died in 1891, he left money for the creation
of such a legal defense fund. WILLIAM DORSEY'S PHILADELPHIA,
supra note 36, at 171. Lewis's legal and non-legal strategies for
African American advancement seem to be more collective and
show more cross-class solidarity than those of Simkens. Contrast
the tone of Lewis's comments in the Christian Recorder, supra:
The colored people will sooner secure their civil
rights by relying upon their own resources in common with
all other citizens. Let them individually and unitedly edu-
cate themselves to a higher standard of respect, industry,
integrity and confidence in each other. Then, if civil rights,
or any other right which belongs to the citizen, be denied
them, they should raise a residuary fund for the purpose of
diligently defending themselves against any such
aggression.
with those of Simkens and his supporters in the Arkansas Man-
sion. Lewis was concerned about class and color divisions within
the African American community. In 1879, shortly before the Na-
tional Colored Convention in Nashville, Lewis suggested that the
issue of "caste within the race" should be a topic for discussion.
WILLIAM DORSEY'S PHILADELPHIA, supra, at 168, 277.
269. Taney surveyed statutes placing special restrictions on Afri-
can Americans, then went on to say that these laws show:
that this class of persons were governed by special legisla-
tion directed expressly to them, and always connected with
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larly, a correspondent with the Christian Recorder argued
that by singling out African Americans for "special
treatment," the Sumner Act had "virtually recorded that
the colored man is the inferior of all other citizens." 270
Therefore, by striking down the Sumner Act, the
Supreme Court had "paid a compliment to the colored
citizens," 2 7 by removing from them the stigma of being
subject to special legislation. As long as civil rights laws
were in place, African Americans "were held by the laws
of the United States as a parent does his child." 2 72 Now
that the Sumner Act was struck down, the African Amer-
ican citizen had "become[] a full grown man," who
could enforce his civil rights by the same means "as
every other citizen of the United States."'2 73
In the same way that some African Americans'
memory of the stigmatizing, oppressive role played by
antebellum anti-Black class legislation colored their
view of post-war civil rights laws, memories of the con-
stitutional ideas of anti-slavery legal theory274 also pro-
voked African American opposition to the Sumner Act.
Soon after the Sumner Act was struck down, a resolu-
tion asking Congress for new legislation to replace the
Act was introduced to a convention of African American
provisions for the government of slaves, and not with those
for the government of free white citizens. And after such an
uniform course of legislation as we have stated, by the colo-
nies, by the States, and by Congress, running through a pe-
riod of more than a century, it would seem that to call
persons thus marked and stigmatized, "citizens" of the
United States, "fellow citizens," a constituent part of the
sovereignty, would be an abuse of terms, and not calculated
to exalt the character of an American citizen in the eyes of
other nations.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 421 (1857).
270. Conservative Views of a Colored Lawyer of This City, Christian Re-
corder, Nov. 1, 1883 at 2.
271. Id.
272. Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883 at I (letter to editor from
I.B. Atkinson). Atkinson wrote to the Mansion in order to "ex-
press my entire approval of your course and position in the mat-
ter" of the Civil Rights Cases and civil rights law. The author
quoted (with approval) at length from the Mansion's editorial of
October 27, Equal Rights. Regarding an interview with Bishop
Turner, Turner on the Civil Rights, also published in the Mansion on
October 27, Atkinson said:
With all due respect to the learned and honored
Bishop, to say the least of his views on the decision ....
they are retrogressive. When we were enfranchised and
made full citizens of the United States, the ballot, which is
the instrument by which every citizen directly or indirectly
enforces his rights, were placed in our hands, this endowed
us with all the rights of any other class of citizens. But our
citizenship was peculiar to all other citizens, for the reason
that we had just emerged from slavery and had neither land,
money nor education. Yet we were made citizens, which we
were justly entitled to after serving the United States more
than two hundred years as slaves, and when made citizens
we were held by the laws of the United States as a parent
does his child, when he becomes a full grown man his father
gives him his share of property and says to him act for your-
self as other men for you are a free man. This is exactly
what the judges of the United States says to us. Then why
should a man like Bishop H.M. Turner attempt to excite
and throw a shadow of retrogradism on his people over a
thing that is no good to us and never has been. We need no
special legislation to enforce our civil rights; we must en-
men meeting in Hartford, Connecticut. One delegate to
the convention objected that
it seemed strange to him to be asking of the legis-
lature protection in his civil rights, as he was a citi-
zen of the country, born as was his father here
beneath the flag. Being a citizen, he thought he
was secured in the rights of citizenship. He quoted
the Declaration of Independence, and said the
rights set forth therein were honestly set forth and
for many years honored. He felt that it was a deg-
radation to ask for protection in rights which no
one had the right to deprive him of, and in keeping
with this feeling he voted "No!" [on the resolution
asking for new legislation.]2 75
Thus, at least some African American opposition to the
Sumner Act was based on an attachment to the anti-slav-
ery legal theories that held all of Reconstruction to be
declarative of existing rights.
2 76
B. THE NEGRO Is A CITIZEN AND MUST BE
PROTECTED
2 7 7
While a few writers greeted the death of the Sum-
force them just as every other citizen of the United States
does, and I will attempt to show the way for enforcing them
by a brief reference to some of your points given above.
Atkinson then recited Simkens' points of October 27 about educa-
tion, wealth intelligence, etc., see Equal Rights, supra, and con-
cluded: "If we will only carry out these wise propositions and use
our ballots discreetly, we will eventually have all we are entitled to
in the way of equal rights."
273. Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883 at I (letter to editor from
I.B. Atkinson).
274. See supra sources cited in note 27.
275. The Hartford Convention: Colored Citizens of Connecticut Discussing
the Civil Rights Question and Other Important Topics, New York Globe,
Jan. 5, 1884 at 1.
276. The editor of the Arkansas Mansion attacked Justice
Harlan's Civil Rights Cases dissent on grounds that indicate an at-
tachment to anti-slavery legal theory. Part of Harlan's dissent had
used the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts as a basis for
arguing that Congress had power to reach private actors even
under the antebellum Constitution. 109 U.S. at 50-53 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Mansion attacked Harlan's position with a vehe-
mence which helps explain why its editor disapproved of the Sum-
ner Act:
He [Harlan] has his pick and axe digging at the roots
of the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments . . . and colored
men applaud him. ...
He holds that the intention of the 13th, 14th and 15th
amendments are failures. That the fugitive slave law of
1793 and 1850 is constitutional, hence the civil rights bill
. . . is constitutional, i.e. that Congress has the constitu-
tional right to primarily legislate to grant or take away the
liberty of its citizens. With him the Dred Scott decision, Fu-
gitive Slave Law and the Civil Rights Bill, are in accord with
the Constitution, and black men applaud him, but the writer
is one of those that says, "Give us liberty or death."
Our Opinion of Justice Harlan's 'iews, Arkansas Mansion, Dec. 1,
1883 at 1.
277. See Our Exchanges, Christian Recorder, Nov. 15. 1883 at 2
(exchange from Chicago Conservator) ("Friends of humanity
must show themselves now. Patriotic hearts must proclaim their
loyalty. The Nation must speak. The negro is a citizen and must
be protected, or else the amendments are void and national power
a myth").
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ner Act as a blow against class legislation, a victory for a
new laissez-faire social order in which "wealth and intel-
ligence" would be the key to success, or as the removal
of the last reminder of stigmatizing "special" treatment,
most writers were dismayed by the decisions. Many of
those who attacked the Court's reasoning felt compelled
to address the issues of class legislation and laissez-faire
which had been raised obliquely by the Court and more
directly by their fellow African Americans and other Re-
publican opponents of class legislation.
The African American response to those who be-
lieved that the Sumner Act had improperly made Afri-
can American citizens the special favorite of the laws
was twofold. Some writers denied that the Sumner Act
was class legislation at all. Other writers acknowledged
that the Sumner Act was "especially for the negro," but
justified such legislation as a necessary part of any real
commitment to African American freedom.
1. The same rights as are enjoyed by other people
Some writers in the African American press had a
simple answer to critics who used class legislation argu-
ments to attack civil rights laws: such enactments were
not class legislation in the first place. The usual under-
standing of class legislation was that it was legislation
especially for the benefit of one group of people, at the
expense of another group. African American writers de-
nied that this was a feature of civil rights laws. Civil
rights laws did not secure special privileges to Blacks.
Instead, they secured rights to African Americans which
were already held by whites. Reconstruction and civil
rights laws also made possible, for the first time since
the nation's founding, the achievement of real freedom
for citizens of all races.
Some writers objected to the classification of the
Sumner Act as class legislation by pointing out, "The
plain intent and meaning of the Civil Rights Law, was to
secure to the colored people, the same rights as are en-
joyed by other people. That, and nothing more." 2 78
Since the Act gave no benefit to Blacks that was not al-
ready enjoyed by whites, it could not be classified as leg-
islation especially for the negro.2 79
To support the argument that the Sumner Act se-
cured no special privileges to African Americans, many
writers argued that the rights protected by the Act were
simply common law rights. As John Mercer Lang-
ston 280 explained, the Sumner Act "seems to be simply
a declaratory statute explanatory of existing rights. It
does not create our rights; it simply defines and explains
them. What rights does it explain? The simplest com-
mon law rights of which we have any knowledge
"281
These common law rights should be guaranteed to
all citizens, as part of their citizenship. "The means of
enforcing these rights . . . always existed through the
various channels of the state courts," and white citizens
could use the state courts to vindicate their common law
rights.2 82 However, "the laxity of [the state] courts in
several states" when it came to enforcing the rights of
Black citizens "brought about the enactment of the
[Sumner] civil rights bill." 2 83 Since the purpose of
Sumner's Act was simply to give African American citi-
zens the same access to common law rights already pos-
sessed by white citizens, it was absurd to claim that the
legislation gave special benefits to African Americans.
Another reason that civil rights laws could not
properly be classified as class legislation was that the
achievements of Reconstruction had benefitted all citi-
zens, not just African Americans. Before the war, when
slavery corrupted the Constitution, "there was not a
man in the country, however white, as no one black, who
was in the position of his full share of civil, religious and
278. The Civil Rights Bill Declared Unconstitutional: Opinions of Some
of Our Colored Exchanges, Petersburg Lancet, Oct. 27, 1883 (ex-
change from Louisville Bulletin).
279. This argument was made forcefully by Justice Harlan in his
dissent. See 109 U.S. at 61-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
280. John Mercer Langston was one of the preeminent African
American leaders of the nineteenth century. See WILLIAM CHEEK
& AIMEE LEE CHEEK, JOHN MERCER LANGSTON AND THE FIGHT FOR
BLACK FREEDOM, 1829-65 (1989); William Cheek & Aimee Lee
Cheek,John Aercer Langston: Principle and Politics, in BLACK LEADERS
OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, supra note 44, at 103-126; JOHN
MERCER LANGSTON, FROM THE VIRGINIA PLANTATION TO THE NA-
TIONAL CAPITOL (1894). Langston, at the request of Charles Sum-
ner, drafted the bill which was eventually to become the Sumner
Civil Rights Act. BLACK LEADERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,
supra, at 121).
281. The Civil Rights Law, New York Globe, Oct. 27, 1883 (speech
byJohn Mercer Langston, given at a meeting at the First Congre-
gationalist Church in Washington D.C. on October 19). See also,
Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 3, 1883 at
I (exchange from Cincinnati Afro-American) (Sumner Act was
"meant to enforce" the common law); The Civil Rights Bill Declared
I nconstitutional: Opinions of Some of Our Colored Exchanges, Petersburg
L.ancet, Oct. 27, 1883 (same); Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press and
Leading .1en of the Country, Arkansas Mansion, Nov. 10, 1883 at I
("Ex-Gov. P.B.S. Pinchback... holds that with or without the civil
rights bill ... the civil rights of all citizens are defined by the com-
mon law.").
The idea that the rights enumerated in the Sumner Act
were guaranteed by state common law was referred to by Justice
Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases. Bradley prefaced his imposition
of the state action requirement with the claim that "Innkeepers
and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are
aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper
accomodations to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith
apply for them." 109 U.S. at 25. Justice Goldberg, writing in
1964, also argued that common law rights at the time of the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment included the right of nondis-
criminatory access to public accommodations. See Bell v. .1Iarland,
378 U.S. 226, 296-302 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing
that state enforcement of facially neutral trespass law against
Black sit-in demonstrators violated Fourteenth Amendment).
One modern commentator has argued that the common law tradi-
tion's protection against discrimination was relatively limited. It
may be that "whatever law did exist applied solely to common car-
riers, enterprises traditionally subject to stringent common-law
regulation." Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw.
U.L. REV. 503, 516 (1985). Whatever the historical record may
show, writers in the Black press inevitably spoke of the common
law tradition as color-blind, although they certainly recognized
that the law that was actually pronounced in courts was anything
but.
282. Address to the Colored People of Louisville, Arkansas Mansion,
Oct. 27, 1883 at 1.
283. Id.
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political liberty."28 4 The destruction of slavery and the
establishment of equality under the law "emancipated
the white men of the country and the black alike."1
285
The amendments and civil rights acts had aimed to es-
tablish a nation of universal freedom, in which all citizens
were protected by the federal government in their fun-
damental rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness."2 8' Speaking specifically of the Sumner Act,
one correspondent wrote to the New York Globe:
The Civil Rights bill was not worded . . . so as to
specially protect the Negro, but to guarantee civil
treatment to every honest man who had sufficient
respect for and confidence in [the] purity and sta-
bility of our Government to become a citizen of it.
A Civil Rights bill hurts no one, protects all and is
only odious to those who make laws for the protec-
tion of respectable persons a necessity. 28 7
2. We object to being put on a level with them
Given the antebellum association of class legisla-
tion with slavery and the fact that civil rights laws could
be justified without arguing for class legislation, it is re-
284. The Civil Rights Law, New York Globe, Oct. 27, 1883 (speech
by John Mercer Langston, given at a meeting at the First Congre-
gationalist Church in Washington D.C. on October 19).
285. Id. Compare Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 123 (Bradley,
J.dissenting) ("The mischief to be remedied [by the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments] was not merely slavery . . . [but also] intoler-
ence of free speech and free discussion."); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 364-65 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting) (importance of pro-
tecting Northerners and Unionists in the South).
286. I speak here of the aim of the Reconstruction amendments
as perceived by writers in the Black press. Of course, the Supreme
Court rejected this nationalist interpretation of Reconstruction in
Slaughter-House and the other "dreadful decade" cases. See supra
Section II. However, most writers in the Black press continued to
claim that the nation had a duty to protect its citizens' fundamen-
tal rights to life liberty and the pursuit of happiness. See, e.g., Civil
Rights Laws, New York Globe, Feb. 3, 1883 at 2 ("I f, according to
the decisions of the supreme court, the United States has the
power to protect citizens in the enjoyment of that 'life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness,' which it unblushingly guarantees, we
fail to see it. The United States is a complex fraction, any one of
whose parts is vastly more unified and potential than the whole.
The United States is simply a tub without any bottom, and we
hold it in supreme contempt, because it holds nothing it claims to
hold. Again we say it, there is no law in the United States for the
Negro. He is an alien in his native land."); Is There Any Law for the
Negro?, New York Globe, February 17, 1883 ("We maintain that
governments are maintained for the protection of life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness of its members .... [A]t no time since
the close of the war have we enjoyed that immunity of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness which are guaranteed to us."); The
Civil Rights Decision, New York Globe, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2, reprinted
in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 167-68 ("It was
only a few months ago that the Supreme Court declared that the
Ku Klux law was unconstitutional - that the United States was
powerless to protect its citizens in the enjoyment of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. . . . [W]e are declared to be created
equal, and entitled to certain rights, among them life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness, but there is no law to protect us in the
enjoyment of them."); Civil Rights Decision, Huntsville Gazette,
Oct. 20, 1883 (comments of Frederick Douglass) (Civil Rights Cases
opinion is "contrary to the Declaration of Independence").
A full discussion of the rights which African Americans be-
markable that some writers in the black press did face
the issue head on and present arguments in favor of
"legislation especially for the negro." These arguments
were marked by a rejection of the formalism of liber-
alism and an intense appreciation of the unique histori-
cal experience of African Americans.
One of the most striking things about laissez-faire/
liberal ideology is its formalism, often manifested in its
blindness to power differentials. It is this formalism
which allows the category "class legislation" to exist and
to contain examples which seem wildly divergent. A
minimum wage law, designed to protect a worker who
owns nothing but her ability to labor, falls into the same
category as a grant of monopoly designed to protect a
manufacturer who owns everything else. A progressive
income tax, or a civil rights law, or an eight hour day
law, all fall into the same category as a slave code, and
all are to be condemned. This formalism treats legisla-
tion designed to bring some justice to the victims of
hundreds of years of slavery as if it were a handout to
bank owners. In the formalistic world of liberal jurists,
class legislation is class legislation, no matter which
group benefits and which pays the cost.
2 8 8
Some writers in the African American press re-
lieved Reconstruction put under the protection of the federal gov-
ernment is beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the rights
which were identified by African American writers included: the
right to be free from violence, the right to marry the person of
one's choice, free speech, free exercise of religion, and the right
to be subject to the common law. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Decision,
New York Globe, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2 (violence); The Southern Prob-
lem, New York Globe, March 3, 1883 (marriage & religion); Civil
Rights Laws, New York Globe, Feb. 3, 1883 at 2 (marriage); States
Rights Heresy, New York Globe, March 10, 1883 (speech); Mobile:
The Civil Rights Decision, Huntsville Gazette, Nov. 3, 1883 (incor-
rectly dated Oct. 27 on inner pages) (common law); The Civil
Rights Law, New York Globe, Oct. 27, 1883 (John Mercer Lang-
ston at First Congregationalist Church) (common law). For a
strong argument that the framers of the Reconstruction amend-
ments meant to bring a broad range of rights, including at least
the Bill of Rights, under federal protection, see No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE, supra note 24. For a recent refinement of the "total in-
corporation" theory, see The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, supra note 25.
287. Another View of the Decision, New York Globe, November 3,
1883 (letter from George B. Vashon, St. Louis, Missouri). The
Cleveland Gazette identified two specific groups which would loose
out, in north and south, in the absence of the Sumner Act:
It is claimed that it will have little or no effect here in the
North .... No one need be foolish enough to believe any
such thing. That decision will close hundreds of hotels,
places of amusement and other public places here in the
North to our people. Not only the Negro race will have to
suffer because of this decision, but doors, aye! hundreds of
them, will be closed to the Jew and Catholic.
Civil Rights Decision: Declared Unconstitutional By the Supreme Court,
Cleveland Gazette, Oct. 20, 1883 at 2 (emphasis in original).
288. See Laissez-Faire and Liberty, supra note 147, at 313, 319-20.
Recent Supreme Court Justices have made statements about the
Reconstruction amendments which are reminiscent of this formal-
istic vision of class legislation. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 211 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is only one Equal Pro-
tection Clause."); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("The guarantee of equal pro-
tection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. lfboth
are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."). A
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jected this formalistic approach to law and social rela-
tions, arid recognized the racial dynamics of power in
post-War America. Justice Bradley defended his deci-
sion to end African Americans' status as "special favor-
ite of the laws" on the grounds that they could still
secure their rights by the same means as other citizens.
As we have seen, some African Americans believed
Bradley was right, and urged their fellow Black citizens
to rely on state law, just as whites would. 28 9 But the edi-
tors of the Christian Recorder had the following message
to give to "that class of our friends who accept" the Civil
Rights Cases decision because "it simply leaves us where
the white men of the country are left; neither better nor
worse."
2 90
We, of course, object to this on the ground that as
yet things are not even. We are not as educated as
white men; we are not as rich; we are not as strong
in character; we are not as numerous; and alto-
gether we are not as well prepared to protect our-
selves. Therefore, we object to being put on a
level with them. 29 1
The editors of the Recorder knew that formal equality on
a non-level playing field is not equality at all. As Justice
Blackmun has explained, "In order to get beyond ra-
cism, we must first take account of race. . . . And in
order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently." 29 2
Some African American opponents of early civil
rights laws, like modern opponents of affirmative action,
objected to any claim that special protection was needed
on the grounds that such claims were stigmatizing. For
African American supporters of civil rights laws, how-
ever, the need for special protection arose from power
imbalances which could be recognized without shame or
stigma because they were so obviously a product of his-
tory rather than a failing of African American character.
It was a history so awfully filled with racist oppression
that it was not at all surprising that African Americans
were "not on a level" with white citizens. This recogni-
tion of the history and continuing effects of racial op-
pression broke the formal symmetry of the liberal
attitude toward class legislation and formed the basis for
African American arguments in favor of "legislation es-
pecially for the negro.' 1' 3
The importance of historical memory for the defi-
nition and defense of class legislation can be clearly il-
lustrated in the context of early Republican plans for
redistribution of rebel lands to the former slaves who
had worked them. 294 To opponents of the redistribu-
tion policy it was naked class legislation of the worst
kind: the property of one group of people was to be for-
cibly expropriated by the government and handed over
to another group. However, from the viewpoint of Afri-
can Americans in the former slave states land redistribu-
tion could hardly be called confiscation at all. Through
the prism of African American history it looked much
more like the "land which they had watered with their
tears, enriched with their blood, tilled with their hard
hands,"'29 5 was payment long overdue for hundreds of
years of forced and uncompensated servitude.
African American "carpetbagger" William Whip-
per 2 96 reminded liberal opponents of "special treat-
ment" for African Americans that "[t]he white race have
had the benefit of class legislation ever since the found-
ing of our government. '29 7 But now white Americans,
after hundreds of years of benefiting from special treat-
ment at the expense of African Americans;
[a]fter having stolen from us the worth of two hun-
dred years hard labor; after having bound us in
chains and fetters, mentally as well as physically;
after having surrounded us with the most demoral-
izing social evils; after having received our protec-
tion and devotion while they were completely at
our mercy, during the late civil war, they now re-
ward us by ignoring every claim we have upon citi-
zenship, every tie that should bind together the
members of a body politic, and withhold from us
all sympathy and all encouragement. 298
White America's cries of foul against "legislation espe-
cially for the negro" seemed hollow in the wake of this
history, even when they came from people who had
been friends of the anti-slavery movement.
Hundreds of years of slavery and racial oppression
had produced a massive transfer of wealth from African
similar attachment to an abstract category called "racial classifica-
tion" has haunted the Court's doctrinal analysis of modern affirm-
ative action programs. See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond:
Affirmalive Action and the Elusive 11eaning of Constitutional Equality, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1989).
289. See supra Section VI.A.
290. Amen-an Industiy: Civil Rights, Christian Recorder, Dec. 13,
1883 at 2.
291. Id. The conflict between this view and that of anti-class leg-
islation writers was made explicit nine days later by Henry
Simkens of the Arkansas Vansion. After quoting the above para-
graph, Simkens commented: "All who accept the foregoing para-
graph wears a badge of inferiority ..... Civil Rights, Arkansas
Mansion, Dec. 22, 1883 at I.
292. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407
(1978) (opinion of BlackmunJ.).
293. Compare RECONSTRUCTION, snpra note 50, at 507 (When Afri-
can Americans heard liberal "reformers' clamor against 'class leg-
islation' and admonitions to the freedmen to 'work out their own
destiny,' they discerned a refusal to acknowledge blacks' unique
historical experience, and a cruel indifference to their fate.").
294. See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying text.
295. The Twentieth Anniversary of Lincoln's Proclamation of Emancipa-
tion, Washington Bee, Jan. 6, 1883 at 1-2 (speech of Frederick
Douglass).
296. The term "carpetbagger," although originally intended by
white southerners to be an insult, has now become "so unavoida-
ble a part of the lexicon of Reconstruction" that it has lost its
perjoritive implications. RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 295
n.28. See id. at 137-38, 294-97. For information about William
Whipper, see THOMAS HOLT, BLACK OVER WHITE: NEGRO PoLIT-
ICAL LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION
(1977).
297. New National Era, Dec. 12, 1872, reprinted in THE BLACK
PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 156-57.
298. To Your Tents, 0 Israel!!, Peoples Advocate, Nov. 10, 1883 at
2.
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Americans to white Americans, convincing most African
Americans that they needed special protection from
white domination. Frederick Douglass described the sit-
uation to a gathering celebrating the twentieth anniver-
sary of the Emancipation Proclamation:
No people ever entered the portals of freedom
under circumstances more unpropitious than the
American freedmen. They were thrown overboard
in an unknown sea in the midst of a storm without
planks, ropes, oars or life preservers and told they
must swim or perish. They were without money,
without friends, without shelter and without bread.
The land which they had watered with their
tears, enriched with their blood, tilled with their
hard hands, was owned by their enemies. They
were told to leave their old quarters and seek food
and shelter elsewhere. 29 9
As Frederick Douglass exclaimed, the true "marvel" of
the African American condition was not that they were
in need of federal protection and special legislation, it
was that African Americans were "not extermi-
nated."o300
It is remarkable, and a testament to the power of
liberal ideology, that whites who derided civil rights
laws as class legislation, many of whom had been advo-
cates of anti-slavery, could ignore the concrete reality of
history in favor of the abstract appeal of laissez-faire and
"neutral" legislation. But this failure of memory and
imagination was more than just a product of liberal ide-
ology. It was also a self-conscious part of the liberal
political project. By disavowing civil rights legislation,
and thus suppressing African American political activity
in the South, liberal reformers hoped to divert the na-
tion's attention from the moral issues of race and justice
which had brought radicals into power, and consolidate
their own grip on politics. The formalism and ahistori-
cism of liberal laissez-faire legal theory provided the
perfect tool for this exercise in forgetting, while racism
insured that the victims would be unworthy of concern
to most white Americans.3 0 '
To the victims themselves, the history of racism in
America was too painful, and its effects too longlasting,
to ignore. Frederick Douglass explained the importance
of memory to African Americans in a powerful attack on
those who would forget:
[T]he nation may forget; it may shut its eyes to the
past and frown upon any who may do otherwise,
but the colored people of this country are bound
to keep a fresh memory of the past till justice shall
be done by them in the present. When this shall
be done we shall as readily as any other part of our
respected citizens plead for an act of oblivion.
30 2
Unfortunately, no matter how "fresh [the] memory of
the past" was kept in the minds of African Americans, it
could not be saved from the Supreme Court's "act of
oblivion."
Writers in the Black press were well aware that
white America was shutting its eyes to the effects of two
and a half centuries of slavery. African Americans rec-
ognized that over the course of the previous decade, the
country had seen "the ebb of public sentiment on the
rights of the new citizen and the shifting of the main
political issues which divide National parties from those
questions growing out of the reconstruction period to
those mainly economical in their nature." 30 3 Even
those whites who had formerly seemed to be friends,
and who had actively participated in the struggle to end
slavery, were abandoning the cause of African Ameri-
cans, and leaving them to the laws of nature.3 0 4
With white America's act of oblivion in mind, the
Christian Recorder presented an argument in favor of fed-
eral civil rights laws which used an analogy that the Re-
corder hoped might appeal to the former "friends" who
had deserted them:
We wonder if it has ever occurred to these
friends of ours that the plea we make [for-civil
rights laws] is precisely the plea which American
industry makes when it is proposed to take away its
Civil Rights bill, in the shape of the Tariff, for what
is Tariff but a protection to a class who confess
themselves not to be as strong as another class?
As we see, then, the cases, if not precisely, are
largely similar. In their competition with white
men, colored men, by reason of their immaturity,
ask Congress to throw around them the arms of
protection in the shape of a Civil Rights law, which
it does. But the Supreme Court says Congress
shall not do it; and the class of friends alluded to
above say "Amen," supplementing it with the
statement, "you are just where white men are;
don't fret or ask for more." In their competition
with foreign industries, American industry, just
like the colored man, by reason of immaturity, asks
299. The Twentieth Anniversay
, 
of Lincoln's Proclamation of Eniancipa-
tion, Washington Bee, Jan. 6, 1883 at 1-2 (speech of Frederick
Douglass). See also Civil Rights, Peoples Advocate, Oct. 27, 1883 at
I (by "Le Duke," a regular columnist) ("We are now left in the
desert unarmed to reason, unarmed, with a wolf, to battle un-
shielded with the elements - the snow of scorn and the whirlwind
of prejudice.").
300. The Twentieth Anniversary of Lincoln's Proclamation of Emancipa-
tion, Washington Bee, Jan. 6, 1883 at 1-2 (speech of Frederick
Douglass).
301. According to Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, the dis-
tinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" victims plays an im-
portant role in "manufacturing consent" for United States foreign
policy today. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 37-142 (1988).
302. Washington National Republican, April 17, 1888, reprinted
in VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 45, at 520-536 (speech by
Frederick Douglass on April 16, 1888 in Washington, D.C., at a
celebration of the twenty-sixth anniversary of emancipation in the
District. Douglass had just returned from a tour of the south,
where he had been shocked by the conditions of the ex-slaves
there. He denounced the low pay, the "truck" system, and land-
lord-tenant laws.).
303. The Civil Rights Decision, Peoples Advocate, Oct. 20, 1883.
304. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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Congress to throw around it the arm of its protec-
tion in the shape of strong Tariff laws, which is
done; and the Supreme Court says, "Amen, it is all
right." And our friends say, "Amen," too.
We colored men are of the opinion that if it is
sufficient for us to be on the same platform with
the white man, no better and no worse, American
industry ought to be satisfied if it can be on the
same platform with the industries of the world. ....
Our only objection to the Bradley opinion is that it
leaves the weak at the mercy of the strong. And is
not that the objection which the industry of our
country makes when you talk to it of free trade?
One and the same principle is involved, and it is
impossible with any show of equity to grant the
wishes of one and deny the wishes of the other. If
the nation must protect its weak industries it surely
ought to protect its weak men. The principle that
abolishes Civil Rights will bring a Free Trade.30 5
The Christian Recorder's comparison of civil rights
laws to protective tariffs served two purposes. By ap-
pealing to the self-interest of the industrialists who were
coming to dominance in the Republican party, the Re-
corder hoped to awaken support for civil rights among
those who were oblivious to the plight of African Ameri-
cans. At the same time, the analogy served to remove
any hint of stigma from the beneficiaries of civil rights
laws. If the captains of industry were not stigmatized
and humiliated by protective tariffs, why should African
Americans, who had so much more reason to need pro-
tection, be stigmatized by federal protection of their
civil rights?30 6
While the editors of the Christian Recorder used an
analogy to build support for civil rights and defuse the
issue of stigmatization, William Whippper took a more
direct route, appealing openly to the experience of Afri-
can American history:
I want class legislation in favor of liberty, justice
and equality as a remedy for the evils of the past.
It was class legislation that has changed our whole
civil condition . . . . It was class legislation that
placed us outside of the Constitution, and it is
class legislation that must bring us back again.
Therefore, I am for class legislation wherever it is
needful, right, and in conformity with the princi-
ples ofjustice and humanity.3 0 7
Convinced by experience that "legislation espe-
cially for the negro" was needed, and freed by memory
from fear of being stigmatized by such legislation, writ-
ers in the African American press were able to argue for
federal civil rights laws without apology, even to the
point of embracing "class legislation." If the nation
truly devoted itself to eradicating the effects of slavery
and racism, there would indeed come a time when "the
scales are ... balanced." °30 8 At that point, there would
be no need or justification for African Americans to be
the special favorite of the laws. Until that time came,
some writers in the African American press demanded
that "legislation especially for the negro" be a part of
the nation's commitment to civil rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Reconstruction ground to a halt after 1877,
judges inspired by the possibilities of Justice Field's
Slaughter-House dissent began to graft laissez-faire princi-
ples into the Constitution through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Concerns about
federalism delayed the Supreme Court's adoption of
laissez-faire jurisprudence, but the Civil Rights Cases can
be seen as an early victory for laissez-faire, a victory
which came at the expense of the one group whose pro-
tection was declared by the Court to be a central pur-
pose of Reconstruction. The myth of laissez-faire, with
its autonomous individuals interacting upon terms of
free contract, would dominate the legal landscape of
economic regulation for the next six decades, until eco-
nomic crisis and the political mobilization of the New
Deal forced the Supreme Court to abandon it.3 0 9
305. American Industry: Civil Rights, Christian Recorder, Dec. 13,
1883 at 2. Compare Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business
Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1314-21 (1991) (parallels be-
tween modern debates over trade barriers and minority contractor
set-asides). The Arkansas Mansion responded to the Christian Re-
corder's editorial nine days later: "[A]ll the colored people need
now as a race, is protection as citizens at home, and what will pro-
tect our white brother commercially, from stronger powers with-
out, will also protect us; so we are for protection in every sense of
the word." Civil Rights, Arkansas Mansion, Dec. 22, 1883 at 1.
306. This argument also exhibits total disdain for liberal Repub-
lican legal theory and political economy by using an analogy to
protective tariffs to drive its point home. Liberal orthodoxy re-
jected tariffs as another objectionable example of class legislation.
Although this objection to trade barriers was an entrenched as-
pect of liberal political economy, Reform Republicans, supra note
161, at 57-58, 63-64; THE BEST MEN, supra note 160, at 172-82, it
never rose to the level of constitutional doctrine. John Sproat has
pointed out that "[a]lthough they used the term 'free trade' in ad-
vancing their tariff views, few liberal reformers were really free-
traders themselves. Rather, it was an ideal many of them clung to
long after they had abandoned it as a feasible alternative to pro-
tectionism." After 1872, " 'moderate protection' or 'judicious re-
form' replaced free trade as the goal of most orthodox liberals."
Id. at 177.
307. New National Era, Dec. 12, 1872, reprinted in THE BLACK
PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 156-57. Whipper's more direct
approach may be attributable in part to the fact that he was writing
in 1872, before it was clear that white America would try to forget
the injustices of the past. See aso New National Era, Nov. 23,
1872, reprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890, at 156 (William
Whipper) ("We have been oppressed as a class and we must rise
as such.").
308. New National Era, Aug. 28, 1873, reprinted in THE BLACK
PRESS, 1827-1890, at 157-58 ("As color, or race, supplemented by
injustice, has been the cause of exclusion, so let color, or race,
reasonable fitness conceded, be the ground of recognition until
the scales are once more balanced. . . . Cool is the suggestion
that the colored American, after enduring over two centuries of
wrong and exclusion from the results of his own efforts and sub-
mitting to every deprivation of just public benefaction refrain
from referring to his wrongs and his color (his identity) as at least
one of the bases for recognition.").
309. While the New Deal Supreme Court abandoned laissez-faire
in the field of economic regulation, in the sense that redistributive
legislation is no longer thought to be constitutionally forbidden, it
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Today, half a century after the death of laissez-
faire in the economic sphere, our courts have yet to
come to terms with the laissez-faire fictions of racial dy-
namics rejected by the dissenters in the black press.
has rejected an anti-capitalist republican interpretation of Recon-
struction, in which wealth redistribution would be constitutional
required. See, e.g., James v. 'altierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (classifica-
tiuns which disadvantage poor people are not subject to height-
ened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment).
310. See, e.g.. Jones v. Afed H. Maayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (42
U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits private discrimination in sale of real prop-
erty, and is constitutionally authorized by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment); Runyonl v. AlcCarV, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981
prohibits private discrimination in contracting, and is constitu-
tionally authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment); Heart of 41-
The modern Supreme Court has overcome many feder-
alism-based impediments to effective enforcement of
civil rights.3 10 The Court seemed for a time to escape
the type of formalistic analysis that is blind to the power
lanta Mlotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Title 11 of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reaches private discrimination in public accom-
modations, and is constitutional under the commerce clause); Grif-
fin v. Breckemidge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is
constitutional and reaches private racist conspiracies); South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding 1965 Voting
Rights Act); Domibrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (allowing
federal injunction of state criminal prosecution). But see. e.g..
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (197 1) (limiting Dombrowski); Pa//er-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989) (limiting
Runvon).
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beginning people began- to congregate in front
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thousand persons stood ready to enter,iand
within thirty minutes thereafter, seats were
at a premium. At eight o'clock, the time
for beginning, there was no standing room in
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others.
The trolowiag were among tho letters of
regret at their inability to hear Minister
Langston's lecture, read by Mr Lawson:
Justice J. M. Harlan, Attorney General Brew-
ster, District Attorney G. B. Corikhill. Post-
master General W. Q. Greshami, Assistant
Secretary of State John Andrew Wyli,, As-
THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW.
lfsi JoIY MERCER LANGSTON DE-
FINES CITIZENSIlIP AND
THrE JU" GHTS ATI'ACH-
ING TO IT.
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ship-What Parties are Created for
-The Duty of the People at this
Time.
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Independence standing before h
Articles of Confederation st4
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States standing before him, t)e
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in. t he face of all these .docu:
teach the equality of mansind.
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nuvrality, legod or otherwise, to
utterkhce was announced as th(
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But, leaving such decisions of
let us come to the opinions of o
General. We have had two re
torneys General in this country
the period of the slaie holdit g
Government. I refer to Mr Le
William jVirt. Under the form
tion was discussed as to whether
could as citizens preempt 6b1i(
the learned Attorney decided
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THE NE.' YORK GLOBE is pwblishd
S&zturday at No 4 Cedar street, by Geo
Parker, T. Thos .Fortune and Wm Walter
All business comtrn o.tions should be di-
roid to Goo Parker and 'mpany. Article
*tpnded for pubhcatio shotidd be addressed t
a eds.or. 2'. ThFortue.
Zntered at the post- in New York Oit,
as Becond-class Matter.-
NEW TORK, SATURDAT, OCTOBER go, 185
THE CIVIL RIGETS DECISION.
The odlored people of the United States
feel to-day as if thiy had been baptized in ioe
water. From Maine to Florida they-are ear,
nestly discussing the decision of the Supreme
Court declaring the Civil Rights law to be un-
constitutional. Public meetings are being
projected far and wide to give expression to
the commonlfeeling of disappointment and
ap rehenskon for the future.
The Republican party has carried the war
into Africa, and Africa is accordingly. stirred
b.its centre.
We need not at this time review the legal
aspects of the aw or the aecision. in times
past we -have done so.
It was only a few months ago that the Su-
preneCoart declared that the Ku Klux law
was unconstitutional-that the United States
was poWerless to protect its 4citizens in the en-
joyment of life, libert4' and the pursuit of
happint es. What sort of Government is that
'which openly derlarei it has no power to
.protect its citizens from ruffianism, Intimida-
tion and. murder! Is such a Gcvernment
worthy the respect and loyalty of honest
men? It certainly doe 'not enjoy our respect
and our loyalty to it is the cheapest posses-
sion we have.
Having declared that colored men have no
protection from the government in their polit-
COMING EVENTS.
The New Yo ft l .not hWag slwee,
markedthathe ecgre vote was tg "ti:
the am" antuinm ement in AmerIOPa
ties. This admissiop from the leading I
publican newspapet of the country v
wrung from it by utterances and acth
which could bear no other interpretaion ti
the one given. It is true, as it should
that our vote cam no longer be relied upon
a compliant element, always as$mti!
whether treated with becoming considernt
or not.
It becomes us at this time, standing as
do in the shadow of coming events wh
must bear fruits upon which we must feci
the years iismediately !to follow, wisely to
terrogate ourselves, and men and patties
to the rule by which we shall square our
ture actions.
The independence of the individual
choose from among the parties which bid
his suffrage the one giost in consonance v
his yiepi of what should constitute a cor
party is not denied. That the mass of
people bav ebeen, by reason of peculiar
cumstances,#taunch and unswervinguRep
cans Is not denied. Trhe right of the cit
to free thought, free speech and free ae
should'not be denied, since these embody
essence of the ideal member of a repte
five goernment.
The colored people of this country hav
right not peculiar and common to each
every other class of their fellow-citiens-
is, in law. The attempt of men and pa
to eirte for us a eonlition peculiar and r
nor common has canued all of the diasati
tion which Republican machine organs (
plain of among us. To our efforts- to v
it plain that our f rienp, as well as our-
mies, have used us to advance their selfu
terests must be ascribed such sentinrant
those spoken by the Times. In State
municipal election we have clearly shown
weirnow how to wield a manly, indepea
ballot. If it still be tnecessary to g" fi
'- . . . . , .... , m _ I Ill II | I
a
I II I I I - i 4mlim
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Legislation Especially For The Negro?
imbalances produced by the history of race in this coun-
try.3 1 1 But the modern Supreme Court seems to be
slipping back into formalism, failure of historical mem-
ory, and liberal assumptions of individualism, all of
which preclude the formulation of effective remedies for
racism." 12
Our courts and our political institutions continue
to espouse the liberal ideal of equality in the abstract.
However, by clinging to the belief that "color blind" re-
sponses to racism will remedy its effects, they underesti-
mate racism's power, persistence, and pervasiveness.
Such underestimation may have been understandable in
1883, when writers in the Black press had seen a change
from slavery to full (formal) citizenship in the course of
one generation. But there is no excuse for it now, after
the experience of the last century.
To those who fear that any non-color blind remedy
will stigmatize its beneficiaries, the Black press had a
simple answer one hundred years ago that remains com-
pelling today. Remember history. Race "has been the
cause of exclusion, so let [it] ... be the ground of recog-
nition until the scales are once more balanced."3 1 3
Only by following this command can we answer the ap-
peal made by the dissenters in the Black press over a
century ago, the "demand that our rights secured to us
by the Constitution be a reality, not the mere word."13 14
311. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967).
312. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) ("societal discrimination" inadequate predicate for race-
conscious remedies; same standard of review for all racial classifi-
cations); Wards Cove v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (plaintiff in Ti-
tle VII Suit must identify specific employment practice which led
to disparate impact; burden of proof remains on plaintiff); Mem-
phis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (construction of wall between
white and Black parts of town does not violate equal protection);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of inten-
tional discrimination under equal protection clause). For a de-
scription of how formalistic analysis which is insensitive to history
and social context can lead the courts back to decisions like Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1883), see James Forman, Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the
Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505
(1991). See also, Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317
(1987) (intent requirement ignores pervasive, unconscious nature
of American racism).
313. New National Era, Aug. 28, 1873, reprinted in THE BLACK
PRESS, 1827-1890, supra note 4, at 157-58.
314. Freedom in the United States a Mockery, Cleveland Gazette, Dec.
15, 1883 at I (call for a state convention of Black men, to be held
in Columbus, Ohio, on December 26, 1883).
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